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Burma was already a failed state when the military seized power in 1988 after 
brutally quashing the democracy movement. Yet, without improving the social and 
economic conditions, and despite a lack of capacity and legitimacy to govern, the 
military regime managed to survive and hold on to power until 2015. Arguably, it 
continues to enjoy veto powers beyond the transfer of authority in a fragmented 
country that has been beleaguered by ethnic conflicts and separatism even before 
independence. Thus, this dissertation asks how the regime maintained control in the 
Pa-O Self-Administered Zone during the period 1988–2015. The aim is to identify 
the social control mechanism through which power originating from the state could 
be asserted at the village level, where the resistance took place.  
Social control denotes the ability of the regime to penetrate and regulate society in 
order to fulfil the aims of extraction and appropriation. The mechanism entails the 
co-optation of local warlords at one end of the control spectrum and the suppression 
of local resistance at the other. Co-optation at the top level and suppression at the 
local level are not separate social control strategies; rather, they are linked by a 
political economy network that redraws the lines of patron-client relations. While the 
political economy and patron-client relations have been altered, at the heart of the 
social control mechanism is the village tract system, which was sidelined during the 
colonial era but was reinstated under the military regime. Crucially, the village tract 
leaders are at the centre of the social control machine, performing the functions of 
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  Chapter One:        
Nation-Building and the Question of Control 
 
The concept of the nation-state relates to the idea that a country needs to at least 
establish its territorial boundaries and create conditions under which the people who 
will become its citizens aspire to the common virtues within those territories. In 
contrast, a nation is simply a community of people who share a common identity, 
which may simply be based on a common language, ideology, shared memories, or 
what Anderson (1991) has termed an imagined community, but this sense of identity 
should be strong enough for them to defend the very idea of nationhood. However, in 
the decolonisation process after the Second World War, conceptions of both the 
nation-state and nation often collided, resulting in a state formation process that was 
marred with violence and civil wars. Ayoob (1995) calls this a Third World 
predicament because elites were moving too fast and too hard on the state-building 
project without realising that conditions in these new nation-states were drastically 
different from their European counterparts. The latter had over four hundred years to 
build their states. Therefore, any attempt to replicate the previous state formation 
experience would be doomed to failure.  
1.1 Burma and the Third World Security Predicament 
Burma’s state formation process could not escape the fate of the Third World 
security predicament.
1
 For a country that has 135 ethnic groups, integrating these 
nations into a nation-state has proved to be a challenge (Kramer, 2010; Sakhong & 
Keenan, 2014; South, 2008). Indeed, the clash between nation and nation-state 
remains one of the most prominent features of politics in Burma. Although the 
Panglong Conference and the subsequent 1947 Constitution enshrined the spirit of 
ethnic diversity, the assimilation project started shortly after independence in 1948. 
In 1952, the government declared that all official business had to be conducted in 
Burmese. In the process of Burmanisation, school teachers had to use Burmese to 
                                                          
1
 After independence, the name of the country was the Union of Burma (Burma). In 1989, the name 
was changed to the Union of Myanmar (Myanmar). Likewise, Rangoon was renamed Yangon, Pegu 
became Bago, and ethnic groups such as Karen changed to Kayin. In this study, names such as 




teach at school and history had to be taught from the perspective of Burmese 
nationalism (Brown, 1994; Collins, 2002). More importantly, as the country was 
being consumed by Cold War politics, building a nationalist Burman army known as 
the Tatmadaw became the only security apparatus that could hold the divided and 
vulnerable country together (Callahan, 2003, p. 5; Holliday, 2010, p. 31). The ethnic 
minorities responded by upping their nationalist movements (Lintner, 1999; Smith, 
1999). Consequently, although the country briefly experimented with democracy, an 
over-reliance on the military inevitably invited a coup d'état in 1962 by Ne Win, who 
intensified the process of Burmanisation (Collins, 2002). The new administration 
introduced the Burmese Way to Socialism, thereby condemning a once prosperous 
country to decades of economic mismanagement. Consequently, by the 1980s, the 
country was in disarray. Drug money provided weapons for ethnic armed groups and 
fuelled more fighting with the Tatmadaw. The country’s foreign reserves dwindled 
from US$410m in 1980 to just over US$110m in 1985,
2 
and the fiscal deficit climbed 
from 5.1% in 1985 to 8% of GDP in 1988 (Htay, 2007).  
The situation reached boiling point on 8 August 1988, when thousands of students, 
joined by Buddhist monks and civilians, staged country-wide protest demanding 
political and economic reform. The protest, also known as the 8888 Movement, was 
brutally suppressed by the military, which was headed by General Saw Maung, who 
installed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) as the transitional 
government and promised holding a general election, but not until order was 
restored. Answering calls from the people, Aung San Suu Kyi formed the National 
League for Democracy (NLD) in order to campaign for democracy. Although the 
NLD won a landslide victory in the 1990 general election, the military junta 
renounced the result and placed Suu Kyi under house arrest. Economic sanctions 
from the West swiftly followed, and the country quickly sank into the abyss in the 
international arena, isolated and marginalised. To compound the misery of the state, 
ethnic groups such as the Kachin, Wa, and Shan escalated their demands for greater 
autonomy and self-determination (Kyaw, 2008; Maung Maung, 2012; McCarthy, 
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2000; Taylor, 2009; S. Yawnghwe, 2013). In short, by 1988, the country had become 
a failed state.  
In neoliberal institutionalism and neo-Weberian intuitionalism discourses, state 
failure is measured in terms of state capacity. Indeed, Rotberg (2004, p. 1) claims 
that nation states fail when ‘they are consumed by internal violence and cease 
delivering positive political goods to their inhabitants’, which include healthcare, 
education, infrastructure, economic development, security, and law and order. 
Therefore, it is the non-performance of a government in regard to delivering security, 
welfare, and economic development that leads to state failure (Di John, 2010; 
Zartman, 1995). Suffice to say, the provision of positive political goods does not 
necessarily make the state more answerable to its citizens or more democratic, but it 
at least serves to enhance the legitimacy of the regime. 
Moreover, a state is not necessarily a failed state if the regime can force its will on 
the civilians despite social resistance; it only fails to deliver the public goods that the 
people want (Hameiri, 2007). Therefore, there is a difference between a state’s 
capacity to deliver positive political goods and its capacity to force its will on 
society. Zartman (1995, p. 7) marks this difference as the distinction between a 
‘strong’ state and a ‘hard’ state. 
When the SLORC took control of the country in 1988, irrespective of whether it 
wanted to prevent state failure or turn the country into a ‘hard’ state, and mindful that 
these were not mutually exclusive objectives, the immediate task was to rebuild state 
capacity. 
1.2 Ceasefire Agreement and the Nation-Building Process 
Amid the chaos, the SLORC abandoned its decade-long four-cut counter-insurgency 
strategy and replaced it with ceasefire negotiations. The four-cut counter-insurgency 
strategy was first introduced by Ne Win in 1963 and was aimed at cutting off food, 
funding, intelligence, and the supply of civilian support to resistance groups, leaving 




2006, a total of 20 ceasefire agreements were reached with various ethnic armed 
groups
 
(Zaw Oo & Win Min, 2007).  
The ceasefire initiatives signalled a significant shift in the mindset of the rulers. 
Instead of forced amalgamation through Burmanisation, it was the first attempt since 
the Panglong Agreement in 1947 where the ruling regime considered state-building 
as a viable option for national reconciliation. Indeed, Kivimaki (2008, p. 82) points 
out that ethnic rights had often been linked to the struggle for democracy, but, 
ironically, it was the military regime that made efforts towards a rapid conclusion of 
ceasefire agreements. However, this ceasefire initiative was different from 
conventional post-conflict resolution procedures, which emphasise disarmament, 
demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) (Kyed & Gravers, 2015). Instead, ethnic 
groups in Myanmar were allowed to keep their arms, and disarmament had no place 
in the ceasefire negotiations. Therefore, the initiative should be seen not as a political 
settlement but as a military one. Indeed, in assessing the effectiveness of the 
ceasefire agreements, Zaw Oo and Win Min (2007, p. 59) conclude that ‘this policy 
is unlikely to guarantee ethnic harmony or a lasting peace’. This arrangement raised 
the question of whether the regime was genuine in securing peace in the long run. If 
securing long-term peace was not the objective, what could these ceasefire 
agreements achieve?  
1.3 Strategies of Regime Survival 
One logical deduction would be that the ceasefire agreements bought the regime 
precious time to work on its pacification project, with the ultimate aim of holding 
onto power and achieving regime survival. However, the country has, since 
independence, been torn apart by conflicts arising from decolonisation, ethno-
nationalism, geopolitics, and the resource curse. Moreover, sanctions from the West 
deepened the economic and legitimacy crises. Therefore, could these ceasefire 
agreements have served to tame such multi-dimensional challenges at the same time 




1.3.1 Reliance on China 
There is no shortage of literature attempting to address how the regime became 
increasingly dependent on China in order to breach the Western sanctions. Taking 
advantage of the military regime’s predicament, Bader (2015a, 2015b) explains how 
China was able to serve its own interests by helping the regime to exploit the 
country’s resources, thereby providing the financial lifeline to support the survival of 
the regime. However, keeping the regime financially afloat would not necessarily 
lead to its survival. On the contrary, squandering the national resources would only 
lead to a wider spread of poverty and inequality, thus jeopardising justice, increasing 
resistance, and further undermining legitimacy.  
From a historical perspective, Myoe (2011, p. 188) explains the close relationship 
between China and Myanmar by referring to the Pauk-Phaw (meaning kinship) 
friendship that was established in the 1950s, claiming that ‘neither the Sinocentric 
world order of tributary relations nor the Westphalian world order of sovereign 
equality can adequately define the nature of Sino-Myanmar relations’. Therefore, 
financial assistance from China is justified on moral grounds based on the 
brotherhood relationship of Pauk-Phaw. However, content analysis shows that China 
only used the Pauk-Phaw friendship when it tried to repair the relationship between 
the two counties. Indeed, there was an absence of the use of the term from 1991–
2001 by China, and the term only resurfaced more frequently from the Chinese side 
after the re-pivot to Asia policy of the US (Yue, 2014). In fact, the financial 
assistance from China that came with investment concessions caused more social 
disharmony and bred local resistance. The social backlash from the Myitsone dam 
project and the Letpadaung copper mine are cases in point.
3
 Therefore, Chinese 
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investments in Myanmar were, in fact, not a blessing but a curse that would come 
back to haunt the regime (Arakan Oil Watch, 2012). Moreover, since the awarding of 
these foreign investment projects were marred with accusations of corruption, illegal 
land repossession, and crony capitalism, they served very little in enhancing the 
regime’s legitimacy and, thereby, its survival (Bauer, Shortell, & Delesgues, 2016; 
Bissinger, 2012). 
Indeed, the Sino-Myanmar relationship is simply a marriage of convenience brought 
about by Cold War struggles and power rivalries (Fan, 2012). At the turn of the 
millennium, when China became dependent on oil but vulnerable to the stability of 
its supply, Myanmar became the solution for by-passing the geopolitical choke-point 
at the Strait of Malacca (Chen, 2008; Wong & Yue, 2014). However, the increase in 
revenues from the export of oil and gas only enriched the regime and its cronies, but 
did nothing to ease economic and social tensions.  
When U Thein Sein took presidential office in 2011, he showed signs of loosening 
the authoritarian grip and began to warm towards the West, which prompted Haacke 
(2010) to remark on a change in the regime’s survival tactics by taking calculated 
risks to court the US, thereby lessening the dependency on China. Other scholars 
joined this discourse by examining the realigned relationship between the US, China, 
and Myanmar (Fiori & Passeri, 2015; Huang, 2015). Yet again, the existing literature 
only examined the survival techniques from a realist perspective by assuming regime 
survival would be enhanced through the balancing act between China and the US. 
These studies examined the issue from a macro perspective, but they failed to 
provide any narrative as to how resistance was being dealt with at the micro (local) 
level. 
1.3.2 Nationalism as everyday politics 
Breaking economic and international blockades should be just one of the concerns 
when it comes to regime survival. In this sense, how to deal with rising ethno-
nationalism can be understood as another obstacle to long-term survival. 
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Endeavouring to link a political solution for ethnic conflict to international relations 
was the central theme of the work of Lian Sakhong. As a Chin ethnic scholar, 
Sakhong, together with other Chin political activists, was arrested in 2010. His 
reflection on his experience and desire to protect the Chin identity and culture 
prompted him to advocate for a Federated Union of Myanmar, assisted by 
international mediation (Sakhong, 2010, pp. 138-140). The emphasis remained on a 
negotiated political settlement. However, as already argued, the ceasefire agreements 
were not a political settlement, and therefore the mismatch between an ideal political 
outcome and political reality is as far apart as before. 
Indeed, Michael Gravers (1999) has correctly pointed out that, throughout the history 
of Burma, power is expressed through nationalism. The ‘Burmese Way’ was only a 
catchphrase drummed up by Ne Win after he staged the coup, when there appeared to 
be no alternative way to describe the embedded ideology (Gravers, 1999, p. 78). For 
the Burmese state-building project, there was no pluralism, only ‘the Burman-
foreigner dichotomy; they must fit into the loyal or the alien categorization. 
Ethnocentrism and xenophobia are caught up in every political debate or action’ 
(Gravers, 1999, p. 80). Gravers had no confidence in any resolution of the conflict 
arising from nationalism, as he notes that opposition minorities were using the same 
power tactics as the regime in order to justify their own causes for armed struggle. 
Therefore, as long as the leaders of these nations manipulate their audience into 
believing that they are the only people who can provide security and control, and 
more importantly, to protect their culture and heritage, there will be no end to the 
rhetoric of nationalism. Gravers is not alone in reaching this pessimistic conclusion; 
Martin Smith (2007) also shares the same concerns by pointing out that insurgency 
has been a way of life in the political evolution of the country since independence. 
Having met many key ethnic armed group leaders first-hand, Smith was able to 
capture the dynamics of ethnic insurgency fanned by greed, betrayal, geopolitics, all 
in the name of nationalism (Smith, 1999). 
1.3.3 Ceasefire agreement as conflict management 
At this juncture, it is worth recapping the mainstream literature on Myanmar after the 




hardships were eased as the country sold off its natural resources and became 
increasingly dependent on China. However, this merely served to deepen public 
resentment against the military regime, as the benefits reaped were only shared with 
state cronies. Moreover, the ceasefire agreements were, in fact, just a change in 
tactics from all out confrontation to securing temporary peace, and ethnic tensions 
under the banner of nationalism remained. Therefore, regime survival did not appear 
to be sustainable in the prevailing political, economic, and social climate, but the 
regime managed to remain in office until 2015, and arguably still enjoy veto power 
over the NLD, who won the election. Could there be more than was apparent 
working behind the scenes to sustain regime survival? 
In this regard, Tom Kramer (Kramer, 2009, 2010) has made two important 
contributions to an understanding of the post-ceasefire political contours: first, by 
developing a framework to understand the ethnic conflict; and secondly, by re-
framing the narratives of the ceasefire initiatives. Kramer unpacks the complicated 
ethnic issue into various organisations. Within the ethnic minority organisations, 
Kramer identifies three sub-groups: the armed groups, the political parties, and civil 
society organisations (CSOs). While he points out the natural alliances among these 
ethnic actors, he also raises the possibility of potential conflict of interests and 
grievances among the sub-groups (Kramer, 2010, pp. 58-69). This serves to highlight 
the continuation of the divide-and-rule strategy in the post-ceasefire era, albeit in a 
different version from the British era. Furthermore, while acknowledging that the 
ceasefire agreements were not political settlements, Kramer goes one step further 
from the military settlement as suggested by Zaw Oo and Win Min (2007) to put 
forward the concept of conflict management. The significance of the distinction 
between military settlement and conflict management is that Kramer does not see the 
ceasefire agreements as the tool for resolving the conflict, but rather as a statecraft 
technique for managing the conflict. In this sense, under the conflict management 
narrative, divide-and-rule in order to maintain regime survival took over the 
objective of securing peace.  
However, apart from voicing concerns over the possibility of continued ethnic 




structured themselves to resist the regime under the divide-and-rule tactic of conflict 
management. In describing the goals and strategies of various cease-fire groups, he 
ironically fails to differentiate between the objectives of various ethnic political 
parties and their armed group counterparts, and there is no mention of how these 
objectives contradict those of local ethnic CSOs (Kramer, 2009, pp. 16-20). 
Moreover, he fails to inform readers on what was holding the structure together, 
therefore provided no clue as to how the divide-and-rule tactic would work in favour 
of regime survival. Consequently, the operational mechanism of the divide-and-rule 
tactic under ceasefire conflict management remains hidden inside a black hole. 
1.4 The Hidden Mechanism of Survival 
At this stage, it is apparent that there is no such thing as a grand theory to describe 
and explain the post-1988 political contours in Myanmar. The existing literature 
examines the circumstances and conditions under which the military faced a 
challenge to their survival, but there is inadequate analysis to determine the actual 
process of how these challenges were being dealt with in practice. Using a black-box 
analogy, the factors and conditions affecting regime survival are thrown into the 
black box at one end, and the outcome of regime survival come out the other, but 
with no explanation of what actually took place inside the black box. In the rare 
situation where some details have emerged, they are patchy and could be very 
misleading. The investment in Myanmar during the early 1990s by Robert Kuok, 




At the peak of the Western sanctions brought about by the repudiation of the 1990 
election, the Shangri-La Group, owned by Robert Kuok, reached an agreement with 
the regime to build the Traders Hotel in the heart of Yangon in 1994. Asia World, 
which was run by Steven Law, the son of the Myanmar drug kingpin Lo Hsing Han, 
was quoted as a partner in the hotel.
5
 This high profile investment caught the 
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attention of the world, not only because it broke the financial blockade that the West 
had imposed on the regime, but it was also the first of many investments that brought 
the regime, drug lords, and overseas investors to the same table. Not surprisingly, 
many researchers cast the investment in a bad light and jumped to the conclusion of 
Asian business tycoons linked to crony capitalism in Myanmar (Pederson, 2015; 
Rotberg, 1998). While this case could be cited as an example of how the regime 
overcame Western sanctions and escaped from isolation, or used as a reference on 
resource exploitation, there was a great deal of detail that was not apparent on the 
surface but that painted a different picture. This highlights the importance of digging 
deeper beneath surface of the ceasefire agreement in order to determine the network 
of operations that would enhance state control after decentralisation.  
The negotiation to build the Traders Hotel started well before the sanctions had been 
imposed. However, when the project was finalised, the sanctions began to bite, and 
technical problems unexpectedly emerged, one of which was the transfer of funds to 
pay for the hotel’s construction. At the time, the official rate was 7 kyat for 1 US 
dollar, but the black market rate was K220 to the dollar. In this context, it did not 
make sense to convert the investment at the official rate, but the Shangri-La Group 
could not use the black market. Another problem was who would be able to build the 
hotel while Western sanctions were in force? Reputable contractors inevitably had 
Western links and were therefore barred from involvement. A solution was found by 
bartering with the Asia World Group. At the time, Asia World was the largest 
contractor in Myanmar, and they had an import license for important raw materials, 
such as cement, iron, and steel. The deal was arranged such that Kerry Trading, a 
sister company of Shangri-La, would sell oil and sugar to Asia World, and Asia 
World would, in turn, build the hotel for Shangri-La. To be sure, Lo Hsing Han, his 
son Steven Law, and Asia World were never Robert Kuok’s partners, although the 
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There are two reasons for recounting the experience on the transaction between 
Shangri-La and Asia World, the first of which is to follow the practice of ‘participant 
objectivation’ as suggested by Bourdieu (2003) in dealing with the problem faced by 
an ethnographer on how to reconcile subjectivity and objectivity when observing a 
foreign experience. The purpose of participant objectivation is to inform readers on 
the social conditions of the observer who is making the observation, thereby 
highlighting the effects and limitations on the observation. With regard to this thesis, 
recounting the experience serves to highlight the author’s sensibility to economic and 
business transactions, as well as the networks behind the scenes. The second reason 
paves the way towards exploring and constructing the research question based on the 
knowledge that, for any decision to be implemented, there must be an exchange of 
services several layers below the decision makers, who may not even be aware that 
such transactions are taking place. Therefore, in articulating the research question 
and setting it within a theoretical framework, this thesis is mindful of exploring the 
link between the macro and micro levels of decisions and actions, and stresses that 
the empirical experience of this research can be traced back to the early 1990s when 
the Shangri-la project began.  
1.5 The Paradox of Decentralisation While Maintaining 
Control 
The complexity of nation-building and the challenges faced by a military regime that 
lacks capacity and legitimacy were discussed earlier in this thesis. A survey of the 
literature on how the regime dealt with the dilemma of regime survival amid 
international isolation, economic meltdown, and ethnic tension failed to yield any 
satisfactory answer as to how the regime could survive the challenge. Although the 
ceasefire agreements bought temporary breathing space for the regime to ‘get its 
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house in order’, the siphoning off of national resources only served to intensify 
resistance at the local level. Yet, the regime survived the challenge. The way they did 
so, or what went on inside the black box, remains unanswered. In this sense, there is 
a need to dig deeper under the surface in order to unveil the mechanism(s) of survival. 
Burma is a country that is rich in natural resources, including oil and gas, timber, 
fishery, and gems and minerals. In the financial year 2013/14, oil and gas brought in 
US$2.7 billion to government revenues, while mineral revenues contributed another 
US$460 million (Bauer et al., 2016). However, according to an independent report 
by Global Witness (2015a), the value of jade production in the country was US$31 
billion in 2014 alone. The vast difference between the revenue received by the 
government and the estimated actual revenue highlights the substantial shadow 
economy of the country, which breeds corruption (Arakan Oil Watch, 2012).  
More importantly, such revenue potentials inevitably invite competition for control. 
Ironically, these natural resources are located in the country’s former Frontier Areas, 
where ethnic minorities reside. Therefore, a problem of resource distribution and 
administration becomes entwined with ethnic issues of autonomy and self-
determination. Given a lack in legitimacy to govern, civil war would be a highly 
probable outcome if these events were to happen in Africa, such as in Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, or Sudan (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Collier & Sambanis, 2005a; Hoeffler, 
2011; Hyden, 2006). After all, the politics of the belly would ensure that the 
country’s endowments would be siphoned off to the ruling elites who are trying to 
enrich and empower themselves, resulting in an inevitable fight for a share in the 
national cake from those who are being deprived (Bayart, 1993). However, the greed 
of the political elites and the grievances of the deprived are two sides of the same 
coin, or ‘alternative interpretations of the same phenomenon’, and they provide very 
little explanation of the political outcome, be it civil war, revolution, or simply 
rioting (Collier & Sambanis, 2005b, p. 325). Therefore, in order to understand 
regime survival in Myanmar, our attention turns to examining the approach used by 




1.5.1 Re-legitimation through decentralisation 
Arguably, the shift from the four-cut counter insurgency strategy to conflict 
management through ceasefire agreements indicates the first step of the re-
legitimation process. Yet, this process is not without inherent risk. In his seminal 
work about the relationship between the state, economy, society, and culture, Manuel 
Castells (2007, p. 271) notes that increasing diversification and fragmentation of 
social interests in a network society will lead to legitimation crisis when the 
government cannot meet these demands. Responding to this crisis, the government 
may shift its power and resources to local and regional governments. In doing so, the 
central government becomes less effective in meeting the demands of conflicting 
social groups, thus resulting in minorities relying more on their local patrons and 
thereby further empowering them in the process. Therefore, Castells (2007, p. 275) 
argues that, what starts as a process of re-legitimising, the state, through a 
decentralisation of power, actually ends up deepening the legitimation crisis. He 
further claims that, if national identity is mishandled, civil war is a likely outcome, as 
in the case of Chechnya (i.e. the Chechen Republic) (Castells, 2007, p. 273).  
Castells’ observation is in line with that of civil war experts and serves to underline 
the predicament faced by the Burma government in trying to maintain country unity 
on the one hand while continuing to exploit resources at the expense of ethnic 
minorities on the other. According to Castells (2007), the key to avoiding the 
collapse of a state from the decentralisation process is the effectiveness of its 
governance. 
1.5.2 The dawn of emerging political complexes 
How would the claim of Castells hold up when juxtaposed against the ceasefire 
initiatives in Myanmar? Although over 20 ceasefire agreements had been reached 
since 1988, the country is still embroiled in ethnic fighting, noticeable in Northern 
Shan State. In summarising the political situation since the military takeover, Mary 
Callahan (2007) observes three outcomes: near devolution in Wa and Kokang, 
military occupation in Rakhine and Kayah, and coexistence in the Pa-O territory in 




necessarily invalidate the claim of Castells or the civil war experts, for war and co-
existence were simultaneously one of the outcomes. Indeed, her finding supports the 
conundrum earlier raised by Collier and Sambanis (2005b, p. 325), in that the 
political outcome of the struggle between greed and grievance rests on the pathways 
through which the struggle is played out. That is to say, it depends on what took 
place inside the black box. 
In arriving at her conclusion, Callahan (2007) applies the concept of ‘emerging 
political complexes’ as a possible explanation for the different political outcomes. 
The notion of the emerging political complex originated in Mark Duffield’s (2001) 
work on conflict prevention and resolution. In this regard, Duffield identifies 
underdevelopment as a major threat to security and therefore proposes combining the 
resources of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), government agencies, military 
coalitions, international institutions, and donor governments in a concerted effort to 
provide a secured environment for development. Duffield notes that, in certain 
conflict areas, different players are constantly attempting to set rules, claim the moral 
high ground, and offer protection, at the same time as continuing to extract resources. 
These players have their own agendas, which are sometimes complementary to each 
other (Duffield, 2001, p. 156). Their coalitions are flexible, adaptive, and changing, 
in other words, mutually constituting. While these emerging political complexes ‘are 
able to wage war’, Duffield (2001, p. 192) emphasises that ‘in many places they are 
also the only force realistically capable of reinstating a peace’.  
Employing the emerging political complex concept, Callahan (2007) goes on to 
describe the composition of these complexes in the areas of devolution, occupation, 
and coexistence. Stakeholders are highlighted and their interests identified. Her work 
makes a significant contribution towards an understanding of the area of conflict in 
that she has shifted the analytical focus away from the state to include non-state 
actors. Callahan’s findings on military occupation and devolution are consistent with 
civil war scholars. However, when explaining the third possible outcome, that of co-
existence, how can the resulting co-existence be reconciled with Castells’ claim that 
the process of re-legitimising a state through the decentralisation of power could 




1.5.3 The re-legitimation process 
The answer to the previous question lies in the ceasefire initiatives with ethnic armed 
groups after the SLORC took power. There were two components to this 
decentralisation and re-legitimisation process: the first started with the signing of 
ceasefire agreements and mapping out territorial jurisdiction, while the second 
involved the co-optation of local strongmen as agents for the state. 
The first step took place almost immediately after the SLORC assumed power. In 
May 1989, the military regime introduced the Programme for the Progress of the 
Border Areas and National Races Development (also known as the Border Areas 
Development programme [BAD]) in an attempt to promote development in the 
Frontier Areas, thereby alleviating the pressure from internal conflict (Lambrecht, 
2004). However, the introduction of BAD coincided with the collapse of the CPB in 
the summer of 1989. Many CPB members escaped to the border areas by either 
joining the local ethnic armed groups or forming their own, therefore fuelling further 
ethnic conflicts (Lintner, 1990; Lintner & Black, 2009). Therefore, although it started 
with good intentions, the BAD initiative fell into difficulties.  
Desperately needing some positive development to support its legitimacy to govern 
and to prevent further escalation of ethnic uprising due to reinforcement from ex-
CPB members, the military regime turned proactive on ceasefire diplomacy with 
local armed groups. Between 1989 and 1995, a total of sixteen ceasefire agreements 
were concluded, nine of which were reached with armed groups in Shan State and 
the rest with armed groups in Kachin, Kayah, and Karen States (Zaw Oo & Win Min, 
2007). In return for a ceasefire, the military regime awarded economic concessions, 
at various degrees, to the ethnic armed groups and set in motion the reformation of 




The second step involved the co-optation of local strongmen. A report by the Burma 
Partnership in June 2011 lists no less than 42 cronies of the state,
7
 many of which 
were closely related to the regime’s senior personnel. However, there were two on 
the list that raised attention because they were warlords turned entrepreneurs. 
Perhaps the most famous of those who surrendered arms and became cronies of the 
state is Lo Hsing Han, whose son Steven Law started the Asia World Company in 
1992. Asia World is one of the largest conglomerates in the country, with businesses 
ranging from construction to transportation, import and export, oil and gas, deep sea 
ports, industrial development, and even a supermarket chain. Another former state 
enemy turned crony is Nay Win Tun, who was a general in the Pa-O National Army 
(PNA). When the armed group signed a ceasefire agreement with the regime in 1991, 
Nay Win Tun converted into a businessman and formed the Ruby Dragon group of 
companies, with jade mining among its lucrative businesses.  
1.5.4 Warlord co-optation and ceasefire capitalism 
How would these warlords-turned-cronies help to shape the emerging political 
complexes? In recent conflict discourse on Myanmar, ceasefire capitalism has gained 
currency.
8
 A term coined by Kevin Woods (2011), ceasefire capitalism describes a 
form of production of capital that relies on a specially constructed political economy 
that is conducive to state control. Rather than treating the state as the main analytical 
unit, Woods (2011, p. 748) makes clear that he wants to ‘decenter “the state” and 
“the military”’ in his analysis and focus on ‘state/military and state-/military-like 
actors’ instead. The process of ceasefire capitalism involves the co-optation of local 
ethnic armed group elites by offering economic incentives in exchange for a 
ceasefire agreement. In doing so, the Burmese regime had implemented a ‘post-war 
state territorializing strategy’ and achieved a ‘military-state centralization’ of power 
through this new administrative mechanism (Woods, 2011, pp. 766-767). Therefore, 
Woods has developed a schema in which to capture the inside operations of the black 
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box by linking warlords, development, and local governance in a complex political 
economy.  
However, Woods comes up short in explaining how the co-optation of local 
strongmen, which in itself is a decentralisation of power, could compliment the 
objective of military-state centralisation. If Castells could have his say, he would 
argue that the decentralisation of authority to local ethnic warlords would only serve 
to further weaken the legitimacy of the central government. Moreover, what does this 
new governance mechanism entail?  
1.6 Research Question: How to Maintain Control After 
Decentralisation? 
Consequently, an important piece of the jigsaw is missing in the conceptualisation of 
the new political order. If an emerging political complex becomes the new political 
reality in a contested zone, and ceasefire capitalism is the tool holding the structure 
together, the political complex still cannot provide the regime with legitimacy and 
control. There is a missing link between the policy at the macro level, where 
emerging political complexes are being constructed, and achieving the objective of 
control at the micro level, where resistance takes place at township and village levels. 
In other words, there is a need to identify the linkage between the macro and micro 
levels of power construction as part of the survival strategy. The macro level of 
power refers to how power, influence, and authority are distributed within the state 
system, whereas the micro level focuses on how the power, influence, and authority 
affect individuals (Bell, 1975, 70-90). 
Therefore, this dissertation asks: how did the military regime manage to enhance its 
legitimacy and capacity by decentralising authority but without losing control in the 
Pa-O Self-Administered Zone (Pa-O SAZ) during the period 1988–2015? The 
research question attempts to reconcile the paradox between Castells’ warning 
regarding the danger of weakening legitimacy after decentralisation and the claim by 
Woods that ceasefire capitalism could achieve military-state centralisation. 
Furthermore, the research question aims to clarify and contextualise the concept of 




provide a better understanding of what is taking place inside the new political 
structure. In this context, the debate between James Scott’s (1976) moral economy 
and Samuel Popkin’s (1979) rational peasant will be revisited, and the difference 
between what Mancur Olson (1993) calls a roving bandit and a stationary bandit will 
be demonstrated.  
Given that the regime does not enjoy the monopoly use of force and there are 
multiple actors contesting for power and control, the research question inevitably 
needs to be broken down into several sub-questions in order to address the multi-
polar dynamics, the first of which is: how was the area administered before 1988 and 
what changes have taken place since? The objectives here are to outline the rules of 
the game, highlight how they have changed over time, and explain their implications, 
which serves to lay the foundations for the construction of the emerging political 
complex.  
Following the line of enquiry advocated by Kramer, Callahan, and Woods in 
unpacking the state, the next sub-question asks who the political actors in the Pa-O 
SAZ are and what their roles are in the emerging political complex. In her 
assessment of the political contours in the post-ceasefire environment, Callahan 
(2007) mainly focuses on the ethnic armed groups and political parties; in this regard, 
insufficient attention is paid to non-armed group political actors. Similarly, in his 
analysis of Burma’s ethnic conflict, Kramer (2010) outlines three ethnic minority 
organisations: the ethnic armed groups, political parties, and CSOs. However, he 
does not take into account political activists who are not part of these organisations. 
Moreover, what about the involvement of foreign organisations? Therefore, the list 
of relevant political actors appears to be inadequate and in need of updating.  
Third, what are the interests and objectives of these political actors? What is holding 
them together to form the emerging political complex? During this process, patron-
client relations will be examined in order to determine if old relations were broken 
and new ones established. The process of charting their relationship should also help 
to identify where the cleavages lie, thereby allowing further examination into how 




Finally, based on the findings above, how could the new political setting be 
conducive to state control? Given that the state has decentralised authority and it 
does not enjoy the monopoly use of force, who is representing the interest of the state 
at the local level? How is authority being carried out and by what means? Finally, in 
answering the main research question, how can the delegation of authority help the 
regime to reclaim legitimacy and capacity without losing control? 
The contribution of this research is three-fold. On a statecraft level, it aims to provide 
the missing link to explain why ceasefire capitalism is more than just warlord 
accommodation but could contribute towards a grander state-building project. It 
advances the groundwork of Callahan and Woods in providing an operational 
mechanism to facilitate control in a decentralised zone. Moreover, this is the first 
comprehensive use of the state-in-society approach to study how a regime can 
implement the triangle of accommodation to enhance social control since Migdal’s 
original publication in 1988. On the theoretical level, this investigation inevitably 
reopens debate on Scott’s (1976) moral economy versus Popkin’s (1979) rational 
peasant. Moreover, after reaching a ceasefire agreement, the PNO has effectively 
become a stationary bandit. The research will help to provide evidence to validate 
Olson’s (1993) claim regarding the difference in behaviour between a roving bandit 
and a stationary bandit. Finally, on a political transition level, this research can shed 
light on the political contours under ceasefire capitalism and, from there, project the 
path of political transition. 
The research is based on a case study of the Pa-O Self-Administrated Zone (SAZ) in 
the Southern Shan State of Myanmar during 1988–2015. In answering these 
questions, several issues need to be clarified. First of all, what does control mean? 
Second, why choose Pa-O SAZ as the subject of investigation? Third, what are the 
justifications for choosing the period 1988–2015?  
1.6.1 The meaning of control 
In the context of this research, control means the ability to implement administrative 




three perspectives: authority, legitimacy, and capacity (Teskey, Schnell, & Poole, 
2012). While capacity and legitimacy are two separate issues, they are nonetheless 
interdependent. A regime that lacks legitimacy will find it difficult to build state 
capacity, whereas a lack of capacity could also undermine legitimacy (OECD, 2010).  
Authority is defined by Max Weber (1964, p. 324) as ‘the probability that a certain 
specific command (or all commands) from a given source will be obeyed by a group 
of persons’. As David Bell (1975, p. 15) notes, authority is often mixed up in 
everyday language as the same as power and influence; however, although they may 
overlap in meanings and sometimes can be used interchangeably, they are 
nonetheless different. For example, while a leader may be powerful, this does not 
mean that he/she is necessarily influential. Likewise, a leader who has authority may 
not necessarily have power and influence.  
Having authority does not necessarily mean having the legitimacy to that authority. 
Weber (1964) points out three types of legitimacy that support authority: charismatic, 
traditional, and rational-legal. Bell (1975, p. 45) adds procedure (how a leader is 
chosen) and substantive (the quality of the decisions made by the leader) legitimacy 
to Weber’s inventory. A report by the OECD (2010) has essentially summed up both 
Weber’s and Bell’s classifications. The report highlights four sources of legitimacy: 
input (or process) legitimacy, output (or performance) legitimacy, shared beliefs, and 
international legitimacy. Input legitimacy refers to the compliance with pre-agreed 
rules and regulations. Democratic countries where leaders are products of universal 
suffrage are examples of this category. Output legitimacy is concerned with the 
effectiveness and quality of delivery of public goods and services, or the ‘expected 
functions’ of a state (Whaites, 2008). For a strong state, such as China, development 
and economic achievements are sources of legitimacy. However, in a weak state, 
providing security and some form of law and order could also be a source of 
legitimacy; in addition, strongmen, such as Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and, 
arguably, the military rulers in Burma, also fall into this category. Shared belief is 
more difficult to quantify, as it involves a sense of political community that can be 
politically and socially constructed. Again, Burma offers a rich source of reference. 




and the formation of the Union of Burma show how legitimacy could be politically 
constructed, but the subsequent breakdown in trust and the call for self-determination 
demonstrate how socially constructed ethno-nationalism could bring down such 
legitimacy. Finally, legitimacy can also be achieved by international recognition, 
although this may not be without controversy.
9 
 
After eliminating internal and external enemies, a ruler needs to set up administrative 
structures in order to maintain control over the extraction of resources (Tilly, 1985). 
While this can be achieved by force, if rulers want to be more resilient against 
challengers, they need to depersonalise rules into institutions so that raw power can 
be transformed into ‘regularizing institutions and processes of government’ 
(Ottaway, 2002, p. 1014). This leads to the question of capability, which can be 
understood in terms of the state’s capacity to penetrate society, regulate the 
relationships within it, perform the function of extraction, and make the appropriate 
attribution as desired (Migdal, 1988).  
Therefore, in assessing the ability of the regime to maintain control, reference will be 
made to the source of authority in the Pa-O SAZ, the legitimacy of the source of 
authority, and the state capacity to penetrate into the SAZ, regulate it, extract 
resources from it, and attribute the spoils from the extraction. 
1.6.2 The rationale for choosing Pa-O SAZ as the focus of research 
There were over thirty ethnic armed groups operating in different regions of Burma 
at the time the SLORC took control of the country. Some have reached ceasefire 
agreements with the new regime, some agreed to a ceasefire but renewed fighting, 
and some have continued fighting to this day (Keenan, 2012b).
10
 Since the objective 
of this research is to find out how the regime managed to retain control and establish 
legitimacy in a decentralised zone, only those ceasefire groups that have been 
awarded demarcated areas of their own and have restored some form of order within 
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the area under their administration, or ‘co-existence’ (Callahan, 2007), were 
considered. 
Callahan (2007) has pointed out two regions where co-existence was achieved, i.e. 
the Mon State and the Pa-O area. The Pa-O region was chosen ahead of the Mon 
State because the Pa-O was involved in the struggle for self-determination right from 
the beginning, even before the country became independent. Therefore, the 
transformation from being a state enemy to an ally of the state offers useful insights 
into the statecraft techniques used by the regime. Indeed, Khin Nyunt, who was the 
first secretary (Secretary-1) of the SLORC and later became the prime minister in 
2003, often used the Pa-O as a successful example of the ceasefire agreement helping 
to reintegrate the Frontier Area back into the main state (Zaw Oo & Win Min, 2007, 
p. 28). 
The history of the Pa-O can be traced back to well before the Anawrahta Empire, 
from Pagan, in AD 1057. They are called Taungthu by the Bamar, the dominant 
ethnic group in Burma. Taungthu in Burmese means southern people, referring to the 
Thaton area of lower Burma in the 11
th 
century, or what is now the Southern Shan 
State (Christensen & Sann Kyaw, 2006). The Pa-O is generally considered to be a 
sub-group of the Karen, who are one of the eight major national ethnic races in 
Myanmar (Christensen & Sann Kyaw, 2006, p. 3; Hackett, 1953, p. 27).  
The Pa-O have always been politically pro-active, even before the country was 
independent. The Pa-O National Organisation (PNO) was set up in 1947 and played 
an active role in the Panglong Conference. Self-determination has a deeper meaning 
to the Pa-O because not only do they feel marginalised by the dominant Bamar race, 
but they also struggle against the Shan because they are competing with them for 
land and resources. Like other ethnic groups in Burma, many Pa-O farmers grew 
opium to subsidise their livelihoods, and the ethnic armed groups relied on taxing the 




The early Pa-O nationalist movement suffered a similar fate to many ethnic armed 
groups, in that their aspirations for self-determination were muddled by the influence 
of communism, resulting in internal splits and conflicts. Inevitably, the Pa-O 
nationalist movement was split between the nationalist camp (the PNO) and the 
communist camp (the Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organisation 
[SNPLO]), which subsequently changed its name to the Pa-Oh National Liberation 
Organisation (PNLO). Both the PNO and PNLO reached ceasefire agreements with 
the SLORC in 1991 and 1994 respectively, and since they were the dominant armed 
groups in the area, the Pa-O area can be considered to have been pacified since 1994. 
These backgrounds are not unique to the Pa-O, given that other ethnic regions also 
faced similar challenges, and therefore what factors contributed to the success of the 
Pa-O region may also be relevant to other areas. 
1.6.3 The period 1988–2015 
The period 1988–2015 was chosen as the timeframe for this study because it captures 
the military tenure, which started when the military took power by replacing the 
Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) with the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC) in 1988, all the way to the general election in 2015, which 
effectively ended the military regime’s governance when the main opposition 
political party, the NLD, won a landslide victory. The 8888 uprising marked the start 
of the SLORC, and the NLD victory in 2015 put an end to the military realm, at least 
as far as the presidency was concerned.  
The SLORC seized power on 18 September 1988. Immediately, the new regime 
abolished the 1974 Constitution and dissolved all the organs of the state under the 
Constitution, including the Pyithu Hluttaw (the upper and lower houses), the Council 
of Ministers, the Council of People’s Justices, and, at regional level, the 
State/Region, Township, Ward/Village People’s Councils (Steinberg, 2001). Senior 
General Saw Maung became the chairman of the SLORC, and power was 
concentrated in the hands of the military. He was ousted from office by Senior 
General Than Shwe on 23 April 1992. In trying to restore some form of government, 
the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) was formed on 15 




the purpose of diluting the image of military control by trying to function as a ruling 
political party. Even though the SLORC was replaced by the State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC) on 15 November 1997, the country was effectively 
still being run by the military, and importantly, had no constitution (Network for 
Democracy and Development, May 2006; Taylor, 2009, pp. 446-447). In 2010, the 
USDA was disbanded. Its members and assets were transferred to a newly registered 
political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which 
contested and won the general election later that year under U Thein Sein.
11 
Therefore, between 1988 and 2015, the state power controlled by the military in 
Myanmar can be seen as being represented, at various times, by the SLORC, USDA, 
SPDC, and USDP. 
Although it was only a by-election, the 2012 election was significant. It was the first 
time since 1990 where the NLD was again re-registered as a political party, 
contested, won, and took up seats in the parliament. However, Callahan (2012, p. 
120) is quick to pint out that ‘there has been no major shift in the characteristics of 
those who hold top government posts.’ Others hold guided optimism in Myanmar’s 
political transition. Zin and Joseph (2012, pp. 112-113) argue that the participation of 
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD in the 2012 by-election, coupled with a rejuvenation 
of civil society, opened up political space and opportunities for democrats. Indeed, 
the International Crisis Group (2012, p. 6) observe that there was a ‘new climate of 
political openness’. However, although the NLD won 43 out of the 44 seats they 
contested in the 2012 election, the government was still being controlled by the 
USDP. Therefore, it was not until the 2015 election that power was transferred to a 
civilian government and the military took a back seat. 
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1.7 Theoretical Framework: State-in-Society and the 
Struggle for Control  
The objective of a theoretical framework is to define the parameters of the research 
and, within these parameters, to answer the research question. In general terms, the 
research question involves examining the state-society relationship in a post-conflict 
zone. However, the state-society relationship can be analysed from different 
perspectives. It can be viewed from top-down, therefore treating the state as the focal 
point, or from bottom-up, thereby treating the people and society as the main focus. 
In maintaining control of a divided society, how relevant or irrelevant is the state in 
this process of power construction? This is the meta level of enquiry that asks what 
the role of the state should be and in what form the state should project itself. 
The research question asks how power is being constructed and manifested in the Pa-
O SAZ so that the regime can enhance legitimacy and maintain control despite a 
decentralisation of authority. Following Duffield (1998, 2001) and Callahan’s (2003, 
2007, 2012) arguments that there are multiple actors in a conflict zone contesting for 
power and their interactions result in them mutually constituting each other, the 
research needs to be more empirically focused in order to capture the multilateral 
dynamics driven by political, economic, and social forces.  
The theoretical framework of this research does not use the state as the main 
analytical unit because it failed on two tests, the first being the normative definition 
of the state and the second being the role of the state in development. With regard to 
the definition of the state, the most common perspective views the state as a 
centralised political organisation that commands a monopoly of the legitimate use of 
force (Weber, 2004). Yet, the legitimacy of the state is often called into question. In 
his historical analysis of social power, Michael Mann (1986, p. 11) argues that ‘most 
historic states have not possessed a monopoly of organized military force and many 
have not even claimed it’. The huge number of ethnic armed forces with their own 
pockets of domination in Myanmar is testimony to Mann’s claim and a rebuff to 
Weber’s definition because, while the state as a country still exists, the government 




In the Communist Manifesto, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (2016) saw the state in 
a slightly different light. They believed that the state is nothing but an organisation 
controlled by a committee under the bourgeoisie with the sole objective of 
maintaining the dominance of the ruling class. Essentially, Marx and Engels saw the 
main role of government as securing the production process in order to maintain a 
capitalist state (S. Clarke, 1991). Afansyev (in S. Clarke, 1991, p. 3) refers to this as 
the ‘fusion of state and monopoly power’. In a materialistic world, this means 
exploiting the working class who has very little bargaining power. However, 
Marxism loses its explanatory usefulness when the state-society relation is not solely 
based on production but involves other fundamental issues, such as ethnicity and 
religion. In the case of Myanmar, Marxism cannot satisfactorily explain the desire 
for self-determination by ethnic minorities, who apart from wanting to avoid 
economic exploitation, they also demand maintaining their cultures and identities.  
A different perspective that may be able to justify the state as an appropriate 
analytical unit is based on the logic that when society progresses under 
modernisation, state capacity and legitimacy will be enhanced, non-state armed 
actors will be made redundant, and finally the state will regain its monopoly use of 
force (Acemoglu, Robinson, & Santoes, 2013). Here, the state is seen as the 
vanguard of development, driving the modernisation process (Evans, Rueschemeyer, 
& Skocpol, 1985; Haggard, 1990; Hollifield & Jillson, 2000; Jessop, 1990). 
Economic development will inevitably bring about the liberation of state power, 
which will eventually lead to democracy (Moore, 1993; Rostow, 1960; 
Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992).
12
 A democratic system of governance 
is not denying the role of the state, but rather provides it with the justification and 
legitimacy to rule. As Lipset (1963, p. 41) puts it, ‘all the various aspects of 
economic development – industrialization, urbanization, wealth and education – are 
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so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political correlate of 
democracy.’13  
The problem of using this line of argument to justify the state as the unit of analysis 
for this research is that there was very little development in the country both before 
and after the 8888 uprising. The West imposed economic sanctions on the country 
after the regime crushed the democracy movement, and the regime had to rely on 
investments from China in order to make ends meet (Steinberg & Fan, 2012). 
Therefore, far from being the vanguard of development, the Myanmar government 
was more like observing from the backseat – passive rather than proactive. 
Moreover, the generals and their cronies were too busy enriching themselves by 
selling off state assets to show any concern for rural development.  
Related to the modernisation school is the argument of the institutional school, which 
sees the state as an organisation vested with power that is independent from class 
cleavages. Grounded in the Weberian tradition of social theory, Skocpol (1979) calls 
this the state-centred approach. This school argues that power is derived from the 
organisational structure, a point well illustrated by Michael Mann (1986) in his 
seminal work The Sources of Social Power. In this sense, Mann distinguishes 
political power from coercive power (the military). Political power, which is linked 
to the state, is based on the development of organisational infrastructures, from 
which the authority to administrate a given territory is derived (Mann, 1986, pp. 1-
33). However, repeated state failures raise questions about the institutional school. 
Neo-institutionalists admit that institutions may have defects, but they will evolve 
over time to provide better service for the state (Lecours, 2005). In his comparative 
study on Asian and Latin American newly industrialised countries, Stephan Haggard 
(1990, p. 3) claims that ‘the influence of social forces on policy is undeniable, but it 
is always mediated by institutional settings”. The institutional school was given 
added impetus when the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s set the tone 
for the third wave of democracy. This historical event even allowed Francis 
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Fukuyama (1992) to claim ‘the end of history’, concluding that democracy under a 
liberal environment was the best form of governance. This signalled the triumph of 
liberalism, with the institutional school as its vanguard. The doctrine of the 
Washington Consensus, which was underwritten by US foreign policy immediately 
before and after the turn of the 21
st
 century, insisted that recipient countries should 
embrace liberal reforms and strengthen institutions as a pre-requisite for aid. The 
economic sanctions on Myanmar were also a product of this doctrine. However, in 
reality, how effective is this policy when the institutions are kidnapped by the ruling 
class? If the claim by Haggard is correct, the Asian financial crisis should have 
brought about institutional changes that would have broken down crony capitalism. 
Yet, in countries that were worst hit by the financial storm, such as Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Indonesia, the business cronies all survived and fared even better amid 
institutional reforms. The Sy, Gokongwei, Tan (Lucio), and Cojuangco families of 
the Philippines, the Chearavanont and Chirathivat families of Thailand, and the 
Hartono, Widjaja, and Salim families of Indonesia are dynasties that all transitioned 
smoothly from the Asian financial crisis under different governments. The crony-
capitalism index composed by The Economist shows that, after Russia, Malaysia and 
the Philippines occupied second and third positions in May 2016, while Indonesia 
ranked seventh. In fact, the magazine shows that the wealth generated by crony 
capitalism as a percentage of GPD increased significantly over the last two 
decades.
14 
Therefore, the neo-institutionalists clearly underplayed the endurance of 
business elites, who can hijack economic reforms and shape them in such a way as to 
maintain their dominance.  
Indeed, during the period under review, the application of the institutional approach 
on the regime’s control in Myanmar has clear limitations. To begin with, the country 
did not even have a constitution until 2008. After nullifying the election result in 
1990, the country did not have a general election until 2010. According to the Rule 
of Law Index published by the World Justice Project, Myanmar ranked 92 out of 102 
countries surveyed in 2015, which placed the country only better than Bangladesh 
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and Bolivia but worse than Sierra Leone and Ethiopia.
15 
Indeed, Myanmar was not 
indexed until 2015, which speaks volumes about law and order in that country before 
the transition to a civilian government in 2011. At best, the Myanmar government 
could only say it possessed what Mann describes as coercive power. However, 
ceasefire capitalism has created a decentralised power structure away from the state 
to local strongmen. In the ceasefire zones, the military has a very limited presence. 
State apparatuses are reduced to providing limited services for health and education. 
In SAZs, such as the Pa-O, there is not even a magistrate court. Therefore, there is a 
strong absence of the state both in terms of its structure and its functionality. 
However, if the state is not the analytical unit, what framework can explain the 
power dynamics that appear to be dispersed? For a solution to this conundrum, the 
thesis turns to Joel Migdal and his state-in-society approach.  
Migdal (2001) begins by questioning the state-centred approach by challenging its 
core assumption that the state (or the centre) has a monopoly on the use of violence 
and superior access to resources. Instead, he argues that ‘we should look at multiple 
sites to understand domination and change – and at results that [do] not fit any of the 
parties’ designed policies’ (Migdal, 2001, 10). Migdal suggests that it is the 
dynamics at these multiple sites, or what he terms arenas, that affect the eventual 
outcomes, which could be very different from originally anticipated.
 
In these 
multiple sites, Migdal (2001, p. 11) reminds researchers that they should abandon the 
burden of state rules and regulations and instead ‘zero in on the conflict-laden 
interactions of multiple sets of formal and informal guideposts for how to behave that 
are promoted by different groupings in society.’  
Indeed, the state-in-society approach is embedded in Callahan’s work. In examining 
the country’s political situation, Callahan (2007, pp. 8-9) stresses that ‘to more 
critically assess the nature of political authority throughout Burma, and more 
specifically in the ethnically-demarcated states, this study follows Joel Migdal’s 
conceptual approach’. The state-in-society approach has allowed her to arrive at 
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different outcomes for different arenas, some suffering total devolution, some 
experiencing military occupation, and some achieving coexistence. Her findings 
reinforce Migdal’s claim about the difficulties of anticipating outcomes due to 
various local dynamics at work. Therefore, instead of looking for a general theory to 
explain the different outcomes, the state-in-society approach would suggest that one 
should try to understand the dynamics at the local level because there is no point 
looking at the outcomes when they may not even be the original intention. This is 
particularly true when state power has been franchised to local strongmen in a 
process of power arbitrage, effectively ending the state’s monopoly over the use of 
violence in the territory concerned (Ahram & King, 2012). Migdal (1988) describes 
this as the accommodation of embedded societal actors or strongmen by weak states. 
Behind Migdal’s (1988, p. 22) main argument on state-society relations is the 
concept of social control, which is ‘the successful subordination of people’s own 
inclinations of social behaviour or behaviour sought by other social organisations in 
favour of the behaviour prescribed by state rules’. Social control can be understood 
by means of three indicators: compliance, participation, and legitimation. 
Compliance means getting the population to conform to the demands of the state, by 
sanctions or force if necessary, while participation is the involvement of the 
population in meeting state demands. Whereas compliance and participation can be 
derived from the mindful calculations of individuals in regard to rewards and 
sanctions, legitimation goes further to indicate the acceptance by the population of 
the rules of the game under state organisation (Migdal, 1988, pp. 32-33). Therefore, 
social control involves the successful subordination of people’s own inclinations of 
social behaviour in favour of the behaviour prescribed by state rules (Migdal, 1988, 
p. 22). Social control is what Mann (1984) refers to as infrastructural power, which 
involves the organisation and regulation of the population at the societal level.
16 
Importantly, enforcing social control facilitates the delivery of positive political 
goods, which include healthcare, education, infrastructure and economic 
development. Therefore, social control is a mean to prevent state failure because 
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effective social control enhances the capacity of the state to penetrate, regulate, 
extract, and attribute resources as it desires. 
In regard to theoretical development, Migdal has outlined his approach on how to 
observe state-society relations. The first step begins with understanding the 
environment of the conflict. It is only through this understanding that the ‘arena’ 
where the leaders and local resistance collide can be identified. The next step is to 
examine the mechanisms of social control. Here, Migdal has singled out three levels 
of control, or what he calls the ‘triangle of accommodation’. At the top level is the 
accommodation of the central executive leadership. In the case of the military regime 
in Myanmar, this refers to the generals that made up the SLORC. The second level of 
accommodation is the leadership in the state agencies. In the context of the post-
ceasefire landscape, this relates to the accommodation of the ethnic warlords, or what 
Duffield and Callahan refer to as ‘the emerging political complex’, and what Woods 
calls ‘ceasefire capitalism’. The final level is the accommodation of the officials at 
the local level, or what Migdal (1988) calls the ‘implementers’. Migdal (1988, p.238) 
notes that the implementers ‘are usually far from the sight of state leaders, often even 
far from the sight of top personnel in their agencies, and they pose little danger of 
creating power centers that could threaten the position of state leaders’. However, 
despite their obscurity, they are crucial in ‘determining whose authority and rules 
will take hold in region’ (Migdal, 1988, p. 238). The bottom level of accommodation 
is precisely what the existing literature fails to address and where this dissertation 
aims to fill the gap in current knowledge.  
Local resistance is used by Migdal (2001) to explain why many Third World 
countries remain weak in terms of capacity despite building up many institutions to 
support the functioning of the state. However, Migdal never claims that local 
resistance cannot be overcome. Indeed, he offers the triangle of accommodation as a 
solution to recapacitate the state through the implementation of social control. What 
needs to be highlighted here is that just when state capacity is building up, so will the 
level of resistance. Therefore, the state-in-society approach is not only about 
predicting the political outcome of the tussle between state and society, but it also 




another. Hence, Midgal (2001, p. 23) stresses that ‘the state-in-society approach 
points researchers to the process of interaction of groupings with one another and 
with those whose actual behaviour they are vying to control or influence […]. The 
state continually morphs’. 
1.8 Analytical Approach: A New Order under Critical 
Political Economy 
If the theoretical framework relates to the parameters containing the research 
question, then the analytical approach should light up the signposts that guide the 
research in finding the answer within that framework. With this in mind, the present 
thesis turns to the Murdoch school of critical political economy to form the backbone 
of the analytical approach. The difference between the theoretical framework and the 
analytical approach is that Migdal is on a higher level of theoretical abstraction, 
whereas the Murdoch school of critical political economy is an empirically grounded 
analytical approach used to explain the persistent lack of democratic development in 
Southeast Asia. 
Political economy is concerned with the interactions between political and economic 
cleavages in a society. When dealing with a post-conflict political and economic 
landscape, ‘political economy analysis seeks to understand both the political and 
economic aspects of conflict, and how these combine to affect patterns of power and 
vulnerability’ (Collinson, 2003, p. 3). Under this approach, the state is no longer 
treated as an autonomous entity but as represented by agents who have their own 
agendas and interests. It is through the interactions of these agents, some conciliatory 
and others confrontational, that the state is shaped.  
The Murdoch school refers to a group of scholars in the Asia Research Centre of 
Murdoch University in Australia working on the political regime trajectory in 
Southeast Asia. The group includes Richard Robinson and Vedi Hadiz, who focus on 
Indonesia, Garry Rodan on Singapore, Kevin Hewison on Thailand, Jane Hutchison 
on the Philippines, and Caroline Hughes on Cambodia, to name but a few. This 
school views the state in the context of social power relations (Jones, 2014). They 




powerful local business elites can severely constrain the institutional capacity of the 
state because of their close ties with the government. Despite Indonesia and the 
Philippines going through democratic transition after the removal of Suharto and 
Marcos, the business elites remained influential after the downfall of the regimes. In 
examining the fall of Suharto after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Robinson and 
Hadiz (2004) found that the business elites of Indonesia managed to lean on their 
structural power in the economy in order to extend their dominance in the political 
economy, even though the patronage relationship with Suharto was removed. A 
study carried out by Hutchison on the Philippines also reflects a similar outcome. 
After Marcos was toppled in 1986, Hutchison (2006) found that the old oligarchs 
were still able to maintain their power in Congress. Robinson and Hadiz (2004, p. 
256) call the new political order ‘oligarchic democracy’, whereas Hutchison (2006, 
p. 57) goes further to suggest that it should be the norm, as he sees the process as ‘the 
restoration of elite democracy’.  
While acknowledging the existence of state institutions, the Murdoch school believes 
that the functions of these institutions are being constrained by conflicting social 
forces, which include ethnic divisions, class status, and religions. Consequently, the 
political outcomes of these socio-political dynamics are being conditioned by these 
powerful social forces, whose interest is not liberal reform but to tighten their control 
over state assets. Their examination of political economy in Southeast Asia 
consequently led Hewison, Robinson and Rodan (1993, p. 18) to conclude that ‘a 
particular regime, therefore, cannot be understood separately from the structure of 
social power and conflict and specific class interests.’ To be sure, the Murdoch 
school does not see the state and its official institutions as the main analytical units. 
Instead, attention should turn to the separate power cluster that is formed by a 
coalition of political and business elites; in this sense, it is their actions that are 
influencing state decision making and capacity, which, in turn, shape the state. In 
adopting this analytical approach, this research claims that the political transition in 
Myanmar will be conditioned by the collusion between political and business elites. 
Power is not in the hands of the state but instead rests with separate power clusters, 




The case of political transition in Cambodia provides a good example for explaining 
why the critical political economy approach is applicable to the case of Myanmar. 
When Cambodia was transiting from socialism to capitalism in the mid-1980s, state 
assets were transferred to private companies controlled by political elites who re-
emerged in the political scene under the banner of the Cambodian People’s Party. In 
the 1993 election, under the watchful eye of the United Nations, the party won just 
38.2% of the vote and was forced to form a coalition government with the Western-
backed FUNCINPEC party, which took 45.5% of the vote. However, through control 
of the country’s natural resources and the extensive patronage network with the 
military, the Cambodian People’s Party gradually gained advantage over its main 
political rivals. In the 1998 election, it retook the lead, with 41.4% compared to the 
31.7% picked up by the FUNCINPEC. While still lacking an overall majority, the 
Cambodian People’s Party received 47.3% of vote (FUNCINPEC 20.8%) in the 2003 
election. In 2008, the party became the majority political party, with 58.1% of the 
vote (Hughes, 2003; Jones, 2014). The trend of the Cambodian People’s Party 
dominance is clear, but how did they manage to accomplish this revival when control 
of the state was removed from them? Their dominance exposes the weakness of both 
the modernisation and institutional schools because the nexus of power construction 
was clearly wrestled away from the state to a political economy outside of the state 
domain.  
Juxtaposing the Cambodia experience on Myanmar, the two regimes share many 
parallels. Before the 2015 election, the military regime of Myanmar had already 
transferred valuable state assets to the two companies they controlled: The Union of 
Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEH) and the Myanmar Economic 
Corporation (MEC). They have also tried to present a civilian image by forming the 
USDP as their de facto political party, and they have built extensive patron-client 
networks with local strongmen. Like the Cambodian People’s Party, the USDP also 
suffered defeat in the 2015 election. However, does this signify the end of the 
military and the USDP in the power constellation of Myanmar?  
Despite the NLD election victory in 2015, the actual political and economic reforms 




limited. On the political front, the 2008 Constitution provides the military with veto 
powers. Under the provisions in Articles 109(b) and 141(b), the military is 
automatically given 25% of the seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw and the Amyotha 
Hluttaw. However, under Article 436, any changes to the Constitution must have 
75% approval. Therefore, any proposed constitutional change that may weaken the 
power of the military will simply be blocked by the effective veto vote. On the 
economic front, the military have vested interests in all sectors of the economy. 
Through the UMEH and MEC, companies set up by the military to look after their 
own interests, the military have stakes in all the key businesses in the country, 
ranging from natural resources and tourism to construction and transportation. The 
Letpadaung copper mine in the Sagaing region is a case in point. The mine is 
operated by the Chinese company Wanbao Mining, but the UMEH, inevitably, has a 
stake in the operation. Despite public outcry about the project, and the previous 
government under U Thein Sein asking Aung San Suu Kyi to investigate, nothing 
changed and the mine resumed operations on 5 May 2016. Sagaing Chief Minister U 
Myint Naing was quoted as saying that he could take no action despite the NLD 
enjoying an overwhelming majority in the regional Hluttaw Council.
17 
 
The 2008 Constitution and the Letpadaung copper mine highlight two salient points 
regarding how Migdal’s theoretical framework can be applied to the study of regime 
survival strategy. Referring back to the triangle of accommodation that Migdal has 
suggested, the 2008 Constitution is top-level accommodation, securing and 
perpetuating the place of the military in the state in spite of the political transition. 
The Letpadaung copper mine represents the second level of accommodation, given 
the patron-client relations formed between business elites and politicians to foster the 
state priorities of extraction and appropriation. Crucially though, the fact that the 
copper mine resumed production amid strong local resistance and investigation 
headed up by the main opposition suggests that strong social control has been 
achieved. What this means is that the third level of accommodation of the 
implementer is also working. Yet, the question remains: who are the implementers 
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that did the work for the regime behind the scenes? This leads us back to the main 
research question of this thesis. 
1.9 Research Design and Methodology 
In her PhD dissertation examining political resistance in authoritarian Burma, Linnea 
Beatty (2011, p. 19) expresses difficulties in accessing information because of the 
lack of reliable official data.
18 
This is particularly true when the subject and the area 
of study, namely the construction of power in the Pa-O region, are extremely under-
researched. In terms of literature, there are only three books written in English that 
talk specifically about Pa-O, the most recent of which is by Russ Christensen and 
Sann Kyaw (2006), which provides the background to the Pa-O struggle for self-
determination. There is also a book published in 1980 by Mika Rolly (1980) on the 
historical and cultural background of the Pa-O people and an ethnographic study on 
the Pa-O society by Willion Hackett (1953), published over half a century ago. There 
are brief mentions of the Pa-O in other books and journals, but they usually do not go 
into too much detail (e.g. (Callahan, 2007; Kramer, 2010). While all these studies 
will be closely examined in the following chapters, there is much to explore and find 
out.  
This thesis turned to grounded theory to form the backbone of the research design. 
Using the grounded theory approach, the research design was based on a mixture of 
qualitative and quantitative techniques. Interviews were arranged with the key actors, 
i.e. government officials, local political parties from both pro- and anti-government 
camps, political activists, ceasefire armed groups, CSOs and NGOs, and, of course, 
ordinary Pa-O villagers. To overcome the language problem, a Burmese 
undergraduate from the City University of Hong Kong was recruited as an 
interpreter. He also acted as an informant as he used to work part-time for the Kaung 
Rwai Social Action Network (KRSAN), a Pa-O CSO based in Taunggyi, the capital 
of Shan State. A second interpreter, who also acted as an informant, was recruited 
from another CSO. He is a local ethnic Pa-O, and his father held a senior position in 
the PNO. The need for the second interpreter was because of the need to have 
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someone who could speak ethnic Pa-O, in addition to verifying the accuracy of the 
first interpreter’s interpretation. His connection to the PNO was an added bonus, and 




The research began by approaching KRSAN for introductions and to propose 
interviews. By employing a snowball technique, the author was referred to local 
political parties, ceasefire groups, armed groups, activists, peacekeepers, NGOs, and 
local villagers for interviews. There was no pre-set number of interviews; in this 
regard, the number and target of the interviews were guided by the saturation of 
information. Altogether, 190 interviews (excluding questionnaires) were conducted: 
30 politicians from 6 political parties; 9 political activists; 5 ceasefire groups; 15 
representatives from 9 CSOs and NGOs; 4 business entities, 120 Pa-O villagers 
(including 13 village headmen and 7 village tract leaders), 1 politician, 1 religious 
leader, and 5 government officials, during the period from June 2014 to July 2017. 
From the interviews, key actors in the Pa-O political economy were identified and 
their relationships charted.  
In addition to taking memos, an audio recording of the interviews was carried out 
upon receiving consent from the interviewees. A short script was then read out to the 
interviewees, consisting of an introduction to the person doing the interview, the 
purpose of the interview, the procedures of the interview, the use of the information, 
confidentiality, treatment of interview notes and recordings after the information was 
processed, and checking whether the interviewees had any questions (see Appendix 
1: Interview Introduction Brief). To maintain research ethics, all audio recordings, 
memos, and notes were to be destroyed after completion of the research.  
The Pa-O people have been involved in the struggle for self-determination since the 
country became independent in 1947. However, what does self-determination mean 
to the Pa-O people now that they have their own SAZ? This is the overarching 
question that should help to shed light on how the regime maintained control in a 
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decentralised area. Therefore, the interviews focused on six main areas: the main 
political actors in the SAZ, law and order, justice, development, self-determination, 
and the recent elections. On the issue of the main political actors, the interviewees 
were asked to identify who they saw as having influence in the SAZ. On the issue of 
law and order, questions related to who maintained law and order and how they 
achieved it. On the issue of justice, the questions focused on how grievances were 
settled and if justice had been served. Based on what they had experienced, how did 
they view self-determination? The interviews also aimed to identify how the Pa-O 
people saw development and what they wanted from development. Finally, the 
interviewees were also asked about how they viewed the recent election (see 
Appendix 2: Semi-Structured Interview Question List).  
As part of the grounded theory approach, this thesis employed four research 
strategies to collect information for analysis: conducting semi-structured interviews 
to identify the relevant issues, setting hypotheses for variance analysis, carrying out a 
case study to contextualise the results from the quantitative analysis, and performing 
across-methods triangulation so as to validate the results. Throughout the analysis, 
references are made to articles from the press, published government data, the 
government gazette, published laws and regulations, and archived documents. Such 
secondary sources were intensively scrutinised in order to provide a comprehensive 
summary of the relevant information in support of this research.  
1.9.1 Grounded theory 
Since very little is known about the political order in the Pa-O area, a grounded 
theory approach was adopted to uncover the political networks and determine how 
power is constructed, administrated, and resisted. According to Birks and Mills 
(2011), grounded theory has an exploratory aspect that makes it most appropriate 
when little is known about an area of study. Grounded theory consists of ‘systematic 
inductive guidelines for collecting and analysing data to build middle-range 
theoretical frameworks that explain the collected data’ (Charmaz, 2003, pp. 249-
250). Essentially, grounded theory does not start an enquiry with a theory and then 
attempt to prove it, but it is instead a systematic method of collecting and analysing 




process that is heuristic in nature, and involves analytical interpretations of initial 
data that lead to and inform further data collection, eventually contributing towards 
theory building. Therefore, data collection and analysis are interrelated processes 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 6).  
The procedures for a grounded theory investigation comprise several steps: initial 
coding and categorisation of data, concurrent data collection and analysis, writing 
memos, theoretical sampling, constant comparative analysis, theoretical sensitivity, 
intermediate coding, selecting a core category, theoretical saturation, and, finally, 
theoretical integration (Birks & Mills, 2011; Charmaz, 2003). The main objective of 
data coding is to define and categorise data for further analysis (Charmaz, 2003, p. 
258). The coding process and concurrent data analysis help researchers to gain new 
perspectives, which may lead to new directions. Writing memos during data 
collection becomes a written record of the researcher’s chain of thought during the 
enquiry process, or what Clarke (2005, p. 85) describes as ‘the intellectual capital in 
the bank’. Theoretical sampling is required when the properties, conditions, 
dimensions, or relations between categories require further clarifications. During this 
process, written memos become the audit trial for theory development. Constant 
comparative analysis relates to the constant comparison of incidents with other 
incidents and codes, or codes with codes, codes with categories, and finally 
categories with categories (Birks & Mills, 2011). This is an important process, during 
which various dimensions of the grounded theory are being integrated. Theoretical 
sensitivity consists of two parts: personal and intellectual history. On a personal 
level, this reflects the researcher’s own background in relation to the situation under 
investigation, very much along the lines of the ‘participant objectivation’ of Pierre 
Bourdieu (1977). On the level of intellectual history, this basically relates to a 
literature review, or the sum of the theoretical knowledge that the researcher has 
acquired. Intermediate coding follows on from the integration process and refers to a 
generalisation and abstract description of the data in hand. Identifying a core 
category will help researchers zoom in on a particular area where they want to 
develop their theory. The way to identify a core category is by reaching a point 




saturation of various properties of the categories. In theoretical integration, the 
technique of narrating a storyline is often used to present the grounded theory. 
There have been heated debates as to how the core categories can emerge from 
empirical observations without the influence of previous theoretical knowledge. 
These different views were epitomised by the rift between Glaser and Strauss, the 
two pioneers of grounded theory, as to what the role of previous theoretical 
knowledge in the inductive process should be. In Emergence vs. Forcing, Glaser 
(1992) openly accuses Strauss of betraying the common cause of grounded theory. 
However, the rift in opinion is not as wide as it seems. Both Glaser and Strauss agree 
that grounded theory is relative to the perspective of the practitioner. That is to say, 
different investigators using grounded theory as a research method can generate 
alternative theories from the same observations. Therefore, the grounded theory 
method can be seen as a form of hermeneutics, while, at the same time, hermeneutics 
can be used to complement a grounded theory analysis (Rennie, 2000, p. 494).  
Consequently, with the application of grounded theory extended from psychology 
and healthcare research to other social science disciplines, it has been generally 
accepted by scholars that, as long as the core categories emerge from the empirical 
data, then the development of these categories with theoretical preconceptions are 
still regarded as sufficiently grounded from observations (Kelle, 2007; Rennie, 
2000). Indeed, Chalmers (2013) argues that scientific observations are always laden 
with theories. Therefore, to claim that a researcher can somehow free oneself from 
theoretical preconceptions is ‘naïve inductivism’ (Kelle, 2007, p. 197). Moreover, 
Rennie and Fergus (2006, p. 496) suggest that embodied experience can enhance the 
quality of category generation because it is consistent with the constant comparative 
procedure of the grounded theory method.  
Therefore, it needs to be stressed that, although a theoretical framework has been 
introduced in the initial part of this thesis, readers are reminded that the conception 
of the state-in-society approach was informed by the earlier empirical observations 




A common criticism of grounded theory is the lack of objectivity in the data 
collection process (Thomas & James, 2006). No qualitative methodology can escape 
this criticism. However, this shortfall can be overcome by using the constant 
comparative procedure of Birks and Mills (2011) in order to improve the checks and 
balances. The constant comparative process also allows researchers to identify 
inconsistencies during the interviews, and therefore researchers will be able to clarify 
the data with further questions.  
1.9.2 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews are one of the most commonly used qualitative 
techniques in trying to extract information from participants. In such interviews, 
questions are constructed in such a way that the interview is thematic and topic-
oriented. In so doing, the researcher can avoid wandering into unrelated topics and 
ensure the relevance of the interview (Edwards & Holland, 2013). The purpose of the 
interview is three-fold. First, it represents first-hand information on a subject, which 
can be about the personal experience of the informant, details about an organisation, 
or descriptions of an event. Second, it provides an opportunity to verify information 
obtained from different sources, and, in the case of contrasting accounts, interviews 
expand the spectrum and perspective of the underlying story. Last but not least, it is 
useful in generating more referrals for interviews.  
There are two issues relating to semi-structured interviews for this research, the first 
of which is concerned with the number of interviews and the second relates to 
protecting the identity of the interviewees. The number of interviews was restricted 
by the accessibility of the population. Many Pa-O villages are located in remote 
hillside areas, which are not supported by tarmac roads, and thus accessibility was an 
issue. Moreover, there are strict rules regarding overnight stays at a village, which 
may raise ethical concerns about maintaining the confidentiality of informants. 
Therefore, the research is not a large-N study. Whilst the benefit of a large-N sample 
is that the result may have better external validity, a small-N study can achieve better 
internal validity and measurement validity. Another implication of using a small-N 




however, the findings can form the basis of a causal inference for future studies, 
when a big-N sample is available.  
Confidentiality relating to the identities of the interviewees was of paramount 
concern in this research. Therefore, their names, as well as the time and place of the 
interview, are not disclosed in this thesis. Moreover, all the notes and audio 
recordings are to be destroyed after the thesis completion.  
1.9.3 Analysis of variance and post-hoc testing 
The grounded theory approach does not begin with theory, but instead relies on other 
investigative techniques, such as interviews and observations, to generate hypotheses 
for theory building. From the semi-structured interviews, this research constructed 
several hypotheses relating to the conduit of control in the SAZ that need to be tested 
by way of variance analysis (ANOVA). Variance analysis is the study of the 
differences in the means of groups of samples. By using various statistical models, 
depending on the subjects of study, ANOVA sets out to determine if there is a 
statistically significant difference in the sample means.  
This research collected data from three independent groups and aimed to establish if 
there was a significant difference in the means of each group. Therefore, a one-way 
ANOVA test using SPSS software was used to test the null hypotheses.  
While a one-way ANOVA can confirm whether there is a difference in the means, it 
cannot establish which group caused the difference. Hence, a post-hoc test was 
carried out. For the purpose of this research, Fisher’s Least Significant Difference 
(LSD) was chosen to determine which group caused the difference. 
1.9.4 Case study 
As a research methodology, case studies are one of the most commonly used 
techniques to find out what can be learned from a single case (Stake, 2003). In a case 
study, attention needs to be drawn to the nature of the case, its background, the 




other relevant issues, other similar cases, and the informants through whom the case 
is known (Stake, 2003, pp. 139-140). 
However, this technique is often criticised as being overly subjective and vulnerable 
to misinterpretation. To overcome this perceived lack of objectivity, this research 
utilised triangulation, thick description, and comparison to improve the quality of the 
case presented. In this context, triangulation is ‘a process of using multiple 
perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or 
interpretation’ (Stake, 2003, p. 148).20 For example, when an informant mentioned a 
case in which a villager was murdered because he was involved in a land dispute 
claim, the triangulation verification that followed involved checking with public 
media, such as national and local newspaper reports, on the murder, the existence of 
any legal documents relating to the claim, and, in the absence of such independent 
evidence, cross-checking with other informants. Other methods that can help to 
mitigate misrepresentation error is by showing the draft of the interview transcript to 
the informant for verification (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
On the other hand, thick description refers to providing as much detail about the case 
as possible so that readers are informed about the backgrounds and can form their 
own interpretations (Geertz, 1973). This can be used in conjunction with comparing 
against other cases so as to guide readers about possible areas of difference (Stake, 
2003). The advantage of using both thick description and comparison as techniques 
to overcome the shortcomings of subjectivity in a case study approach is to provide 
the readers with as much information as possible, but without losing the focus and 
direction of the enquiry.  
1.9.5 Triangulation 
Triangulation relates to the use of mixed data or methods to substantiate a viewpoint. 
The argument for using triangulation is to overcome the dependency on a single 
method and therefore reduce the chance of bias and enhance the validity of the 
findings. As Denzin (1970) claims, ‘no single method is always superior. Each has 
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its own special strengths and weaknesses. It is time for sociologists to recognise this 
fact and to move on to a position that permits them to approach their problems with 
all relevant and appropriate methods, to the strategy of methodological triangulation’ 
(Denzin, 1970, 471). 
There are two types of triangulation, both of which serve to provide cross-checking 
of an event in order to enhance its validity. Within-method triangulation is the 
application of various strategies within one method, such as using different scales to 
measure an empirical case. Across-method triangulation is the use of different 
methods to quantify or contextualise the same empirical case (Blaikie, 1991). This 
dissertation employs both within-method and across-method triangulation to enhance 
the validity of its finding.  
1.10  Organisation of the Thesis 
The thesis follows the analytical scheme outlined by Migdal in his 1988’s book: 
Strong Societies and Weak States – State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in 
the Third World. Although in 1994 the state-in-society approach was taken up by ten 
scholars in the edited book State power and Social Forces, and Migdal again picked 
up the concept in 2001 in his book State in Society, it is in the 1988 publication that 
contains the full analytical procedures. 
Accordingly, the search for answers to the research question of how the regime 
managed to maintain control after decentralisation begins in Chapter 2. This is the 
first step of the state-in-society approach as suggested by Migdal, i.e. to provide the 
background of the conflict. In this chapter, the nature of the state-society relation is 
discussed with regard to four dimensions. The first dimension focuses on the 
background of the ethnic struggle for self-determination and explains why this 
remains important and relevant in the current political climate. The second 
dimension relates to regime survival, wherein the predicaments faced by a regime 
that has limited legitimacy are outlined and its average life-expectancy is discussed. 
This serves to highlight that the Myanmar regime has outlived the average 




leadership, as suggested in Migdal’s triangle of accommodation. The third dimension 
dwells on warlord politics, in which the strategy of warlord accommodation, or the 
second level of the triangle of accommodation, is discussed. This accommodation 
strategy would inevitably result in changes to patron-client relations at the local 
level. Mindful that Migdal has stressed the need to understand the state-society 
relation in the arena where suppression and resistance took place, and since the last 
two sections examine the suppression coming from above, the last section therefore 
examines the resistance brought about by development at the local level. As the 
majority of Pa-O are farmers, this section examines resistance by means of a debate 
on the demand for subsistence ethics under a moral economy, as against trade-off 
calculations by rational peasants.  
With the background of the struggle explained, Chapter 3 examines the 
administrative system in Shan State and aims to answer the first of the sub-questions 
relating to how the state was being administered. The chapter outlines historical 
governmental strategies and policies in frontier management and explains how they 
have evolved over time. The objective of this investigation is to identify the structure 
and capacity of the local system, or what Migdal refers to as social control, and 
expose the components that could be exploited by the military regime in their own 
social control management, in other words, the statecraft strategy.  
Following the examination of the administrative system, the main political actors in 
the Pa-O SAZ are identified in Chapter 4. This is an important step in the state-in-
society approach as it aims to identify the key players in the Pa-O arena. The list of 
political actors is expanded from the three groups listed by Kramer (i.e. armed 
groups, political parties, and CSOs) to include others, such as political activists. In 
this new frontier, or what Duffield and Callahan refer to as the emerging political 
complex, old actors evolved and new actors emerged, and therefore their origins and 
agendas need to be clarified.  
The mechanism of social control is the subject of investigation in Chapters 5 and 6. 
In Chapter 5, the relationships between these political actors are charted under a 




the analytical approach influenced by the Murdoch school of critical political 
economy, representing the second level of Migdal’s triangle of accommodation. In 
essence, this section aims to explain the dynamics of ceasefire capitalism in the 
context of political economy, in addition to how these dynamics are being confronted 
by resistance. How can the success of ceasefire capitalism be assessed? The 2015 
general election provides the benchmark for assessment. The PNO was the only pro-
regime ethnic political party that retained all of their seats in the 2015 election. 
Despite this, there were many social issues unaddressed under the PNO, so how did 
they manage the task when faced with strong local resistance in an election that was 
generally regarded as being open and fair? This boils down to how they could control 
the villagers, or what Midgal refers to as the social control mechanism. 
Accordingly, the means of control is examined in Chapter 6. Drawing from extensive 
interviews, the PNO may have won the election on merit because they have been 
delivering social infrastructure that has improved the livelihoods of Pa-O villagers. 
However, the interviews also reveal that there was rampant land grabbing and 
corruption that led to the degradation of the environment, which affected tens of 
thousands of villagers. Moreover, it has been revealed that the village tract leaders 
(VTLs) have a lot of say as to which village could get what. Therefore, the means of 
control and how it is being manifested at the local level is investigated in this 
chapter. This is the construction of the third level of the triangle of accommodation 
and the identification of what Migdal calls the implementer. In essence, this chapter 
identifies the missing piece of the jigsaw in the current literature on Myanmar 
statecraft and answers the research question.  
Based on the findings, Chapter 7 tests the argument by outlining the hypotheses of 
how control was achieved. These hypotheses are then put to the test by using one-
way ANOVA. The results are then put into context through a case study of the Tigyit 
coal and power project in Pinlaung Township in the Pa-O SAZ. In the concluding 
chapter, key findings from this research are summarised and discussed and their 




2          Chapter Two:           
The Nature of the State-Society Relations 
 
In applying the state-in-society theoretical framework, Migdal (1988, p. 261) has 
stressed that ‘the starting point for analysis is the environment of conflict’. 
Accordingly, the nature of the state-society relations in Myanmar and the cause of 
conflict will be examined in this chapter from four dimensions. The aim is not to find 
the answers to the research question within these four dimensions but to explain the 
research question further in order to be informed about the areas in need of further 
investigation. 
The first dimension examines the basis of self-determination in Burma. Without 
comprehending the background of the ethnic struggle, it is impossible to understand 
why a state-centric approach to unify the country is doomed to failure. The 
examination focuses on the country’s colonial history, the events leading up to the 
Panglong Conference in 1947, and its aftermath. In particular, this section aims to 
locate the Pa-O in terms of their struggle for self-determination and explain their 
relationships with the Karens, of whom the Pa-O is a sub-group, and with their 
immediate neighbour, the Shan. These historical events help to capture the dynamics 
of the ethnic struggle not just from the perspective of nationalism but also from the 
driving force of uneven and deficient development. More importantly, this 
background helps to shed light on the social structure, which is a prerequisite for 
assessing state capabilities (Migdal, 1988, p. 33).  
The second dimension examines the state-society relations from the perspective of 
regime survival. There are different types of non-democratic regimes, a military 
regime being just one of them. Therefore, what are the challenges that are unique to a 
military regime? The objective here is to highlight the predicament faced by the 
military regime in Myanmar and examine how they have overcome such difficulties. 
Although it is not the central theme of this thesis, it is necessary to understand how 




The third dimension looks at the state-society relations from the perspective of the 
ethnic leaders. Although these ethnic leaders started their struggle against the central 
authority on the moral high ground of self-determination, they invariably became 
involved in financial racketeering, which turned their behaviour into that more akin 
to the warlords. Therefore, this section focuses on warlord politics and examines if 
there is a normative role for a warlord in a state. Abandoning the concept of the 
monopoly use of force by a state, attention is turned to the outsourcing of violence to 
local warlords. Warlords are economic opportunists, and this virtue makes them 
culpable to co-optation, or what is known as the second level of accommodation in 
the triangle of accommodation in Migdal’s regime survival strategy.  
However, why can some warlords be incorporated into the state while some cannot, 
or, in Callahan’s terms, why do some areas suffer total devolution as war continues 
while others manage to coexist? To understand the dynamics involved requires 
knowledge about the space where these forces collide. This space is ground zero, the 
arena where different dynamics are played out. Yet, the concept of space seems to 
have been mostly overlooked by warlord politics scholars, who have simply treated 
the space of overlapping authorities as the margins where state power ends. Terms 
like boundaries and frontiers are used loosely. However, there is a clear functional 
difference between a boundary and a frontier, which, in turn, leads to different 
political outcomes. Therefore, an added objective of this section is to make a case for 
the difference, thereby adding a much-needed aspect to the terrain where warlords 
operate.  
Finally, the fourth dimension of the state-society relation approaches the dynamic 
from the other side of the power spectrum, i.e. viewing the conflict through the lens 
of the powerless Pa-O villagers under a suppressive regime. Traditional patron-client 
relations in the rural areas have inevitably been altered under the strategy of warlord 
accommodation. As new sets of rules are being imposed, what would persuade the 
villagers to conform and comply, and what would cause them to revolt? Since most 
Pa-O are farmers, this section revisits the debate between Scott and Popkin on moral 
economy and rational choice. This debate has significant implications for 




the final piece of the triangle of accommodation and shed light on the identification 
of the implementer as the nexus of power at the local level. 
2.1 Background to the Ethnic Struggle 
The struggle for self-determination by the ethnic minorities in Burma can be traced 
back to the collapse of the Konbaung Dynasty (1752–1885). The destruction of the 
traditional patron-client relationship established between the royal court in Mandalay 
and ethnic minorities prompted the quest for more autonomy from the latter. 
However, subsequent events further fuelled this determination. During the British 
occupation, the deliberate separation of the Frontier Areas from Burma Proper under 
the divide-and-rule strategy prevented any chance of integration. Moreover, during 
the Second World War, Aung San initially aligned with the invading Japanese, while 
many ethnic minorities were fighting for the British. The fighting between the two 
sides further bred hatred and mistrust. However, this is just the tip of the iceberg, and 
there are more issues that need to be revealed. The revelations begin with the British 
occupation era. 
2.1.1 A brief colonial history and the segregation of the Frontier 
Areas 
The British conquest of Burma was spread over three stages. The First Anglo-
Burmese War of 1824 –26 resulted in the secession of Tenasserim, Arakan, Manipur, 
and Assam provinces to Britain. The Second Anglo-Burmese War of 1852–53 ended 
with the seizure of Pegu province, effectively making whatever was left of Burma a 
land-locked state. The Third Anglo-Burmese War of 1885–86 resulted in the British 
army taking control of the capital, Mandalay, and thus the annexation of Burma 
under Britain was complete.  
The colonial governance left behind two unwarranted legacies that contributed to the 
subsequent ethnic struggles after independence. First was the alienation of the 
Frontier Areas (also known as the Scheduled or Excluded Areas) from Ministerial 
Burma (Burma Proper).
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greed, colonial governance and the degree of direct control varied in accordance with 
the potential of economic returns. Thus, the topology of the country determined how 
colonial rules were implemented. Such an arrangement meant that the Frontier Areas 
were left alone, and, consequently, their exposure to colonial reform was limited. 
This resulted in preventing the development of a collective identity with Burma 
Proper. Second, colonial governance oversaw the destruction of the social fabric in 
rural areas. After the First Anglo-Burmese War, the British immediately abolished 
the hereditary status of township headmen (myo-thu-gyi) in order to assert their own 
authority. In the Pegu province after the Second Anglo-Burmese War, the British 
approached the Mon and Karen for help to govern, but these ethnic ‘leaders’ simply 
did not have the necessary legitimacy or knowledge to communicate effectively with 
the locals. These new officials, although still carrying the title of Myo-thu-gyi, never 
performed the socio-cultural and administrative functions of their predecessors. They 
arrived on time to collect taxes, but they never showed up at local festivities where 
social bonding could be fostered (Aung-Thwin & Aung-Thwin, 2012, p. 186). 
Consequently, sporadic township and village leaders formed resistance groups to 
challenge the colonial rule. When King Thibaw and his royal court were exiled to 
India after the end of the Third Anglo-Burmese War in 1886, the traditional 
patronage system of the kingdom collapsed. Seizing the void in traditional authority, 
the entire Upper Burma revolted. Suffice to say that the seeds of Kachin, Chin, Shan, 
Mon, and Karen separatism can be traced back to this period (Aung-Thwin & Aung-
Thwin, 2012; Aye, 2009; Smith, 1999).  
By the turn of the twentieth century, the British had largely put down the rebellion in 
Upper Burma and began their project of pacification, or rather a lack of one. In this 
regard, a distinctive feature of British colonial rule in Burma was the limited attempt 
to integrate the Frontier Areas with Burma Proper. A basic parliamentary system 
with a limited form of democracy was introduced for Ministerial Burma.
 
In contrast, 
authority in the Frontier Areas was left with the hereditary rulers and chiefs. 
Although the Village Act was introduced in 1887 to break down the traditional 
township configurations, the purpose of the legislation was merely to sever the 
traditional patron-client relationship between the villagers and the myo-thu-gyis; in 








Just as colonisation by Britain altered the traditional balance of the political and 
social structure of Burma, the Japanese invasion in 1942 created an opportunity for 
different groups with diverse interests to challenge the power dynamics created by 
the British, which hardly had the time to consolidate. Back in early 1930s, the Saya 
San rebellion had already ignited the Burmese appetite for the recreation of the 
Burmese identity. Led by an influential leader by the name of Aung Sang, the 
Burmese Independence Army (BIA) began to take shape. These new challengers 
were initially anti-British, which was the reason why the Japanese were interested in 
recruiting and training them to be a combative force (Aung San, 1946; Maung, 
1989). They picked up arms under the banner of nationalism to fight for an 
independent Burma. At first, they aligned themselves with the invading Japanese 
army in the hope that they would give them independence. This further deepened the 
rift and mistrust with ethnic minorities, who joined the British Burma Army instead. 
In fact, the Japanese invasion did not help to galvanise the unity of the people in 
Burma; instead, it strengthened the demand for self-determination by the ethnic 
minorities. The Japanese atrocity in Rangoon deeply disturbed the ranks of the BIA. 
Aung San realised that Burma would not have independence under the Japanese, and 
he therefore negotiated with the British and switched sides. After the defeat of the 
Japanese, Aung San formed the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) in 
1945 and began negotiations with the British for independence. 
By the time the British left, the newly formed Republic of the Union of Burma, while 
still mourning the death of its founding father Aung San, did not resemble a country 
that had aspirations for unity. Consequently, subsequent attempts to assimilate the 
Frontier Areas into the new Union under a loosely constructed British-styled 
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parliamentary democracy immediately spelled disaster. 
An important point to note from this brief description of colonial rule is the role of 
the township headmen (myo-thu-gyi). It is clear that the British saw the importance 
of the role played by the headmen; otherwise, they would not have replaced them 
with their own people and risked resistance, which materialised. Therefore, the role 
of the headmen, as well as their power and influence over the villagers, needs to be 
investigated further in subsequent chapters. 
2.1.2 The basis of self-determination 
The basis of the right to self-determination in the Shan States can be traced back to a 
scheme devised by the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma, Sir Reginald Craddock, in 
1920. Craddock proposed the formation of the Federated Shan States under northern 
and southern sawbwas (later known as the Craddock Scheme).
23
 Essentially, the 
sawbwas were told that the formation of the Federated Shan States would free them 
from intervention by the legislative council under a new administrative structure that 
would take place in the country. The scheme was accepted by the Shan sawbwas on 
four conditions (Kyaw Win, Mya Han, & Thein Hlaing, 1999a, pp. 21-23). First, the 
Union government would not interfere with affairs in the Shan States. Second, the 
ancient rights, customs, religions, and privileges of the Shan people would remain 
unchanged. Third, the conditions of integration should be more or less on the same 
lines as proposed between Indian States and British India in India. Lastly, the 
hereditary rights of the sawbwas should be acknowledged and guaranteed by the 
British government (Kyaw Win et al., 1999a, pp. 31-32).  
Indeed, there was ample evidence to suggest that the British wanted to keep the 
Frontier Areas separate from Burma Proper. The Burma Act of 1935 reiterated the 
separate treatment of the Excluded Areas, which included the Shan States. The white 
paper of May 1945 removed any illusion on full integration by clearly stating that: 
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[the] administration of the Scheduled Areas that is the Shan States and the 
tribal areas in the mountainous fringes of the country, inhabited by peoples 
differing in language, social customs and degree of political development from 
the Burmans inhabiting the central areas, would for the time being be 
subjected to a special regime under the Governor until such time as their 
inhabitants signify their desire or some suitable form of amalgamation of their 
territories with Burma proper (Kyaw Win et al., 1999a, p. 107). 
The white paper sent a clear signal to the Bamars that if the British had their way, an 
independent Burma would be without the Frontier Areas (see also Aung-Thwin & 
Aung-Thwin, 2012, pp. 235-237). 
It is important to stress that while the Shan sawbwas were adamant that they wanted 
self-determination, they maintained they would rather be an independent state 
governed by the British king if they were to be similarly denied self-determination in 
a Union of Burma under the Bamars. This point did not merely serve the self-interest 
of the sawbwas: in fact, many Shan youths shared the same values of self-
determination. In 1938, the ‘Alin Yaung’ (meaning ‘light’) Reading Club was 
formed by two Shan youths, U Tin E and U Ba Maung at Yawnghwe (near Heho). 
Soon, the club spread to Taunggyi, Kalaw, Pindaya, Hopong, Loilem, Panglong, 
Mongnai, and Inle. At the club, the Shan youths became exposed to the anti-feudal 
and anti-imperialist movements across the world, and they were inspired to follow 
the global trend (Kyaw Win et al., 1999a, p. 120).  
The rift between the demands of the Bamars and ethnic minorities was not any closer 
to being reconciled under the British divide-and-rule strategy. The onset of the 
Second World War temporally overshadowed the urgency of resolving this matter. 
However, the Japanese invasion did not bring unity to the people of Burma; on the 
contrary, the rift deepened between the ethnics who were fighting for the British and 
the BIA, under Aung San, who were fighting for the Japanese in the initial war years. 
National reconciliation only began to take shape after the war, when Aung San 




2.1.3 The Panglong Conference, 1947 
After the war, the issue of the future of Burma immediately returned to the forefront. 
The white paper of May 1945 clearly states that it was not the intention of the British 
to grant the Frontier Areas self-determination because it was backward. The AFPFL 
realised that, in order to gain independence for the whole country, national solidarity 
must be achieved. Therefore, the AFPFL was reorganised in August 1945 to 
incorporate other political parties, arguing that an independent Burma would uphold 
the utmost value of self-determination. In a statement issued in October 1945, the 
AFPFL announced that  
[the] Supreme Council (of AFPFL) regrets that the Hill Areas have been 
excluded from the administration of Burma. It is undeniable that the people of 
Burma more than other peoples desire the welfare and progress of the Hill 
peoples. It has frequently been said that the Hill peoples would be kept 
separate from Burma until they wish to join it of their own free will, and how 
can they express their wishes without being given democratic rights? It is 
proper and natural that these rights should be extended to the Excluded Areas 
(Kyaw Win et al., 1999a, p. 112).  
This message to the ethnic minorities in the Frontier Areas was important because it 
laid a foundation of trust that was based on equal terms.  
The AFPFL followed up its drive for independence by holding a national congress in 
Rangoon in January 1946. Altogether, 18 resolutions were passed. Resolution No. 6 
stated that minorities would be given the freedom to worship, of cultural autonomy, 
equal economic opportunities, and most importantly, the right of self-determination, 
which meant that joining the Union with Burma Proper would be on a voluntary 
basis. Furthermore, Resolution No. 7 rejected the white paper of 1945 in treating the 
Frontier Areas separately. Instead, it claimed that the decision as to whether to join 
Burma Proper should be a matter for the leaders of the Frontier Areas and Burma 
Proper and not the British government. There was an extensive group of Shan 




with the AFPFL on the basis stipulated under Resolutions 6 and 7 (Kyaw Win et al., 
1999a, pp. 115-116). 
After attending the AFPFL conference, the Shan youth leaders formed the first 
political organisation in the Shan States, the Shan States Freedom League (SSFL), to 
spearhead their own push for self-determination. In addition to getting rid of colonial 
rule, the SSFL also demanded the abolishment of the sawbwa feudal system, and 
only on this basis would they agree to join the Union with Burma Proper on a federal 
configuration that ensured self-governance for the whole of the Shan States, one that 
would provide them with equal status, rights, and opportunities with Burma Proper. 
Moreover, they called for the right to secede at any time (Kyaw Win et al., 1999a, 
pp. 122-123). 
With consensus accumulating, the first Panglong Conference sponsored by Shan 
sawbwas was held from 26–28 March 1946. Representatives from Kachin, Chin, and 
Karen were also present at the conference. The conference polarised the differences 
between the Shan sawbwas and the SSFL and prompted the sawbwas to form the 
Shan States Saohpas’ Council (SSSC) to represent their interests. Realising that they 
may be forced to concede their hereditary power, they issued a statement on 27 
November 1946 spelling out that ‘the Shan States should for the time being remain in 
Frontier Areas Administration under the present framework’ (Kyaw Win et al., 
1999a, p. 140). This statement upset Aung San’s plan, who was hoping to bring a 
clear mandate from the SSSC and SSFL with him to London in order to press for 
independence with the British government.  
The mutual mistrust between the SSSC and SSFL remained a thorny issue during 
Aung San’s negotiations with the British. Aung San believed that the only way to 
break the deadlock was for the British government to send a delegation to meet 
directly with the Frontier leaders. Answering the plea from Aung San, the Under-
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Arthur Bottomley, held talks with 
representatives from the Frontier Areas in January 1947 to clarify two points: first, 
the British wanted to see the unification of the Frontier Areas with Burma Proper, 




autonomy and the right of secession. Feeling the pressure from the British, the SSSC 
softened its stance and proposed a political settlement that would allow equal 
representation from people’s representatives.  
This proved to be the turning point. In a meeting on 6 February, the sawbwas, 
together with Shan and Kachin representatives, agreed to join Burma Proper on six 
conditions: equal footings (i.e. status, rights, and privileges), representations in the 
Executive Council, a separate Kachin State, revoking the terms of agreement 
between the Aung San delegates and the British government, and, finally, the right to 
secede.  
 It is important to note that the Karens did not participate in the Panglong 
Conference. They held a separate conference (the Kayin Congress, 5–7 February 
1947) in Yangon and formed the Karen National Union (KNU). The KNU had a 
specific mandate not to participate in any organisation that was set up by the Shans, 
Kachins, and Chins because they intended to form a separate Kayin State, which 
included the Tenasserim Division (Kyaw Win et al., 1999a, pp. 195-196). Instead, 
they sent four representatives to Panglong as observers, one of whom was U Hla Pe, 
an ethnic Pa-O from Thaton.
 
 
The Panglong Agreement was signed on 12 February 1947 by the Shan sawbwas, 
representatives from the Kachin and Chin Committees, and Aung San on behalf of 
the Burmese Government. Whilst the Panglong Agreement has always been regarded 
as the foundation of the Union of Burma, it was the subsequent meetings of the 
Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry (FACE) that laid down the blueprint for the 
1947 Constitution. Indeed, throughout the negotiations prior to the Panglong 
Conference, the right to secede was the bedrock for convincing the ethnic minorities 
to join Burma Proper, without knowing how a federated state would eventually work 
out. However, close scrutiny of the Panglong Agreement would reveal that the right 
to opt out of the Union was not included as a clause. To a certain extent, this 
reflected the trust the ethnic minorities placed on Aung San and served to explain 
why, after his assassination, the bond immediately broke down. It was during these 






Although Aung San was assassinated on 19 July 1947, the right to 
secede from the Union after ten years of independence was embodied in the 1947 
Constitution under Chapter XII.  
2.1.4 Karen: the outstanding issue 
At the time of the second Panglong Conference, the Karen were holding their own 
congress in Yangon. It is important to examine the situation of the Karen further 
because, in terms of ethnicity, the Pa-O was considered to be a sub-group of the 
Karen. Indeed, the Karen sent U Hla Pe, an ethnic Pa-O, to attend the first Panlong 
Conference on their behalf, which strongly indicated their links. Therefore, the 
aspiration for self-determination of the Pa-O was very much tied with those of the 
Karen.  
The Karen Congress was attended by over 700 delegates from across the country. 
Although it was overshadowed by the Panglong Conference, it carried significant 
importance on two counts. First, the Karen National Union (KNU) was formed. 
Second, it spelled out disapproval for the arrangement between Aung San and the 
British government because of inadequate representations in the future government, 
which led to a demand for a separate Kayin State.
25 
The British were reluctant but 
also unable to meet the demands of the KNU, and therefore the ball was passed back 
to Aung San. One of the obstacles was the spread of the Karen population. A note 
from the Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Burma to the British Prime Minister 
underlined the problem:  
The Karen problem is far from simple: probably the majority of the Karens are 
in the Plains and many of them in the Delta. It is exceedingly unlikely that if 
they were asked to exchange their holdings there for holdings to the East of the 
Sittang or in Tenasserim they would not be prepared to do so and they are well 
established in Ministerial Burma (Kyaw Win, Mya Han, & Thein Hlaing, 
1999b, p. 4). 
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To resolve the impasse, Aung San offered two alternatives to the KNU, the first of 
which was to combine the Papun District to form the Kayah State as a part of the 
Union of Burma, but on the condition that they would forgo their rights as minority 
people if the Kayin population in Burma Proper fell below 10% of Burma’s total 
population. If a separate Kayin State could not be formed, then the other alternative 
was to have Papun District as a Special District, and a Kayin Affairs Council would 
be formed to provide advice on Kayin affairs.  
It is important to examine the implications of the proposal by Aung San. The 
proposal itself did not provide much of a choice. The option for a separate Kayin 
State only applied to those residing in the proposed state, and since the Karen 
population was widespread, those who lived in the plain would not benefit from the 
proposal. This strategy effectively pushed the consensus towards the formation of a 
Kayin Affairs Council, which theoretically should benefit all Karens. On 17 
September 1947, the KNU formally declared that they would agree to form a Kayin 
Affairs Council. Despite this, there were leaders among the KNU, noticeably the 
General Secretary of KNU Thra Tha Hto, who opposed the decision (Kyaw Win et 
al., 1999b, p. 49). This laid the foundation for the future struggle for self-
determination. Indeed, the KNU was the first ethnic group to revolt against the Union 
of Burma in 1949 shortly after independence.  
2.1.5 The problems faced by the country leading up to the 8888 
uprising 
After the assassination of Aung San on 19 July 1947, Deputy Prime Minister U Nu 
picked up the pieces and led the country to independence on 4 January 1948. 
However, the new nation immediately faced challenges from the communist 
resistance, the rebellion from the People’s Volunteer Organisation (PVO), and the 
Karen uprising. 
Formed in August 1939, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) was the oldest 
political party in Burma. The CPB, the Burma National Army (formerly the BIA, but 
renamed during the Japanese occupation), and the People’s Revolutionary Party 




started in 1945 when one of the leaders, Thakin Soe, formed a splinter group called 
the Red Flag Communist Party to uphold the tradition of armed struggle.
 
The 
remaining communist members, who represented the majority, rallied around Thakin 
Than Tun and continued to work with the AFPFL, and this group was referred to as 
the White Flag Communist. Both the Red and White Flag Communist Parties tried to 
undermine the Union by accusing Aung San of negotiating a ‘sham independence’ 
(Johnstone, 1963, p. 4). In the Constituent Assembly election in 1947, the CPB 
performed poorly by winning only seven seats.
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After U Nu took office, he was 
wary of the CPB connection with China. In order to keep the nation neutral from the 
East-West tussle, U Nu expelled the CPB from the AFPFL. Consequently, both the 
Red Flag and White Flag communists went underground and began their armed 
resistance against the government (Aung-Thwin & Aung-Thwin, 2012; Gravers, 
1999; Lintner, 1990; Nu, 1975). 
While the communist threat could be seen as an external intervention, the newly 
formed government also faced a conflict from within. The PVO was formed by Aung 
San from the Burman soldiers who had been left out of the newly regrouped Burma 
National Army after the war. The initial objective of the PVO was to maintain law 
and order in the countryside, but its real political agenda was to give the AFPFL 
leverage when negotiating for independence with the British (Silverstein, 2004). 
Coming from a Thakin background, the PVO soldiers were only loyal to their leader, 
i.e. Aung San. When he was assassinated, these soldiers were leaderless and felt 
uneasy with the new government. The communist uprising in 1948 also triggered the 
PVO rebellion against the government. Pockets of PVO forces took roads and 
bridges throughout the country, causing disruption to daily life and spurring the flood 
of refugees to neighbouring countries (Aung-Thwin & Aung-Thwin, 2012, p. 238). 
Finally, the U Nu government needed to face the problem of an imminent Karen 
uprising. The KNU were between a rock and a hard place when they accepted the 
terms offered by Aung San to form the Kayin Affair Council under the new 
government. Not surprisingly, the group rekindled the demand for a separate state 
almost immediately after Aung San was assassinated. Their grounds for discontent 
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deepened when the Karens in the new national army lost their ranks. During colonial 
rule, the British recruited the army mainly from the Karens (39.5%), Kachins (24%), 
and Chins (23.7%), whereas Bamars only accounted for 12.9% (Furnivall, 1956, p. 
184). The British were aware of the anti-colonial sentiment among Bamars, and 
therefore they relied more on the Karens, who had demonstrated loyalty and were, in 
general, more sympathetic to the colonial ruler. The Commander-in-Chief General 
Smith Dun and the Chief of Air Force Saw Shi Sho were both ethnic Karens. 
However, the new government reverted the policy and did not allow the Karen to 
join the military nor the police (Aung-Thwin & Aung-Thwin, 2012, p. 239). General 
Dun was removed and replaced by General Ne Win in January 1949. This effectively 
laid the ground for future troubles, as the well trained Karen soldiers rebelling 
against the government by declaring war on 31 January 1949 (Pedersen, 2011, p. 7). 
While the Karen rebellion was eventually put down by the national army under 
General Ne Win, it was not the end of the Karen struggle for self-determination; 
ironically, however, it sowed the seeds and justification for an army state in Burma. 
Although the Karen rebellion was brought under control, pockets of ethnic revolts 
were growing throughout the country, not least fuelled by the dawn of 1958, when, 
under the 1947 Constitution, the Shan, Kachin, and Chin could opt to secede from 
the Union after ten years of independence. The approach of the ten-year clause 
prompted U Nu, on 26 September 1958, to invite Ne Win to form a military 
government for a short length of time in order to ‘clean up the mess’ (D. G. E. Hall, 
in  Aung-Thwin & Aung-Thwin, 2012, p. 241). The military, as the ‘caretaker 
government’, was the only institution that could maintain order. Under the 
circumstances, the military and civilians were in agreement about the need for a 
caretaker government in order to prevent the prevailing anarchy getting out of 
control. Therefore, it was not until 1962 that Ne Win ousted U Nu from office, and 
then it was regarded as a coup.  
When Ne Win staged the coup in 1962, he justified it by citing the threat to the 
integrity of the Union from the Shan and Karen. He believed that civilian ministers 
were detached from the reality outside of parliament, where only the use of force 




army officers was established to replace the civilian government. On 4 July 1962, the 
Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) was formed. In 1964, it became the only 
legitimate political party when the Law to Protect National Solidarity was introduced 
to ban all other political parties. Meanwhile, U Nu left the country and set up a 
‘government-in-exile’ in Thailand (Aung-Thwin & Aung-Thwin, 2012; Nu, 1975).  
With power once again centrally controlled, Ne Win immediately removed the 
legislature and regional councils that had been set up under the 1947 Constitution. 
This action not only severed the channel of communication between ethnic groups 
and the power centre in Rangoon, but it also shattered the trust these ethnic groups 
had in the Union. Following the introduction of the Burmese Way to Socialism, 
industries and banks were nationalised. Entrepreneurs and the middle class were 
purged, but peasants were supported in that they were given land to cultivate. 
Although they could not sell, mortgage, or rent the land to others, they were free to 
grow what they wanted and were only subjected to minimal taxes. If the peasants 
could not pay the rent to the government, they were protected under the Peasants’ 
Rights Protection Act, which forbid the confiscation of their land. This 
overprotection of the peasants sowed the seeds for future land disputes since, when 
the policy was reversed in the 1990s, the ownership of the land and the rights to use 
the land became a hotbed for grievances at the village level.  
Another consequence of the Burmese Way to Socialism was the rapid decline of the 
Burmese economy. From an average GDP growth rate of 5.8% in the decade 1951–
60, it fell sharply to just 1.9% in the decade 1981–90 (see Table 1). Total reserves as 
a percentage of total external debt fell from 46.18% in 1971 to 29.51% in 1980, and 
by 1987 they had fallen to a historical low of just 4.03% (see Figure 1). On 3 
November 1985, the 50 and 100 kyat notes were demonetised without warning, but 
75 kyat notes were introduced a week later and 15 and 35 kyat notes were introduced 
on 1 August 1986.
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However, just barely over a year later, 25, 35, and 75 kyat notes 
were demonetised, again without warning, on 5 September 1987, rendering 75% of 
the country’s currency worthless overnight. In short, by the time of the student 
uprising in 1988, the country was in political, social, and economic ruin.  
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In summary, when the military took over the country in September 1988, they faced 
multi-dimensional challenges from political, economic, and social problems. They 
could send troops to suppress resistance in major cities like Yangon and Mandalay, 
but how could they deal with sporadic uprisings throughout the country? This 
question brings us back to the question of how they maintained social control.  
Table 1: Burma – real GDP growth rates, 1950–1990 
Fiscal Years 
 
 Average GDP Growth Rate % 
1950/51 - 1959/60 5.8 
1960/61 - 1970/71 3.5 
1970/71 - 1979/80 3.9 
1980/81 - 1989/90 1.9 
Source: (U Myint, 2008) 
Figure 1: Burma – total reserves as a % of external debt, 1970–2013 
 
 
Source: World Bank, International Debt Statistics 
 
 
2.2 Regime Survival: The Predicament of a Military 
Regime  
If a regime cannot sustain itself, then there is very little point in examining its ways 
of maintaining social control because it would not survive long enough to see the 
results. However, the Myanmar military regime survived its legitimacy and capacity 
crises for twenty-seven years (1988–2015), and it still enjoys veto power after the 
transfer of power. Therefore, it is important to determine how they achieved this. 
Recalling the work of Migdal (1988) on the politics of survival, there should be three 




focusing on the agents of the state, and the final layer incorporating the implementer 
at the local level. This section looks at the top level of accommodation. 
Ahram and King (2012, p. 173) note that, for a state where authority is weak, 
franchising violence is less expensive than centralising it. Myanmar certainly was at 
this point when the military seized control of the country in 1988. Lacking 
legitimacy, weak in capacity, and locked in internal ethnic conflict, the military 
regime quickly changed tactics by beginning to franchise violence to local ethnic 
armed forces. This was the beginning of warlord politics, when centralised control 
was replaced by the fragmentation of political authority. While franchising violence 
is less expensive, is it effective in maintaining control? Ahram and King (2012) do 
not provide a definitive answer. Therefore, this section will first examine the 
predicament faced by the military regime.  
This section of the chapter also examines the challenge from within the military. In 
terms of the triangle of accommodation in Migdal’s control framework, this is the 
first level of accommodation relating to the state leadership itself (Migdal, 1988, p. 
247). It examines how the military regime kept its ranks happy and avoided being 
thrown out of power by challengers from within the ranks?  
2.2.1 Life expectancy of a military regime 
The third wave of democracy pounded the Asian shores in the 1980s, with South 
Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines embracing democratic reforms in quick 
succession (Huntington, 1991). However, for the military regime in Myanmar, who 
had just quashed a democratic uprising in August 1988, the generals must have been 
thinking about how they could survive such a challenge from this global democratic 
movement. After all, in his end of history postulation, Fukuyama (1992) has claimed 
that democracy should be the only viable form of governance.  
In her study on the topology of authoritarian regimes, Barbara Geddes (1999) 
concludes that, when compared with two other regime types, i.e. personalist and 




average of just 8.8 years. She offers three reasons for this, the first of which is that 
these military regimes have weak support in society. Furthermore, by using game 
theory, she explains that the military officers preferred to settle on solutions based on 
negotiation rather than all out confrontation. Finally, and more importantly, the 
military could enjoy a safe retreat by returning to their barracks (Geddes, 1999). A 
comprehensive study of regime survival by Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell (2006) 
confirms Geddes’ findings. Hadenius and Teorell (2006) identify five main types of 
regimes differentiated by their degrees of competitiveness: one-party, military, 
multiparty dominant, multiparty, and democracy. Under an authoritarian 
environment, the average lifespan of a military regime during the period of 1972–
2003 was 11.1 years, compared with 12.9 years for a no-party system, 17.8 years for 
a one-party system, and 25.4 years for a monarchy, which enjoyed the longest 
average. Indeed, the military survived only longer than a multiparty regime, which 
had an expected lifespan of just 9.03 years.  
However, the military regime in Myanmar clearly defied the observations of both 
Geddes (1999) and Hadenius and Teorell (2006). After taking power in 1988, the 
Myanmar military regime remained in power until 2015, which makes 27 years of 
continuous governance, compared to a life expectancy of just 11.1 years. Amid the 
expansion of democracy and multi-party politics at the expense of one-party and 
military regimes, the generals in Myanmar were able to withstand legitimacy 
challenges from international and domestic fronts. The pathways for the transition to 
democracy provided by Hadenius and Teorell (2006) are worth closer scrutiny. In 
this regard, the authors note that democracy does not come straight from the 
downfall of one-party or military regimes because the fall of an authoritarian regime 
may simply give way to another. Indeed, from their dynamic regression analysis on 
the effects of regime type on democratisation, a one-party regime has equal 
probability of turning into a military or a multiparty dominant regime. However, it is 
worth nothing that the main route for a military regime to become a democracy is 
through a multiparty government, and there seems to be very little probability of 





Figure 2: Probability of regime transition (Source: (Hadenius & Teorell, 2006) 
 
In their study, Hadenius and Teorell (2006, p. 19) note that ‘[w]hen traditional 
military regimes are changed, the most frequent result is a limited multiparty system 
of a traditional sort’.28 It is interesting that Hadenius and Teorell do not explain why 
a military regime cannot transition to a multiparty dominant regime and stay there, 
which was the case in Cambodia, as described earlier, and could also be the case for 
the military regime in Myanmar.
29 
Perhaps, in their minds, a military backed 
dominant political party cannot withstand the challenge under a multiparty system. 
However, it is precisely because of this that the Myanmar military regime survival is 
a case of interest and warrants further investigation. Why have they not secured a 
settlement and returned to the barrack, as Geddes suggests? Furthermore, was the 
option to transition to a multiparty dominant regime out of the question for the 
military regime in Myanmar? The answer to both questions may be found in the way 
the regime overcame the first hurdle – accommodation at the leadership level. 
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2.2.2 First step of the survival strategy: accommodation of top 
leadership  
According to Svolik (2012), the problems faced by an authoritarian regime can be 
epitomised by the problems of authoritarian control and authoritarian power sharing. 
The problem of authoritarian control refers to the struggle to achieve a balance 
between the ruling minority and the non-ruling majority. To preside over the masses, 
the ruler needs political allies, such as society’s elites or generals in the army 
(Svolik, 2012, p. 4). The problem of authoritarian power sharing arises from 
challenges from the regime’s allies. Svolik (2012, p. 6) draws two distinctive forms 
of interaction between the ruler and his allies, one is ‘contested autocracy’ while the 
other is ‘established autocracy’. When explaining these two forms of autocracy, 
Svolik (2012, p. 117) suggests that formal institutions could contribute towards 
regime survival by alleviating the problem of power sharing because these 
institutions function as the allocators of benefits and rights among the allies.  
How can the problems of authoritarian control and power sharing raised by Svolik be 
resolved so that the military regime in Myanmar could defy the findings of Geddes 
and Hadenius and Teorell? Before finding the answer, the rationale of Geddes on 
military regime survival needs to be examined. Geddes (1999) offers three 
explanations for the relatively short life expectancy of a military regime: the lack of 
support from society, a negotiated settlement as the preferred political outcome, and 
the military always having the safe option of returning to the barracks. However, are 
these explanations applicable to the military regime in Myanmar? 
The suggestion that the military is not accepted in society is contentious in the case 
of Myanmar. General Aung San, who is regarded as the father of independent 
Burma, came from the army. To this day, the people in Burma respect him, as is 
shown by their support for his daughter Aung San Suu Kyi. In an interview given to 
CNS News after her release from house arrest, the leader of the main opposition 
party made the point very clear that she had never hated the military, even though 
they had deprived her of her freedom on and off for 17 years.
30 
Even the army, the 
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Tatmadaw, had been held in high regard by the people in defending the country’s 
territorial integrity. Obviously, ethnic minority groups do not necessarily share the 
same gratitude towards the Tatmadaw, especially those who picked up arms and 
fought for their autonomy. However, as long as the dominant ethnic group, the 
Bamar, felt sympathy towards them, the military rule could justify its existence on 
the grounds of maintaining territorial integrity and securitising the country against 
external threats (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998).
31 
 
Secondly, Geddes (1999) explains that the military regime would prefer to negotiate 
a settlement to resolve any constitutional crisis. This certainly appeared to be the 
case in Myanmar, as the military regime negotiated ceasefire agreements with ethnic 
armed groups almost immediately after seizing power. However, on closer 
examination, the ceasefire agreements were not political settlements because they did 
not involve disarming the ethnic rebels, and there were no plans to integrate the 
mainstream of the rebels back into the state. Therefore, the ceasefire agreements 
were not political settlements, but instead should be seen as warlord accommodation 
and a conflict management strategy that helped to defy Geddes’ gloomy prediction 
regarding the short life expectancy of a military regime.  
The final point about the military being able to return safely to their barracks serving 
as a pull factor in preventing a prolonged military occupation likewise rests on thin 
ice because it does not take into account the possibility of them leaving the barracks 
again. Indeed, as Collier and Sambinas (2005a) point out, the frequency of a coup is 
an independent variable in explaining future coups: the more frequently a coup 
occurs, the more likely it is that the next one will happen. Once mobilised, the 
military do not necessarily find the barracks as their home, especially when their 
interests are compromised. The frequent military coups in Thailand serve as a case in 
point. 
In summary, the short life expectancy of a military regime did not apply to 
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Myanmar. The military is held in high regard, even by its main opposition leader. 
The ceasefire agreements with the armed groups were not political settlements. 
Moreover, even if they retreated to the barracks, they could still dominate the 
political landscape on security grounds; in this regard, renewed fighting in Kokang 
and brutal suppression against the Rohingya are cases in point. However, 
overcoming the conditions leading to a short life expectancy still cannot secure 
regime survival. As Svolik (2012) correctly points out, one of the immediate 
concerns of the regime should be to appease its allies. In the dataset he collected on 
regime survival, Svolik (2012, p. 4) notes that 68% of dictators have been removed 
by regime insiders, i.e. people from within the inner circle of the regime.
32 
Therefore, 
the immediate concern for the military regime in Myanmar was other generals who 
could stage a coup d'état and not the public. 
To secure the backing of other generals and military officers, the Myanmar regime 
was quick to take action. Shortly after abolishing the 1974 Constitution and installing 
the SLORC as the caretaking government, the regime formed two companies to look 
after the interests of military officers. The Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings 
Limited (UMEH) was formed in February 1990 under the Special Companies Act, 
with an initial share capital of US$1.6 billion. In 1997, the Myanmar Economic 
Corporation (MEC) was formed. According to a report on foreign direct investment 
into the country, these two companies control the country’s most important natural 
resources and have shares in almost every sector of the economy, including heavy 
industries, import and export firms, and companies in the service sector.
33 
Under the 
Ministry of Defence, the Directorate of Defence Procurement owns shares in both the 
UMEH and MEC, with the aim of looking after the interests of active and veteran 
military officers (Myat Thein, 2004; Singh, 2005, p. 209; Steinberg, 2001; Tin 
Maung Maung Than, 2007, p. 392).  
Moreover, senior generals were quick to appoint their relatives and cronies to carve 
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up the lucrative sectors of the economy; the Kambawza Bank is owned by Aung Ko 
Win, who is close to Vice Senior General Maung Aye; Mother Trading and 
Construction Limited, with a strong interest in the cement industry, is owned by 
Aung Myat, a close friend of Senior General Than Shwe; the Red Link Company, 
which provides data communication services nationwide, is owned by Toe Naing 
Mann, son of General Thura Shwe Mann; Nay Linn Aung is the son of Lt. General 
Myint Aung, and his company, Nilar Yoma Trading Company, has been granted 
exclusive license to operate gas stations in major cities, including Yangon and 
Mandalay34;
 
the Myawaddy Bank and the Innwa Bank are owned by UMEH and 
MEC respectively. They financed cronies to buy up state assets at steep discounts to 
net asset values. Effectively, ‘Myawaddy functioned as little more than a “corporate 
treasury” for UMEH, whose companies were almost its only clients. Innwa Bank 
[…] like Myawaddy […] functioned for the most part as a finance vehicle for MEC 
subsidiaries and affiliates’ (Turnell, 2009, p. 266).  
Consequently, by setting up private companies under the ownership of the Ministry 
of Defence, with a mandate of looking after the welfare of both active and retired 
military officers, the military regime in Myanmar overcame the problem raised by 
Svolik regarding power sharing through distributing the financial windfalls. More 
importantly, this was not a one-time pay-off arrangement, but an ingenious way to 
ensure the military would continue to enjoy the share of the windfalls, as long as the 
military is in power.  
However, financial security is not the only safeguard protecting the military regime. 
The 2008 Constitution provides statutory guarantees to the military. Under Chapter 
IV, Sections 109, 141, and 161, the military is automatically given 25% of the seats 
in both the Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives) and Amyotha Hluttaw (House 
of Nationalities). Moreover, Chapter XII Section 436(a) stipulates that a 75% 
approval rate is required to amend the Constitution. With the military given 25% of 
the vote, this effectively means that it has veto power because the Constitution 
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cannot be changed without their approval. The 2008 Constitution also makes it 
mandatory to appoint active military officers to head the Ministries of Defence, 
Home Affairs, and Border Affairs (Chapter V, Section 232(b), (c)). As a final 
safeguard, Chapter XI confers powers to the military to declare a state of emergency 
and assume executive and judiciary powers. 
The provision of financial security in the form of recurrent income from UMEH and 
MEC, together with statutory protection under the 2008 Constitution, have helped the 
regime to overcome the problem of power sharing raised by Svolik and prevent 
potential revolt from within the ranks. This represents the top level of leadership 
accommodation within the survival strategy suggested by Migdal. The next section 
looks at the second level, the accommodation of agents of the state.  
2.3 Warlord Accommodation as the Second Step of 
Survival Strategy: Warlord Politics 
After getting its own house in order through the sharing of financial windfalls with 
other generals and officials, the next concern of the Myanmar military regime was 
how to deal with the ethnic warlords. To address this issue, it is necessary to recap 
one of the foundations of the state-in-society theoretical framework. The approach 
suggested by Migdal is to steer away from a state-centric orientation to examine 
state-society relations in the arena where the interaction takes place. In this context, 
one must abandon the notion that the state should enjoy the monopoly use of force. 
Instead, one should zoom in on the arena where the interests of the state and the 
warlords collide. This is the territory of warlord politics. The way the state and the 
warlords interact would dictate the outcome of whether warlords should be seen as 
enemies of the state or whether they could be state-builders in the pacification project 
of the regime.  
The relevance of warlord politics is particularly valid when a state does not enjoy the 
monopoly use of violence. In her study of Laurent Nkunda in eastern Congo, 
Danielle Beswick (2009) echoes the point raised by Duffield (2001) that sometimes 
warlords are the only people that can hold peace, which is the same point raised by 




settlement and instead advocates a multilateral approach in dealing with an internally 
fragmented state. By abandoning the single sovereign approach, the state-society 
relation then opens up to allow mutual co-existence under warlord politics. It also 
paves the way for the second level of accommodation in the scheme of regime 
survival suggested by Migdal – the accommodation of agents of the state.  
However, if order and control could be readily re-established by the accommodation 
of warlords, then there would be no civil wars in many developing countries in 
Africa and Asia. Therefore, the concept of the warlord as either an enemy or ally of 
the state needs to be clarified. Moreover, the arena where the interests of the state 
and the warlords collide requires contextualisation, since geopolitics will have a 
deterministic implication on the political outcome. Finally, the process of 
accommodation also requires scrutiny. The following sections examine these 
outstanding issues. 
2.3.1 Definition of a warlord 
The English word ‘warlord’ first appeared in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 1856 essay on 
the development of aristocracy and centralised authority in England. Emerson noted 
that ‘piracy and war gave place to trade, politics and letters; the war-lord to the law-
lord; […] the privilege was kept, whist the means of obtaining it were changed’ (in 
Ahram & King, 2012, p. 171).  
The word ‘warlord’ invokes banditry behaviour in that ‘warlords’ are invariably 
armed and operate at the margins of the state (Hills, 1997; Jackson, 2003). Indeed, 
Weber (2009, p. 85) describes warlords as ‘liv[ing] off booty, plunder, confiscations, 
contributions, and the imposition of worthless and compulsory means of tender’. 
Mueller (2004) simply calls them thugs. His view is echoed by Lezhnev (2006), 
referring to them as one-dimensional thugs who are only concerned about their own 
interests. Duffield (2001) defines a warlord as a leader of an armed band that likely 
number several thousand. Hills (1997, p. 35) describes a warlord as a powerful 
individual, or a ‘big man’, who exploits the situation in a power vacuum, while 




collapse of centralised power, they resort to the use of violence to claim local power, 
they reject formal state structures, they replace such structures with their own order, 
and they continue to trade.  
However, these definitions tend to be on the descriptive side. An operational 
definition is provided by Ariel Ahram and Charles King (2012, p. 172), who define 
warlords as ‘armed agents who wield some degree of civil power and claim some 
kind of local sovereignty over a defined region while paying allegiance to one or 
more stronger power’. Under this definition, warlordism consists of two components: 
‘the ability to manage and wield violence’ and ‘the simultaneous claim to local 
supremacy but also a quasi-legal subservience and loyalty to superior authority’ 
(Ahram & King, 2012, p. 172). The first component essentially captures the 
descriptions provided by other scholars, but having the ability to wield violence does 
not necessarily make a person a warlord in that he could simply be a criminal or a 
bandit. Hence, the second component, a recognised legitimacy in a territory, is vital 
for the classification of warlord. 
From here, the debate on warlordism branches off into two scenarios, one that is state 
destabilising and one that is state enforcing. Scholars such as Jackson (2003), 
Lezhnev (2006), Mueller (2004), and Reno (1999) are advocates of the first scenario. 
However, in recent years, the discourse has shifted towards the second scenario, 
where warlords are seen as state builders. Indeed, Hobsbawm (2000) points out that 
there were cases where local strongmen, who remained loyal to the king, took up 
arms to defend villages against feudal lords (there are plenty of examples of this in 
ancient China). He goes on to claim that many of these strongmen would ‘sooner or 
later be tempted to take the easy road [in becoming] a retainer of the lords’ 
(Hobsbawm, 2000, p. 61). Wong (2013) also argues that local strongmen could be 
co-opted in the state-building project in the Philippines. The divide between the 
positive and negative claims warrants closer scrutiny. 
2.3.2 Warlords as enemies of the state 




state development is rooted in the Weberian tradition, which emphasises the state 
monopoly on violence. In his work on state-society relations, which was anchored on 
the statist approach, Charles Tilly (1990) explains how the state tries to maintain its 
legitimacy by controlling the monopoly on violence. Through establishing 
institutions to control economic resources, the state therefore has sufficient means to 
fend off its enemies and to pacify its citizens through social programmes (see also 
Davis, 2010). Tilly (1985) goes even as far as to suggest that the state is simply a 
legitimate form of protection racketeering. In his later work, Tilly tries to locate a 
regime within a capacity-democracy space and use this to frame contentious politics. 
Under such a topology, Tilly argues that a low capacity authoritarian regime would 
inevitably invite competition for control, a point that Svolik (2012) would certainly 
agree with, for ‘change and variation in governmental capacity cause change and 
variation in the characteristic of contentious politics’ (Tilly, 2010, p. 211). This also 
fits in well with Migdal’s claim that whether a state is considered strong or weak 
depends on its capacity to maintain social control. Therefore, if warlordism curtails 
state capacity, it is also the source of contentious politics. 
This view of seeing warlordism as an obstacle to development is shared by Kimberly 
Marten (2006/07, p. 72), who maintains that ‘history demonstrates that when 
warlords are given resources […], they will use those resources to support their 
parochial interests in competition against each other and in defiance of centralized 
authority’. He argues that economic development is vital to the long-term state-
building project, but that ‘the warlords on the losing end will otherwise try to fight 
change’ (Marten, 2006/07, p. 73). Although he recognises that warlords may play 
certain roles in contributing towards temporary peace, he believes that ‘they are 
unlikely to become state builders, and their territories will remain undeveloped, with 
economies skewed toward their own patronage networks’ (Marten, 2012, p. 217). 
2.3.3 Warlords as state-builders 
In examining the perspectives of the second camp, which sees the potential of 
warlords as state-builders, it is worth revisiting Beswick’s (2009) argument about the 
shortcomings of a single sovereign approach. Her concern is based on the Western 




monopoly of violence. Neither seeing warlords as the source of instability nor as 
state-builders, Beswick instead lays the blame for continued instability on the 
international actors who are only concerned about maintaining a single sovereign 
entity and fail to recognise the importance of a decentralised authority. She 
concludes by pointing to the ‘fatal-flaw of many state-building strategies in Africa: 
the focus on one source of sovereign power in a region where the state has 
historically been only one amongst many competing authorities’ (Beswick, 2009, p. 
343).  
Indeed, Beswick’s argument is not only applicable to Africa; MacGinty (2010) 
makes similar claims when examining the state-building project in Afghanistan after 
the Taliban was toppled. He, too, claims that liberal peace is a misnomer by 
demonstrating that many INGOS had to rely on local warlords to implement their 
projects. Therefore, the actual practice did not conform to liberal ideals. Like 
Beswick, MacGinty believes that a Weberian state cannot be established when 
multiple political actors are standing in the way of the liberal peace process. 
Is there a normative role for warlords? Insightfully, Hills (1997) suggests that a 
warlord is only called a warlord in a derogatory sense when he is not pro-Western. 
Instead, she uses the term ‘militia’ to replace ‘warlord’. Stanski (2009) shares Hills’s 
concern about the use of the word ‘warlord’ by Western powers. He highlights the 
cultural difference between Western and Oriental views on violence by pointing out 
that ‘[t]hose labelled “warlords” are heirs to a longstanding tendency in US and 
British political thought to construct a violent Afghan “Other”, a figure that contrasts 
with, yet also affirms, purportedly essential features of the West’ (Stanski, 2009, p. 
75). Their points can be made clear if one looks at how the West viewed Libya’s 
Gaddafi. He was not regarded as the head of state but instead was described in the 
English newspaper The Guardian as ‘a warlord in control of a personal army that he 
has tasked with the mass killing […]’.35 However, the media must have had a short 
memory because not so long before The Guardian report, the then British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair visited Gaddafi in May 2004 to cement British interests in the 
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area’s lucrative oil business. Indeed, Gaddafi was shown on TV visiting the 
headquarters of the European Union a month later, when the EU was hoping Gaddafi 
could help stem the flow of illegal immigrants from Africa entering EU countries. 
Therefore, whether a leader is a warlord depends on the vested interests of the parties 
that label him as such.  
Essentially, Hills and Stanski have thrown a spanner in the Western-driven liberal 
peace discourse by asking if warlords can serve the purpose of state formation that is 
outside of Western normative thinking. Mark Duffield picks up the debate by having 
a dig at the West’s one-size-fits-all approach. In post-modern conflict, Duffield 
(1998) notes that warlords are more co-operative with international organisations, 
whereas many post-adjustment rulers ironically adopt warlord-type strategies. 
Duffield (2001) goes further to claim that, sometimes, warlords are the only power 
that can keep order and provide security to the local people in a conflict area, a view 
shared by Jackson (2003). In developing his idea on the emerging political complex, 
Duffield has certainly abandoned the single sovereign approach as suggested by 
Beswick.  
However, what motivates warlords in the first place? From the definitions provided 
by warlord scholars, economic greed appears to be the primary motive. Most warlord 
scholars agree that warlords are rational people (Pye, 1971; Reno, 1999). This, in 
turn, sheds light on their likely behaviour. Ahram and King (2012) suggest that 
because warlords are positioned as frontiersmen, they are well suited to act as the 
arbitrators, or the middlemen, for tricky trades along the boundaries. Indeed, 
Skaperdas (2002) points out that warlords prefer peace to war because, like most 
human beings, they are risk adverse. Using economic models, Skaperdas argues that 
the notion of risk-loving warlords entering into wars in the search of higher returns 
as the reason for conflicts cannot be justified. In this sense, warlords only go to war 
most likely because of miscalculation or misinformation (Skaperdas, 2002). 
However, what if the warlords are motived by factors other than economic gains?  
At this juncture, it is necessary to revisit the argument provided by Jackson (2003) on 




‘militia’ used by Hills to describe the ‘big man’ is not sufficient to distinguish 
different levels of warlordism. In this regard, he adds three categories to the 
inventory: freelance militias, clan militias, and personal militias, and only personal 
militias should be regarded as warlords, whereas the first two categories could only 
be described as gang leaders and ‘traditional’ leaders (or ‘chiefs’) respectively 
(Jackson, 2003, pp. 142-143). Freelance militias are simply bandits with no fixed 
territorial preference, whereas clan militias are more associated with identity, and 
therefore they share history and enmities with rival clans. In contrast, personal 
militias, or warlords, operate at the highest level of the topology because they are 
much more organised structurally and represent not just a particular ethnicity but also 
an ideology. The contribution of this topology is that it fills the missing gap in 
Skaperdas’ analysis, which assumes that all warlords are motivated by economic 
gains. Jackson’s topology opens up the possibility that militias could just be clan 
leaders. After establishing the topology of warlordism, Jackson goes on to explain 
the means available to support alternative governance, namely, primitive 
accumulation for the freelance militia, but the clan and personal militias can take 
advantage of the increased opportunities from globalisation due to their higher 
sophistication in organisation to increase their bargaining power. Indeed, William 
Reno (1999), in his study of warlord politics in Africa, notes that warlords reacted to 
the changing environment after the end of the Cold War to capitalise on the new 
donors coming onto the scene. This provides evidence to support the claim by Ahram 
and King (2012) that warlords (personal militias, as Jackson likes to call them) could 
indeed be useful arbitrators in a conflict zone.  
2.3.4 The importance of territory: roving bandits versus stationary 
bandits 
Can the dichotomy of warlords being either state-spoilers or state-builders be 
reconciled? Mancur Olson (2000) offers an alternative view that places territorial 
control as a factor. While reaffirming that warlords’ behaviour is primarily banditry, 
as rational people, Olson claims that if a bandit can muster enough power to become 
the de facto sovereign in the area, he effectively becomes the stationary bandit and 
the land that he controls could offer comprehensive interest that should encourage 




of production. A roving bandit would take 100% of the money in the till, leaving no 
incentive for the people to produce. In contrast, a stationary bandit would ensure his 
victims have an incentive to produce so that he could continue taxing (or robbing) 
them. Furthermore, the stationary bandit would also have the incentive to provide 
public goods to the people within his domain in order to further encourage 
production (Olson, 2000, pp. 6-10). 
The postulations suggested by Olson have significant implications in two ways. First, 
Olson reasons that when faced with a choice, people would prefer a stationery bandit 
to a roving bandit because a form of co-existence could be reached with the 
stationary bandit. Second, territorial control is vital for a warlord to be seen as a 
state-builder. These two contributions are relevant to the case under examination in 
Myanmar. 
On the first point about a stationary bandit bringing development to the territory he 
controls and being preferred to a roving bandit, these issues ring true when 
examining the political situation in the Pa-O SAZ. Since the PNO reached a ceasefire 
agreement with the regime in 1991, the PNO has effectively become a stationary 
bandit, and within a fixed geographical boundary they have enjoyed the monopoly 
use of violence. Indeed, Callahan (2007) argues that co-existence was achieved in the 
Pa-O SAZ. When Callahan uses the term ‘co-existence’, she is merely referring to 
the relationship between the regime and the ceasefire armed group PNO, but nothing 
is said about whether the same co-existence could be extended to the relationship 
between the de facto hegemon and the local Pa-O people. Therefore, an essential 
question still needs answering: Informed by warlord politics and the nature of roving 
and stationary bandits, how did the regime manage to control the Pa-O SAZ through 
the PNO in the state-building project?  
The second point about territorial control requires further clarification because it has 
always been taken for granted by warlord politics scholars. To understand the 
problem here, one may ask: if a stationary bandit can co-exist with the state and be 
part of the state-building project, why can this approach not be replicated in other 




occupation? This raises the difference in the strategic importance between a frontier 
and a boundary. In this sense, many warlord politics scholars only provide blurred 
definitions of the space in which warlords operate. Some scholars duck the issue by 
simply referring it to a core-peripheral relationship (Davis, 2010; Mathis, 2013; 
Reno, 1999). When examining warlordism in Zaire, Reno (1999, p. 149) comments 
that ‘[t]he existence of multiple centers of accumulation in Zaire promotes this 
radical decentralization of politics’. This core-peripheral theme runs deep throughout 
his book. Another stance is that of the Commission for Africa (2005), which treated 
the areas as ‘ungoverned spaces’. Many scholars also provide vague definitions; for 
example, Beswick (2009, p. 337) calls it ‘the zones of contested authority’ while 
Marten (2006/07, p. 48) refers to it as ‘the disintegration of central authority, a 
phrase that was similarly used by Jackson (2003, p. 133). Finally, there are scholars 
who simply do not discuss the issue at all (Hills, 1997; Mac Ginty, 2010; Skaperdas, 
2002). To be sure, the territorial aspect of warlordism has often been overlooked, but 
it may hold the very key to explaining why, in some areas, co-existence can be 
achieved, whereas devolution and military occupation continues in other areas. 
2.3.5 The Pa-O SAZ: the new frontier 
In examining the power of the state, anthropologists Asad and Harris (2003) ask a 
very important question: Where does the state end? They argue that the state is not a 
fixed object and its boundaries are subjective projections from various dimensions, 
such as inclusion versus exclusion, and the rule of law versus the state of exception. 
Korf and Raeymaekers (2013) contribute to this discourse by drawing a very 
important distinction between borders and frontiers. Borders often give the 
impression that they are where state authority is stretched or compromised because it 
is the nesting ground for smuggling, illegal immigration, and corruption. However, 
borders remain essential parts of the state that must be regulated, for they also 
perform the function of cross-border trade and the movement and circulation of 
people, goods, and services. Moreover, being regulated by the state does not mean 
illegal activities cannot take place. Very often, the state is part of these underground 
ventures. Therefore, Korf and Raeymaekers (2013, pp. 9-10) claim that borders are 
as important as any part of the state because they function as ‘the state’s spatial and 




territorially fixed population’. They go on to explain that, in contrast, frontiers are 
‘not necessarily boundaries, but rather political spaces with distinct spatialities of 
rule and sovereign power’ (Korf and Raeymaekers, (2013, pp. 9-10). Therefore, 
frontiers are at the margins of the state where central authority recedes (Donnan & 
Wilson, 2001). This view is shared by Das and Poole (2004), who describe frontiers 
as an area where the formation of a different political economy from the state is 
permitted through the deliberate relaxation of normally organised practices. 
Essentially, frontiers are seen as an institutional and moral vacuum (Le Meur, 2006). 
Consequently, in practicing state authority, borders remain tightly under state 
control, whereas the political order in a frontier area can be mutually constituted 
among stakeholders, and therefore there is more tolerance and flexibility in terms of 
setting the rules of the game. This difference has significant implications for the 
trajectories of the political order in border and frontier areas.
36 
A quick review of 
Myanmar’s geography and economy should help to illustrate this issue. 
Myanmar shares borders with five countries: Bangladesh, China, India, Laos, and 
Thailand, but border trade is mainly concentrated with China and Thailand. 
Following the argument that the state will assert more control and authority in the 
border areas relative to the frontier areas, one should expect the state to have a 
dominant presence along the borders with China and Thailand. However, these 
borders in the Kachin and Shan States are occupied by ethnic armed groups, who 
also want to secure their own trade routes for smuggling activities. Therefore, the 
conflict hotspots in the 1970s and 1980s were mainly concentrated in the Kachin and 
Shan States. However, the border trade pattern has seen a sharp change since the 
1990s. After the West imposed sanctions on the country, Myanmar has become 
economically dependent on China. As a result of this development, cross-border 
trade between the two countries increased more than threefold, from US$318.4 
million in 1999 to US$1,376.8 million in 2008. In 2010, around 65% of border trade 
went through Muse in the Northern Shan State (Kudo, 2010). For the first eight 
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months of 2015, China accounted for 87% of Myanmar’s total border trade. 
Therefore, the control of Muse as a border to support the Myanmar economy was 
vital for the regime. However, it is worthwhile noting that the cross-border trade data 
only reflects commodities that were cleared and recorded at the check points (i.e. 
official trade), but, as Global Witness (2015a) has claimed in its report published in 
October 2015, up to 80% of the trade in jade was smuggled into China through Muse 
and Myitkyina in Kachin. Therefore, control of these routes is equally important for 
the ethnic armed groups. This serves to explain why protracted conflicts (or what 
Callahan refers to as ‘near devolution’) persist in Kachin and Northern Shan States.  
In contrast, border trade between Myanmar and Thailand dwindled rapidly. In 1992–
93, the total border trade between the two countries was US$143 million, but by 
2002–03 it had reduced to only US$74 million. As a percentage of total Myanmar 
border trade, Thailand accounted for 40% in 1992–93 (Yunnan 54%), which shrank 
to just 16% in 2002–03 (Yunnan 72%). The decline in reliance on the Thai border 
trade implies that control in the Myanmar-Thai border area in the Southern Shan 
State is less significant, thus providing room for the state to negotiate a conflict 
settlement from the 1990s onwards, resulting in what Callahan describes as 
coexistence. These areas of coexistence become the state’s ‘new’ frontiers, where 
law and order need to be reconstructed, and how to deal with the local warlords 
needs to be addressed.  
2.3.6 Co-optation as elite accommodation 
The concept of frontiers is relevant in examining the political order in Southern Shan 
State, not just because the economic conditions have changed, therefore allowing 
lesser direct state control, but also because, under colonial rule, Burma was already 
being divided into Ministerial Burma (or Burma Proper) and the Frontier Areas, 
which included Shan, Chin, and Kachin. While Britain had direct control of Burma 
Proper, authority in the Frontier Areas was left to the local chieftains (Leach, 1954; 
Saha, 2013; Sai Aung Tun, 2009). It is worth remembering that there was a well-
established structure of authority in the Shan State before it was dismantled during 




surrendering their hereditary rights. The authority rested with the sawbwas, but day-
to-day operations, such as collecting taxes, settling disputes, and performing rituals, 
was left to the township and village headmen. With the structure destroyed, the same 
would go for the line of patronage. Hence, when examining the dynamics involved in 
the frontier, or what Duffield and Callahan call the emerging political complex, one 
needs to bear in mind the shift in patronage and the implications this entails.  
The question of how to reintegrate the Frontier Areas so as to become part of the 
Union of Burma thus became the paramount statecraft mission after independence. 
The Burmanisation project started in the 1960s backfired and resulted in intensifying 
ethnic conflicts (Holmes, 1967; Taylor, 2009). The shift in tactics beginning in 1989, 
marked by the signing of ceasefire agreements with ethnic armed groups, signalled 
the dawn of a frontier management approach that emphasised the co-optation of 
ethnic strongmen. The main difference of this approach was not placing the political 
order in the Frontier Area under the direct control of the state, but partially 
decentralising it to local administration. This is not the same as autonomy because 
the arms of the state are still highly visible, but, within the Frontier Area, flexibility 
enabled the accommodation of local conditions.  
This approach is different from the conventional argument by modernisation 
theorists, who claim that it is the lack of development that leads to the divide 
between the state and its frontiers. If the modernisation school had its way, the 
solution would be to focus on development spearheaded by the state (see the edited 
book by Duncan (2004); Stephan Haggard (1990)). This line of argument takes the 
position that the frontier should not be any different from other parts of the state, and 
therefore state intrusion into frontier areas can be justified on development grounds. 
However, James Scott (2009) argues that there are people who genuinely want to 
escape the wrath of the state, or they do not want to be taxed or controlled by the 
central authority, so they settle down in pockets of space within a state that become 
frontiers. The Wa ethnic group in Myanmar is a good case in point. Before the 
independence of the country, the British set up the Frontier Areas Committee of 
Enquiry to look into the integration of the Frontier Areas with the Ministerial Burma. 




housing, and hospitals, the representative of the Wa replied: ‘We are very wild 
people and we do not appreciate these things […]’ (in Kramer, 2007, p. 9).  
The Wa case may be an exception and should be understood in the context at that 
time. However, in most cases for ethnic minorities, the reality lies somewhere in 
between the desire for development and avoiding unwarranted state interference. The 
statecraft technique available to the regime is what Reno (1999, p. 2) calls creating a 
‘shadow state’ that consists of a highly networked and formally recognised patronage 
system based on cutting deals with local strongmen over the control of resources. 
Essentially, it is based on Jean-Francois Bayart’s (1993) idea of ‘elite 
accommodation’. However, it is different from Svolik’s (2012) notion of ‘elite power 
sharing’ because this shadow state does not have a strong institutional set up. This 
lack of bureaucracy is by design, as, if the shadow state is given too much 
institutional capacity, it would attract independent ideology (Reno, 1999). Therefore, 
before examining how the military regime in Myanmar accommodated the ethnic 
elites, it is important to review what co-optation actually constitutes.  
2.3.7 Warlord as the agent: the process of co-optation 
In his study on frontier governmentality in the Philippines, Wong Pak Nun (2013) 
suggests that frontier strongmen should not be seen as a threat to the state but can be 
co-opted in the state-building process to bridge the development and resistance 
dichotomy. Essentially, Wong argues that the decentralisation of state management 
to local strongmen can help to pacify the frontier. The tools that facilitate the 
decentralisation are networking, identity switching, and brokering (Wong, 2013, pp. 
92-94). Wong’s suggestion is to treat frontiers separately but make them work for the 
state by co-opting the local strongman in a patron-client relationship. Patronage, as 
interpreted by Shefter, is ‘a divisible benefit that politicians distribute to individual 
voters, campaign workers, or contributors in exchange for political support’ (in 
Aspinall & As’ad, 2015, pp. 166-167). Scott (1972, p. 92) puts it more bluntly as an 
‘instrumental friendship’. In a nutshell, a patron-client relationship is about handing 




When Wong and Aspinall were examining the client-patron networks in, 
respectively, the Philippines and Indonesia, they were dealing with the relationship 
between local strongmen and central governments within electoral parliamentary 
regimes. However, what if there was no election, as in the case of Myanmar from 
1990 to 2010? What is the relevance of patron-client relations when there is no need 
for local support? In this regard, the finding of Aspinall (2009) in Aceh may offer a 
clue.  
Similar to the ethnic situations in Myanmar, Aceh, which is located in the northern 
end of Sumatra, Indonesia, enjoys a rich endowment of resources, and the local 
Acehnese also demanded independence from Indonesia. There were several uprisings 
spearheaded by the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka [GAM]). In 
trying to pacify this conflict hotspot, the Indonesian government launched 
construction projects in the area. While the new development was transforming the 
political economy of Aceh, the crucial point Aspinall makes is that the GAM actors 
were also being ‘absorbed and transformed’ by the changing political economy 
(Aspinall, 2009, p. 31). The significance of this finding is that it echoes with what 
Wong describes as identity switching: in the case of the Philippines, local strongmen 
became statesmen; in the case of Aceh, GAM combatants became contractors. 
This type of transformation of identity from enemy of the state to part of the state 
machinery is well underway in Myanmar. The process began soon after ceasefire 
agreements were reached in the early 1990s and gained ‘legitimacy’ after the 
establishment of the Office of Privatisation Commission in 1995. The best-known 
case is the Asia World Group, headed by Steven Law, son of the Golden Triangle 
drug lord Lo Hsing Han. The Ruby Dragon Group headed by Nay Win Tun is 
another example of a warlord-turned-entrepreneur. This is the dawn of cronyism in 
Myanmar (Ford, Gillan, & Htwe Htwe Thein, 2016). Between 1995 and 2007, the 
ownerships of over 200 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were being transferred to 
entrepreneurs who had close links with the regime. The Htoo Trading Group, headed 
by U Tay Za and with businesses spanning from real estate to import licences, could 
call on former head of SPDC General Than Shwe as patron. Likewise, Aung Ko 




and the air industry, had the backing of General Maung Aye, former Vice Chairman 
of SPDC. The privatisation process accelerated after 2007, with over 500 SOEs 
being transferred to the private sector. While the privatisation programme could be 
justified on the grounds that the SOEs were ‘notoriously inefficient’ (Turnell, 2010, 
pp. 34-35), the lack of transparency in the privatisation process only added to the 
speculation that the main purpose was to consolidate wealth in the hands of the 
ruling (military) class, with the ancillary purpose of co-optation in cases where local 
strongmen were the beneficiaries.  
Therefore, the relevance of patron-client relationships for an authoritarian regime is 
not just about vote buying, but also about pacifying the conflict zone in order to 
enhance the regime’s legitimacy. In the case of Myanmar, Kevin Woods (2011) 
views the development of military-private partnership, or what he terms ‘ceasefire 
capitalism’, as the ‘territorialising strategy’. However, at the same time, Woods 
argues that this strategy could result in further marginalising local ethnic people who 
are not part of the resource extraction network and risk opening up new avenues of 
conflict (Woods, 2011, p. 767). This was certainly the case in Myanmar, as economic 
development in the rural areas led to multiple problems of land grabbing, pollution, 
corruption, and other social issues. Moreover, because the local strongmen switched 
their identities to become allies of the state, the co-optation strategy inevitably 
intensified the rift among people of the same ethnicity, but without enhancing the 
legitimacy of the regime. The political backlash resulting from the decentralisation of 
power is not exactly the same as what Castells (2007) has described. In this sense, 
Castells warns about losing legitimacy from the centre to the periphery, but at least 
legitimacy was achieved in the peripheral areas. However, the co-optation strategy 
adopted by the Myanmar regime may not have promoted legitimacy because the 
local warlords simply made themselves rich without sharing the benefits and, in most 
cases, continued the violence previously carried out by the state. How can the regime 
overcome this problem? The answer lies in finding the right agent for the military 
regime. 
In their study of Indonesian election, Aspinall and As’ad (2015) argue that while 




political objectives; for this reason, they conclude that ‘what gave the victor his 
winning edge were state-centred forms of patronage and assiduous networking with a 
group we have described […] as state brokers […] (Aspinall & As’ad, 2015, p. 191). 
Finding the right broker can also explain why co-existence can be achieved in some 
areas and why it fails in others.  
However, Woods (2011) and Aspinall and As’ad (2015) have all failed to delineate 
the mechanism by which the macro policy of co-optation could be translated into 
control at the micro level. Clearly, co-optation is just getting the warlord to change 
sides so that there will be one less enemy, but this does not mean that the state can 
then claim effective control in the territory concerned. Moreover, Aspinall (2014) 
states that brokers can betray, thus making it more relevant to find the right partner in 
the co-optation process. Furthermore, the co-opted warlord, now the broker for the 
state, must then deliver the political objectives of the state. There is no evidence to 
suggest that the state capacity has been enhanced through the accommodation 
strategy. Equally, there is nothing to suggest that the accommodated warlords could 
advance social control. Co-optation is the macro policy to bring local strongmen to 
the side of the state, but what did the local strongmen do with this new position as 
agents of the state? How can they maintain control given that their legitimacy is also 
lacking?  
This essentially leads us back to the central research question regarding how power is 
constructed and manifested in the emerging political complex so that the regime can 
enhance legitimacy and maintain control in these ceasefire zones. Unlike the 
accommodation of the leadership that appears to have been settled with financial 
guarantees and constitutional protection, the second level of accommodation 
regarding agents of the state, the warlords in this instance, still have several issues 
unanswered. First, who is the chosen agent and why him? Second, how was the 
accommodation strategy constructed? Third, what is the mechanism of this 
accommodation and how can the agent be prevented from defection? These questions 
will be addressed in later chapters, but this section has already served the purpose of 
framing the narratives in order to capture the dynamics of warlord politics, as well as 




warlords and the state mutually constitute each other when they try to reconcile their 
respective interests.  
2.4 Local Resistance: The Moral Economy and the 
Rational Peasant Debate 
So far, the discussion has focused on the top end of the political spectrum, i.e. 
accommodation at the leadership level, and warlord co-optation at the second level. 
In addition, these discussions can inform the research on the predicament of regime 
survival and why accommodating the warlords was the only viable survival strategy, 
despite the fact that securing leadership and warlord support would only make it a 
weak state. For it to be a strong state, Migdal has warned that state capacity needs to 
be built up, which requires the effective implementation of social control to ensure 
compliance, participation, and legitimation. In this regard, it is necessary to examine 
the issue from the perspective of the underprivileged, i.e. the deprived sector of the 
population who ironically comprised the majority. For the ordinary Pa-O, who are 
mostly farmers, what would make them comply and participate in the state project? 
On the other hand, what would make them turn against the state, resist penetration, 
and even pick up arms to occupy the place the warlords left behind? 
The issue of peasant revolt has occupied many past and present political sociologists 
(Migdal, 1974; Moore, 1993; Walker, 2012; Wolf, 1999). The discourse reached a 
critical juncture when James Scott (1976, p. 4) brought forward the concept of the 
‘normative roots of peasant politics’. His conception of a moral subsistence ethic was 
immediately challenged by Samuel Popkin (1979), who argued, from the perspective 
of a developmental state, that the actions of peasants could be explained by rational 
choice. If Scott is correct on his postulation of a subsistence ethic, then a social 
control project should focus on the relationship between the farmers and their patron. 
However, if the actions of the farmers are the result of calculated gambits, then the 
solution to control may point to the direction of trade-offs. Yet, are the two different 
views irreconcilable? Therefore, the moral economy and rational peasant debate will 
unfold in three sub-sections. The first section looks at the key components of Scott’s 
moral economy, which is then followed by examining Popkin’s counter argument. 




inform the research from the perspective of the underprivileged, thereby providing a 
better understanding about who could best serve as the implementer at the bottom 
level of accommodation and, importantly, how to achieve it.  
2.4.1 The basis of moral economy 
The person to first link moral economy with peasant rebellion was historian Edward 
Thompson (1971, 1991), who examined the public grievances over bread prices in 
Britain during the 1800s. In this sense, there was a paternalist model based on 
common law and customs to bind farmers, millers, and bakers to supply bread at a 
fixed price in the local community. However, the system broke down because of 
market forces. The farmers no longer supplied to their former millers due to higher 
prices offered from other townships; likewise, millers no longer sold their flour to the 
former bakers. The result was a price hike and confusion, which led to public 
discontent (Thompson, 1971, 1991).  
The key point of Thompson’s postulation is that, even though the paternalist model 
may have been replaced or subordinated by new market mechanisms, the traditions 
underlying the paternalist model were still being embraced by the public and served 
as grounds for revolt when the customs were breached. Therefore, Thompson (1971, 
p. 125) claims that ‘the point here is not just prices, in time of scarcity, were 
determined by many other factors than mere market-forces […] It is more important 
to note the total socio-economic context within which the market operated, and the 
logic of crowd pressure.’ He goes on to suggest that ‘riot was a social calamity, and 
one to be avoided, even at a high cost. The cost might be to achieve some medium, 
between a soaring “economic” price in the market, and a traditional “moral” price set 
by the crowd’ (Thompson, 1971, p. 126). 
While Thompson focused on British farmers, Scott (1976) based his analysis on 
Southeast Asian peasants. At the core of his argument is the idea that farmers should 
be entitled to the most basic needs to survive, or what he refers to as the ‘subsistence 
ethic’ (J. C. Scott, 1976, p. 2). He was aware of the incursion of market forces into 




of exploitation, but, precisely because of this, the farmers would need protection. He 
claims that farmers have their own notions of justice that are based on reciprocity 
and the right to subsistence (J. C. Scott, 1976, pp. 160-180). With regard to 
reciprocity, ‘a gift or service received creates, for the recipient, a reciprocal 
obligation to return a gift or service of at least comparable value at some future date’ 
(Scott, (1976, p. 167). From the perspective of the farmers, whose harvest may vary 
from year to year, reciprocity means they are willing to contribute more to the 
landlord during a good harvest, but expect the landlord to provide some assistance 
during poor years. The expectation of assistance is what Scott (1976, p. 45) calls 
‘subsistence crisis insurance’.  
The work on moral economy by Scott is particularly informative because he 
highlights the challenges faced by subsistence farmers and suggests why farmers 
would revolt. The incursion of the state into the subsistence living of farmers affects 
them in several ways. The new development may affect the tenancy system, that is to 
say, the relationship between the farmers and the landlords. Moreover, the changes 
may bring about instabilities due to market conditions. Consequently, if the farmers 
lose their protection through subsistence ethics, and justice is not served, they will 
revolt against the system. Using the example of Lower Burma, Scott (1976, p. 76) 
claims that the ‘increasing resort to force by landlords in the Delta reflected the 
growing resistance to their claims. Each violation of local norms implied a greater 
reliance on coercion’.  
If a state is left with no alternative but to achieve compliance through coercion, then 
its capacity for social control is very limited, which, in turn, makes the state weaker. 
Therefore, if there is a moral economy and the Pa-O farmers expect it to be 
maintained, then the right implementer should be able to deal with the concerns of 
the farmers, and the state should accommodate this implementer in the final piece of 




2.4.2 The rational peasant: the political economy approach 
The question as to whether there was a moral economy is a matter for further 
investigation, but there is also a need to examine the issue from a different 
perspective. Scott sets his premises of rural rebellion on the failure of maintaining 
the subsistence ethic. However, Samuel Popkin (1979) disagrees by claiming that the 
conflict started because the farmers wanted to improve their living standards beyond 
subsistence. In no unambiguous terms, Popkin (1979, p. 3) declares that the moral 
economists were wrong in their assessment of state-rural relationship because they 
‘base many of their claims on unsupported or unexamined premises and that crucial 
parts of their view of peasant institutions are without foundation’. He refutes 
Thompson’s claim of a paternalist model and instead argues that the paternalists, at 
best, can only be called monopolists (Popkin, 1979, p. 4). He lays the blame on the 
perceived rationale that pre-capitalist social relations were the moral high ground, 
and capitalism destroyed such relations (Popkin, 1979, p. 6). 
Instead of safety first, as claimed by Scott, Popkin believes that peasants make 
investments and gamble. As an example, he argues that having children is an 
investment. Farmers have total control over whether to have an additional child or 
not. Therefore, before deciding on whether to have a child, there are cost-benefit 
calculations, and this decision has nothing to do with subsistence. Essentially, Popkin 
views the decision as a trade-off, paying for the cost of bringing up a child for the 
return of free labour after the child grows up. 
Therefore, here lies the main difference between the moral economy approach and 
Popkin’s rational peasant: Popkin views individual decision making as the main 
analytical focus, whereas Scott takes the stance of a communal norm. Consequently, 
Popkin (1979, p. 247) does not believe that the peasant revolts in the first half of the 
twentieth century had anything to do with a subsistence crisis; in this sense, he states 
that there ‘is no direct relation between short-term subsistence crises and collective 
action’. He attributes the cause of the revolt to organisational strategies 




Importantly, Popkin (1979, p. 259) claims that ‘when a peasant makes his personal 
cost-benefit calculations about the expected returns on his own inputs, he is making 
subjective estimates of the credibility and capability of the organizer, the “political 
entrepreneur,” to deliver.’ Hence, there is an expectation of return, but no moral 
obligations of any sort. To be sure, there is no patron-client relation in the decision-
making process when dealing with the political entrepreneur, just calculated risk.  
The point made by Popkin is a significant one because it highlights an important 
issue about the role of the political entrepreneur. To put it into the context of the Pa-
O farmers, Popkin would argue that in order to keep the Pa-O farmers appeased, the 
political entrepreneur, or, in the scheme of Migdal, the implementer, needs to deliver 
what they want. Crucially though, what these farmers want is not the subsistence 
ethic but something that is quantifiable in terms of benefits. 
2.4.3 Reconciling moral economy and the rational peasant 
Even though Popkin may appear to have refuted all the key points made by Scott, 
there are areas of similarity. First of all, Popkin acknowledges that there was a 
subsistence crisis, but he argues that what Scott refers to was just a short-run 
subsistence crisis, whereas his focus is more on long-run subsistence crises, his 
example of whether to have a child being a case in point. In this sense, Popkin (1979, 
p. 20) argues that to ‘treat all subsistence crises as the same form of short-run crisis is 
to brush over the differences in demand-making ability and the ways in which 
subsistence levels change.’ 
Furthermore, on the point of the peasants not being risk adverse and taking gambles, 
Popkin makes this claim based on the peasants already having enjoyed a secure 
footing. Hence, he states that the peasants ‘often are willing to gamble on 
innovations when their position is secure against the loss and when a success could 
measurably improve their position’ (Popkin, 1979, p. 21). Basically, Scott and 
Popkin are looking at two difference classes of farmers – Scott’s farmers are 
deprived and struggling under the changing system, whereas Popkin’s are more 




The debate on moral economy versus rational decision making is relevant to this 
research in that the arguments capture the dilemmas faced by Pa-O villagers, many 
of them who are subsistence farmers looking for justice and the maintenance of 
subsistence ethics, while others are open to changes because they want to improve 
their living conditions. Therefore, the research deals with transition at the village 
level, where subsistence encountered development. To enforce social control at the 
village level requires the implementer to navigate between the demand for 
compliance from the top and the call for justice and moral obligations from the 
bottom. While this section cannot identify the implementer due to a lack of 
information, it has delineated his job description.  
Similar to the previous section on the accommodation of the warlord, the 
examination of the source of resistance at the local level is not complete. It is not the 
intention of this thesis to come to a definitive conclusion as to whether Scott or 
Popkin was correct regarding the assessments of peasant behaviour. Rather, the 
discussion of their differences helps to inform this research about what the role of the 
implementer should be, who the final link in the triangle of accommodation is, and 
where he should locate himself between the state and the Pa-O villagers. 
2.5 A Brief Summary of the Chapter  
The state-in-society approach has been systematically applied in this chapter to 
unravel the question of how the military regime implemented social control in a 
decentralised zone. Following the suggestions of Migdal regarding the necessity to 
examine the nature of the conflict, the first part of the chapter was devoted to 
scrutinising the background of the ethnic struggle and the state of affairs when the 
military regime took charge in 1988. In this regard, the regime faced multi-
dimensional challenges from all fronts, i.e. political, economic, and social, which 
made the state pacification project even more difficult.  
Despite this, the regime survived the challenge, which led us onto a discussion of the 
survival strategy guided by Migdal’s triangle of accommodation. There are three 




accommodation of the warlords (the second level), and, finally, the accommodation 
of the implementer (the last level). The triangle of accommodation is a prerequisite 
for the effective administration of social control, which affords a regime the capacity 
to survive. 
In the case of the Burmese military, the accommodation of the leadership was 
accomplished through sharing the financial windfalls with fellow military officers 
and was further secured by means of the 2008 Constitution. The accommodation of 
the warlords was examined through the lens of warlord politics. This part of the 
chapter sought to resolve the question of whether to see a warlord as an enemy or 
ally of the state and offered the concept of warlord accommodation as a survival 
strategy. Moreover, the importance of territory, in terms of being either a frontier or a 
border, as well as the distinction between a roving bandit and a stationary bandit, was 
outlined in order to paint the landscape of the emerging political complex. However, 
issues regarding how to choose the warlord and what constitutes the mechanism of 
accommodation were left to be examined in later chapters. Finally, this chapter 
examined the source of resistance in the hope of locating the implementer in the final 
layer of the accommodation strategy. Caught between the demand for justice and the 
desire for development, local resistance was framed under the narrative of the 
theoretical debate between moral economy and the rational peasant. At this stage, 
there was insufficient information to identify the implementer and how he could 
achieve the task of social control; despite this, through the analysis, his job 
description has been outlined, which should help in locating him.  
Before moving on to investigate the remaining issues relating to the second and third 
levels of accommodation, a point on the role of the village headmen that was picked 
up when assessing the colonial legacy needs following up. The British segregated the 
Frontier Areas for separate administration and kept the sawbwas as the local 
chieftains, but they replaced the local headmen with their chosen men. This strongly 
suggests that the British recognised the importance of the headmen. What was the 
historical role of the headmen? What are their current roles? How did the change in 
their role affect the patron-client relations with the villagers? To answer these 








3      Chapter 3:                                                                               
The System: The Evolution of the Administrative     
Arrangement in Rural Shan State 
 
The social engineer never starts with a blank sheet of paper; there is already a 
drawing on the blue print. He must take existing machinery and adjust it to his 
purpose; he may scrap much of it, but even the most violent revolution does not 
wholly obliterate the past (Furnivall, 1960, p. 1). 
In writing about the governance of Burma after independence, renowned Burma 
historian John Furnivall offers the above observation and argues that, despite the 
departure of the British in 1948, historical practices were still relevant in the 
governance of the country. His insistence that the past matters matches with 
Thompson and Scott, because customs and practices (communal norms) are the 
foundations of the moral economy school, which argues that, despite the incursion of 
capitalism, rural society still relies on patron-client relations and demands the 
maintenance of moral ethics and justice.  
The rigidity of tradition serves as a good starting point to revisit the question raised 
in the last chapter regarding the role of the headmen in rural Shan State. During the 
colonial era, the British left the Frontier Areas alone by maintaining the sawbwas, 
but they replaced the township and village headmen with their trusted people, which 
indicates that these headmen played an important role in rural society. Therefore, the 
aim of this chapter is to chart the evolution of the administrative arrangement in rural 
Shan State and review how social control was maintained, thereby examining 
whether the role played by these headmen survived the British occupation and the 
subsequent changes, in addition to ascertaining if the patron-client relations between 
them and the villagers have been altered in any way. An understanding regarding 
what practices have been maintained and what functions these headmen held will 
inform the research about who could have played the role as implementer. 




Shan State under the sawbwas (or saohpa in Shan).
37
 It is important to note that 
sawbwa authority is also applicable to the Pa-O, because they also had their own 
sawbwas (Sai Aung Tun, 2009, p. 341).
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Yet, even if the sawbwas had the authority, 
what did it mean in terms of political, executive, economic, and social power? More 
importantly, what was the role of the headmen in this configuration? This was the 
foundation that the rural administrative system built upon, but how much was 
obliterated thereafter? 
Subsequent changes came in several phases. First was the British colonisation, 
during which period the system faced exogenous cultural interference for the first 
time, and the Frontier Areas were segregated from central administration under the 
British divide-and-rule strategy. Then there was the utopia of democracy after 
independence and the surrender of authority by the sawbwas, only for the hope of 
transformation to be short-lived, as the military coup in 1962 turned the course of the 
country towards socialism. By this time, the country was engulfed in internal conflict 
from warlordism, which was spreading like wildfire. Ironically, during this period, 
the rural governance system was given breathing space for reorientation and 
consolidation. It was not until 2008 that the new Constitution finally laid down the 
vision for the rural administration system, which was subsequently enacted in 2012. 
With all the changes over different phases in mind, the resilience of the traditional 
system will be outlined in the following sections.  
3.1 The Pre-Colonial Administrative Arrangement in Shan 
State Under Feudalism 
The pre-colonial administrative system in Shan State was mainly feudal. The state 
was divided among the Shan saohpas, who were the rulers of their respective 
territories (mongs). They paid tribute to the Chinese emperors to the east and 
Burmese kings to the west in order to seek protections. Sao in the Shan language 
means ruler, master, or lord, whereas hpa means sky. The saohpas, or the lords of the 
sky, were regarded as descendants from above and therefore carried indisputable and 
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divine authority to rule over their subjects (Sai Aung Tun, 2009; S. Yawnghwe, 
2013). Burmese kings had no authority over the Shan States, as noted by Chao Tzang 
Yawnghwe (1989, p. 85), the son of Sao Shwe Thaike, who was the first president of 
the Union of Burma and the Saohpa of Yawnghwe: ‘there was not even nominal 
Burman control in the Shan areas at that time’. Similarly, Scott (1901, p. 570) 
comments that ‘the regular authority of the Burmese kings extended only over the 
Burmese-Shans, and thus ended at the last Burmese-Shan village, Maingna in the 
Waingmaw circle’.  
The territory of a saohpa was organised under the baan-mong system, which had 
three levels of administration. At the lowest level of the administration was the 
village, known as the baan or wan, which consisted of fifty to two hundred 
households. The baan was administrated by a pu kye, equivalent to a village leader. 
Several baans, consisting of up to around 1,000 households, would be grouped into a 
village tract called aing under the administration of a pu hein (village tract leader). 
Several aings would form a mong, which was equivalent to a town. This type of 
classification is consistent with what Edmund Leach (Leach, 1954, p. 114) noted 
when he was studying the political system in Highland Burma. Whilst the mong was 
directly under the saohpa, he would rely on the pu heins and pu kyes to help him 
collect taxes and supply necessities to the saohpa family (see Figure 3). All the 
positions of saohpa, pu hein, and pu kyu were hereditary, but the latter two required 
official approval from the saohpa. The eldest son of a saohpa became the kyem 
mong, the heir-apparent. Although the title naw mong was also conferred on the 
second son, his position was purely ceremonial, and he had no authority on the 
administration (Sai Aung Tun, 2009). Whilst the baan-mong system was an 
established political structure within all the domains of the saohpas, there was no 
integration, as each saohpa was an individual political unit, and the saohpas often 
fought among themselves over territories (S. Yawnghwe, 2013, p. 89).  
Although Shan saohpas enjoyed full autonomy within their territories, they were 
effectively vassals of the Burmese kings. Apart from having to pledge their loyalty, 
Shan saohpas had to contribute towards voluntary services in defence of the king in 




king. In return, the saohpas received a letter of appointment, a sanad, from the king 
as confirmation of their status as rulers of Shan, which, more importantly, served as 
an official endorsement of the right of self-autonomy over their internal affairs. Inter-
marriage between the royal court and the sons and daughters of saohpas was not 
uncommon; however, its purpose was mainly political. For the royal court, such 
marriage served as a guarantee of allegiance from the saohpa because his sibling 
would be held hostage. For the saohpa, the royal court marriage was a status symbol, 
and exposure to the administration system in the royal court helped the saohpas to 
manage their own houses (Sai Aung Tun, 2009). 
However, what power did the saohpas really hold? In studying the political system in 
Highland Burma, Edmund Leach (1954, pp. 182-195) contextualises their power in 
terms of judiciary power, military leadership, their role in economic affairs, their 
executive function, and religious guidance. However, when dealing with power, one 
has to be careful; while the overall administrative structure (the village tract system) 
was the same, different ethnic groups may have had subtle differences when it came 
to how power was interpreted. Leach’s primary focus in his study of the political 
system in Highland Burma was the Kachins. While he refers to the whole area of his 
study as the Kachin Hills Area, he notes that the population was under two heads, the 
Shan and the Kachin (Leach, 1954, p. 1). However, Leach stresses that ‘Kachins and 
Shans are almost everywhere close neighbours and in the ordinary affairs of life they 
are much mixed up together’ (Leach, 1954, p. 2). Moreover, the ‘Kachin chiefs, 
when they have the opportunity, model their behaviours on that of Shan princes 
(saohpa)’ (Leach, 1954, p. 213). It is clear that Leach was aware of the danger of 
mixing up the political system of the Shan and Kachin. Indeed, where the practices 
were different between the Shan and Kachin, Leach makes certain to inform readers 
of the differences. Therefore, when examining the power and authority of the chiefs 
in Shan State, unless Leach makes a specific distinction between the Kachin and 
Shan, it is reasonable to assume that the practice was the same for the two ethnic 
groups, at least as far as Leach is concerned.  
Bearing in mind the similarities and dissimilarities of the political systems of the 




(although, since he does not make specific reference to the Shan, the same should 
arguably apply to the latter) had no concept of a judge – disputes were seen as debts 
that should be settled by arbitration, with the chief (saohpa) as the arbitrator because 
he was deemed to have a vested interest in the outcome. In other words, a dispute 
would be resolved by negotiated settlement (Leach, 1954, pp. 184-185). This practice 
had important implications for the social structure of ethnic society because, in the 
absence of the rule of law, people would have to rely on patron-client relations for 
protection.  
In terms of military leadership, here, Leach draws a crucial difference between Shan 
and Kachin. Whereas Kachin chiefs were not organised on a territorial basis, Shan 
chiefs, as a whole, worked as a large community to fend off external enemies (Leach, 
1954, pp. 185-187). Having the capacity to pull together against foreigners made the 
Shan resemble more like a political unit, and the authority of the saohpas could be 
derived from this political unit.  
From the perspective of the chief’s role in economic affairs, Leach provides two 
significant observations regarding the power of the chiefs, one on the nature of 
tribute and the other on the rights to collect tribute. Leach makes the point that 
tribute was like a debt that carried a responsibility to settle a matter. Therefore, 
receiving a bigger debt did not make the saohpa economically more powerful but 
simply increased his obligation in proportion to the debt. To be sure, the culture of 
patron-client relations is embedded in Shan society. On the second point regarding 
the rights to collect tribute, Leach makes a very important distinction between 
tributes that consisted of consumption goods and cash or rice. Normal consumption 
goods, such as meat, would not enhance the economic power of the saohpas because, 
being the chief, they had more official functions that required food in order to host 
guests. In contrast, if Chinese traders passed through a village and had to pay cash to 
the saohpa for protection, this would be translated into real economic power. Leach 
notes that the village headman did not receive any cut from this form of cash tribute. 
This leads him to argue that the saohpa’s right to collect tributes from travelling 




landowners of the territory.
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On the question of executive power, Leach makes a very bold claim regarding 
authority in Shan society: ‘[The] Shan […] leader should himself distain to take an 
active part in day-to-day administrative affairs’ (Leach, 1954, pp. 188-189). Indeed, 
Leach claims that, before the British arrival, the chiefs did not take on any executive 
functions, and even during the colonial era, their role was simply as an agent for the 
British. Instead, the real executive power was vested in the village headman. It was 
very clear that this statement applied to the Shan saohpas because Leach stresses that 
‘the influence of common bawmung (meaning leader and referring to village leader) 
was most pronounced in the wealthiest chiefdoms, where the chief was most 
obviously aping the manners of a Shan prince’ (Leach, 1954, p. 189). In this sense, 
according to Leach, the men who were responsible for the day-to-day administration 
of the chiefdom were the village headmen and not the chief. This view is also shared 
by Furnivall (1957, p. 30). 
Finally, in Leach’s contextualisation of authority, he explains that the position of the 
chief was not a priestly office; he merely performed a ritual function. The right to 
offer sacrifice was exclusive to the chief, but he would have to employ a priest to 
perform the official ritual (Leach, 1954, pp. 189-190). Therefore, the religious power 
of the saohpas was symbolic rather than actual. After the saohpas lost their office in 
1959, the people turned to the Buddhist monks for spiritual guidance (Spiro, 1982). 
From what Leach describes about the political system in Highland Burma, and in 
cross-referencing this information with other authors on the same subject, there are 
several key aspects of the administrative structure that need highlighting. First, what 
actual authority did the saohpas possess? Their position was hereditary and could not 
be challenged. They had the right to receive tribute because they were the owners of 
the land, and they had the exclusive right to offer sacrifices. However, beyond these 
                                                          
39
 The questions then become, after the saohpas surrendered their hereditary rights in 1959, who 
owned the land and who could collect tributes from travelling merchants? This leads to questions 
regarding land ownership and the subsequent disputes on land grabbing and illustrates why the issue is 
so difficult to resolve, as it is not simply about receiving adequate compensation. The problem has to 
be understood in terms of how the Shan people viewed the concept of ‘land’. According to Leach 




authorities that were linked to their birth rights, the actual authority of the saohpas 
was very limited. Rather, the day-to-day administration was left with the village 
headmen. The power and authority of the saohpas may be lost as a result of change 
in the regime, but this does not mean that the social structure at the local level will be 
changed overnight. How much is lost, and, more importantly, how much has been 
retained, thus become extremely relevant in the ongoing discussion of power 
construction in Shan State. 
 
Figure 3: The baan-mong administrative system 
3.2 Divide-and-Rule Under the British Occupation 1886–
1948 
The British occupation in Upper Burma started in 1886 after the Third Anglo-
Burmese War and ended in 1948 when Burma achieved independence.
40
 There are 
two conflicting accounts of what happened to the power of the saohpas here. 
According to Sai Aung Tun (2009, p. 151), a historian and former vice chairman of 
the Myanmar Historical Commission, the Shan chiefs needed to surrender their 
sovereign rights as well as autonomous rights after the British annexed Upper 
Burma. However, according to Kyaw Win et al. (1999a, p. 5), the Upper Burma 
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Laws Act of 1886 (Section 8) specifically made the provision ‘to exclude them (Shan 
States) from the operation of any Act which was not specially extended to them’. 
Moreover, the saohpa system was given legitimate recognition under the Shan States 
Act in 1888 (Kyaw Win et al., 1999, p. 6). To support their argument, Kyaw Win et 
al. (1999) refer to a note the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma, Sir Reginald Craddock, 
sent on 18 May 1919 to the Governor of India, stating that ‘the inhabitants of these 
areas are totally unfit to take part in any form of government other than the 
government through the agency of the Chiefs’.41  
Both accounts are not necessarily contradictory. What is apparent is that a carrot-
and-stick policy was implemented to pacify the saohpas. Upon annexing Upper 
Burma, the British granted a sanad to the complying saohpa to reconfirm his status 
as ruler of his subjects, but the sanad contained two salient features that would alter 
the power dynamics within the Shan State. First, the proprietary rights of natural 
resources, such as forest, mines, and minerals, were wrested out of the hands of the 
saohpas. The new rule required them to obtain an operation license from the 
government, for which they needed to pay annual royalties. The saohpas could still 
sublease the license to their former clients, but, in order to recuperate the royalties, 
the fees would be much higher, which therefore undermined the former patron-client 
relations. Second, the Burma Act of 1898 provided for the appointment of two 
superintendents to overlook the Northern Shan State and Southern Shan State. The 
saohpas were required to keep an agent (assistant to the superintendent) in their 
headquarters as an informant to the government (Sai Aung Tun, 2009, p. 166). In 
1922, a federated system was introduced to the Shan State under Notification No. 31. 
The Federal Council became the highest organ for Shan administration. Therefore, 
while the saohpas maintained their status, as Kyaw Win et. al. (1999) claim, their 
sovereign rights had been substantially curtailed, as Sai Aung Tun (2009) notes. 
Effectively, the British had erected a superstructure above the traditional 
administrative system in Shan State. Before the colonial period, the saohpas had full 
autonomy within their territories. However, after Shan State became the Federal 
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Shan State in 1922, a Federal Council chaired by a commissioner appointed by the 
Chief Commissioner in Rangoon was established to overlook Shan affairs. 
Furthermore, the state was divided into southern and Northern Shan State, with each 
having a superintendent in charge. The Federal Council Commissioner would be 
assisted by a Vice President, who was the superintendent of the Northern Shan State. 
There would also be a Secretary, with the assistant to the superintendent of Northern 
Shan State assuming the role (Sai Aung Tun, 2009, pp. 163-188; Taylor, 2009, pp. 
92-99). Consequently, with this superstructure placed above the traditional authority, 
the line of direct communication between the saohpas and the British government 
was severed (see Figure 4). This led Samara Yawnghwe (2013, p. 90), whose 
grandfather was Sao Shwe Thaike, the first president of the Union of Burma and a 
saohpa, to say: ‘Despite their “full autonomy”, the Saohpas and Shan rulers had to 
obey the resident British officers, supervisors, Superintendents, Residents and 
Commissioners, all of whom ranked higher in terms of access to the power centre, in 
this case Britain.’  
Indeed, the view that the British alienated Upper Burma during the colonial period 
by separating the administration from the centre requires clarification. Based on 
archived materials, which show the administrative structure of Burma from 1886 to 
1942, it is evident that the British had intensified and rationalised the administrative 
system in Shan State during their tenure. In the early colonial period of 1886 to 1897, 
there was only one superintendent in charge of Shan State. In 1888, an assistant 
superintendent was added to assist him. However, by the middle stage of the colonial 
period, from 1897 to 1922, the administration of Shan State had been divided into 
Northern Shan State and Southern Shan State. Both the north and south had one 
superintendent each, but, importantly, the Northern Shan State superintendent was 
assisted by six assistant superintendents, and his southern counterpart was assisted by 
seven assistant superintendents. Towards the end of the colonial period, from 1937 to 
1942, the number of assistant superintendent increased to nine for both the northern 
and Southern Shan States (National Archives Department of Myanmar, 2014, pp. 
118-120).  




in Shan State when leaving it to the saohpas, as in the pre-colonial period and as 
suggested by Sir Craddock, could equally suffice? Robert Taylor (2009, p. 93) 
provides the answer by pointing to the British ‘belief that rationalisation of their 
administration carried the promise of beneficial rewards for the state in trade, 
taxation, and improved security.’ However, in order to make it a profitable project, 
something had to give, and it was at the expense of the traditional patron-client 
relations.  
The long-term effect of overturning the decentralised administration structure 
established during the pre-colonial period was three-fold. First, when the saohpas 
accepted the sanads, they essentially consented to the British to draw boundaries in 
their domains that had never existed before (S. Yawnghwe, 2013, p. 90). This 
process led to the redistribution of land and caused much resentment among the 
farmers who lost their land, but there was nothing their traditional patron, the 
saohpas, could do to protect them. 
This leads to the second point, as it caused a breakdown in the patron-client relations 
between the saohpas and their subjects. Before the British arrived, the saohpas 
enjoyed absolute autonomy over their territories. However, when the British 
attempted to introduce a more structural form of administration that enabled them to 
better exploit the resources in the region, the new polices destroyed the traditional 
patron-client relations between the Shan chiefs and their people. Policies on public 
work, education, health, forestry, and agriculture were centralised under federal 
control. Thus, on the one hand, the villagers had to pay taxes to support the 
livelihoods of the saohpas and their extended families, while, on the other hand, they 
received no returns because their welfare was no longer in the hands of their former 
patrons.  
Moreover, the saohpas lost their power as arbitrators. William Hackett points out 
that one of the most important ideas the British brought to the villages of Shan State 
was the concept of justice (Hackett, 1953, pp. 493-494). Whereas, in the past, it was 
considered a debt and the saohpas had full power over the arbitration result, the 




more in line with British practice that emphasised justice and equality. Consequently, 
in the past, when a man fell afoul of the saohpa, if ‘he was without influential 
friends’, he would be ‘taken into custody, tried, and convicted, and fined, 
imprisoned, or executed without due process of law’ (Hackett, 1953, p. 494). 
However, after the British introduced justice at the local level, the saohpas would not 
dare wield their power. 
Consequently, it was not just the patron-client relations between the saohpas and 
their subjects that were severed during the British occupation; the realignment of 
control closer to the centre also undermined the divine rights and authority that the 
saohpas commanded on their people, with disastrous implications on the hereditary 
rights of their successors. If the saohpas legitimacy to govern did not really come 
from the fact that they were ‘lords of the sky’, and their authority could so easily be 
removed from them, then what legitimacy would their siblings have with regard to 
inheriting the chieftain position? 
 




Therefore, the legacy of the British on the administrative system in Shan State was 
far-reaching. They introduced the concept of boundaries to Shan State, and because 
the saohpas could no longer be the arbitrators of land disputes, it can be argued that 
the British ushered in the problem of land ownership that exists to the present day. 
They wrecked the traditional links between the saohpas and the Shan and called into 
question the automatic right of their succession. Together with increasing cries from 
ethnic minorities across the country for democracy and self-determination, the 
saohpas finally gave up their heredity rights in 1959. 
3.3 Approaching the End of the Feudal System in the Post-
Colonial Period to 1962 
After the successful conclusion of the Panglong Conference in 1947, the country 
geared up for independence. The administration in Shan State was also reformed in 
order to reflect the impending changes. A new political institution, the Shan State 
Council, was formed on 21 April 1947. The council was made up of sixty-six 
members; the thirty-three saohpas were automatic members, while the rest were 
society elites. The council was vested with legislative, executive, and financial 
powers. The government of Shan State was also formed to implement the resolutions 
passed by the council. The Shan State government was headed by the president based 
on the nomination of the prime minister and after consultation with the Shan State 
Council. The president had full executive power and was the sole authority in the 
administration of Shan State affairs (Sai Aung Tun, 2009, pp. 327-328).  
Whilst major structural changes were taking place at the state and regional levels, 
subtle political manoeuvres were also taking place in the saohpas’ domains. Being 
sidelined by the British after the appointment of two superintendents for Northern 
and Southern Shan States, the saohpas took advantage of the Japanese occupation to 
reassert their authority at the local level. In the brief absence of the British during the 
Second World War, the saohpas quickly reinstalled the positions of provincial 
officers, such as myosa and hein, and, at village level, the positions of pu kye. 
Essentially, there were two administrative systems being run at the same time: one 
was operated by the Shan State government, which had the support of the central 




own territories. However, this dual system was very ineffective and inefficient. For 
instance, in terms of finance and budget, the Shan State Council and the saohpas 
kept two separate books. The saohpas were required to pay 25% of their revenues to 
the Shan State government, but only Keng Tung State managed to fulfil its 
obligation. Moreover, the saohpas kept their own police force, but law enforcement 
was restricted to within their domains, thus making cross-boundary crime very 
difficult to police (Sai Aung Tun, 2009, pp. 329-330). It became apparent to 
everyone that reform in the administrative system in Shan State required urgent 
attention if democratisation was to take root. 
At the same time, an anti-feudalism movement was also gathering momentum in Pa-
O. To underpin their desire for self-determination, they formed the Pa-O National 
Association in September 1950, with U Po Khin as the first president and U Pyu as 
the secretary. In order to pacify the Pa-O, both U Po Khin and U Pyu were made 
members of the Shan State Council. However, the co-optation did not work, as about 
4,000 Pa-O protested in Taunggyi, the capital of Shan State, on 11 December 1950, 
demanding democracy. 
In a somewhat unexpected turn of events, the saohpas announced they would 
surrender their rights in 1952. There were different accounts as to why the saohpas 
were willing to give up their heredity rights and the authority that came with it. Most 
historians give credit to the saohpas for supporting democracy (Sai Aung Tun, 2009, 
p. 361). However, it is necessary to understand the transfer of power from a different 
perspective, which sees the saohpas in a less benevolent light.  
After the Second World War, China was caught up in a civil war between the KMT 
and the Communist Party of China (CPC); the latter eventually won, and the KMT 
was forced to escape across the straits to Taiwan. However, some remnants of the 
KMT did not join the main force in settling in Taiwan; instead, they encroached into 
Shan State and waited for an opportunity to recapture China. To finance their 
operation, they recruited Shan natives for troops and engaged in trading narcotics. 
Many Shan farmers began to grow opium for the money, and the easy access to 




circle. Furthermore, the presence of the KMT remnants attracted the incursion of 
communist China into Shan State, causing many local casualties (Lintner & Black, 
2009). The inability and helplessness of the saohpas was one of the main reasons 
why drastic reforms were needed to prevent Shan State from sinking into total 
disorder. Indeed, according to an informant, who was 91 at the time of the interview 
and was a member in the Shan State Council before the 1962 coup, the saohpas had 
no option but to concede their heredity rights because they were not ‘welcomed’ by 
the local people and were seen as an ‘obstacle’ to the central government. The 
informant added that ‘they [the saohpas] demanded a lot of money from the 
government’.42 In the final agreement reached on 29 April 1959, each saohpa was 
given a lump sum, equivalent to 15 years his annual revenue, in return for 
surrendering his heredity rights. 
The relevance of considering this alternative reason for the saohpas to surrender their 
heredity rights is the respective implication on the local administrative system – the 
baan-mong system. If the saohpas were really embracing democracy to the extent of 
surrendering their rights, then the logical implication would be the abolishment of the 
baan-mong system, which relied on patron-client relations, and having a more 
accountable system based on representation put in its place. However, if the 
surrender of their rights was more to do with external pressure and was beyond their 
control, then it would be questionable that there would be any genuine attempt to 
abolish the baan-mong system.  
The truth probably lay somewhere in between. In the same year, when the saohpas 
announced that they would surrender their hereditary rights, a National Welfare 
Conference was held to discuss plans for the decentralisation of power and 
democratisation of local administration. As a result of the conference, the 
Democratic Local Government Act was introduced in 1953, under which a village 
council made up of five elected members was established. The objective of the 
village council was to promote bottom-up planning in support of township 
administration (United Nations Development Programme, 2015, pp. 13-14). This 
prompted constitutional lawyer U Maung (1961, p. 138) to note that ‘today the 
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headman is the servant of the villagers and the Township Officer is the servant of the 
local politicians, and so it goes, step by step, up the hierarchy’. The Democratic 
Local Government Act, together with the surrender of hereditary rights by the 
saohpas certainly seems to support the argument that there was genuine desire for 
greater democracy at the local level. However, in what form and substance did these 
new initiatives take?  
Apart from the elites who enjoyed hereditary positions, most of the villagers were 
farmers who did not receive any education. From Leach’s account of the political 
system in Highland Burma, it is apparent that the villagers never had any experience 
in administration. Therefore, even though allowing a village to elect five 
representatives to form a village council may have been done with good intentions, 
there was a capacity problem in that these five representatives simply did not know 
what the role was and what was expected of them. The only person in a village that 
had any experience in administration was the village headman. Therefore, the village 
council could easily be manipulated so as to rubber stamp the village headman’s 
decisions. Moreover, the village council became the battleground for local power 
politics. The AFPFL had been fragmented and the communist side threatened to 
murder village council members who were not their choice (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2015, p. 14). Therefore, while the form of a representative 
administrative system was in place, the substance remained trapped within the 
historical construct of the village headman’s control. 
Between April 1959 and the military coup in 1962, there was a void of information 
regarding whether the baan-mong system was still in place. The work by Sai Aung 
Tun on the history of Shan State up to 1962 makes no mention of the system, nor any 
other systems to that effect. However, even though the saohpa hereditary system was 
abolished, it appeared that the village tract order was still in place. In her work 
discussing the role of the Shan in maintaining the Union of Burma, Samara 
Yawnghwe (2013), whose grandfather was Sao Shwe Thaike, the first elected 
president of the Union of Burma, describes a local funeral to illustrate why the locals 
hated the Tatmadaw. She quotes her mother, Sao Hearn Hkan, daughter of the 




Tatmadaw during a funeral possession. Since the soldiers did not speak Shan, they 
mistook the procession for a group of bandits and took the village headman away and 
tortured him (S. Yawnghwe, 2013, pp. 205-206). This account refers to a period after 
the saohpas had surrendered their power, as Sao Hearn Hkan goes on to mention that 
the villagers were very angry with the soldiers and went to her and asked for 
weapons to fight back. She explained to the villagers that her brother, the Saohpa of 
Hsenwi, had given up all their weapons to the army as a sign of good faith 
(Yawnghwe, 2013, p. 206). While this account may not be conclusive evidence that 
the village tract system had survived the removal of the saohpas’ hereditary 
succession, it underlines the continued patron-client relations between the villagers 
and their headman, and the fact that the bond was still very strong because the 
villagers were willing to fight on the headman’s behalf at the risk of their own lives. 
3.4 The Return of the Village Tract System after the 
Military Coup in 1962 
If there was any chance of some form of democratisation of local governance being 
in place after the saohpas surrendered their hereditary rights, this was soon dispelled 
after Ne Win seized power in 1962.
43 
The 1947 Constitution was immediately 
abolished following the coup, and the Democratic Local Government Suspension Act 
was introduced in 1964. The implication of the act was as literal as it could be, i.e. 
putting a halt to any form of democratisation of administration and placing all local 
governance firmly within military control. Conversely though, in an indirect way, the 
act secured the role of the village tract system, which was being marginalised under 
the village council system (United Nations Development Programme, 2015, p. 15).  
Another significant development after the coup was the establishment of the Burma 
Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), and the banning all other political parties, as 
commanded by Ne Win. All government officials had to be members of the party. 
Therefore, when the 1974 Constitution was introduced and People’s Councils were 
set up at all levels of government administration, the People’s Councils at the village 
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level were all made up of BSPP members. The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) (2015, p. 16) report suggests that the councils provided the 
opportunity for the local people to participate and voice their opinions, therefore 
‘providing a form of rudimentary accountability mechanism within the state 
structure’. However, according to Robert Taylor (2009, pp. 330-331), the People’s 
Councils ‘were essentially extensions of the central state’s administration.’ 
Indeed, this form of state-party dominant structure set the pattern for the 
development of future local politics. When the multi-party system returned, the state 
did not relinquish control but simply employed a different agent to execute central 
policies. This contradicts the point made by the UNDP (2015, p. 16) that ‘at the 
township and village levels, however, the People’s Councils gradually became more 
genuinely participatory bodies’. If this form of grassroots participation existed in 
local politics during the Ne Win era, which spanned 26 years from when he staged 
the coup in 1962 to when he resigned as party chairman in 1988, then there must be 
some form and substance that can be traced in the subsequent political system 
reflecting public participation after the rule of the BSPP. Yet, in interviews with 
villagers and village headmen, no-one supported the idea there was any form of 
bottom-up participation in the period of 1988 to 2011.
44 
Indeed, the UNDP (2015, p. 
17) also notes that, during the SLORC and SPDC era, ‘on the level of local 
governance, no elections were held and all positions were appointed by the SLORC, 
with military officers taking up many positions especially at district level’. The latter 
statement by the UNDP does not necessarily contradict its earlier statement regarding 
people’s participation; it merely exposes the authoritative nature of local politics in 
that all officials, whether ethnic SAZs or not, were simply agents of the state. The 
People’s Council was made up of people appointed by the state, and this is one 
example where the form and substance did not match, i.e. the People’s Council was 
supposed to be representing the people but, in reality, the members were appointed 
by the regime and acted in its interest. 
The UNDP report also leaves an interesting puzzle unanswered. It states that, under 
the SPDC, administration of the state was divided into four levels. The first level was 
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‘state and division’, which was headed by military commanders or senior military 
officers. The second level of administration was the ‘districts’, which were also 
headed by field grade military officers. The third level of administration was 
‘townships’, which were headed by township officers from the General 
Administration Department (GAD) formed in 1988 (Kyi Pyar Chit Saw & Arnold, 
2014, p. 10). Finally, the bottom level was the ‘wards and village tracts’, which were 
headed by ‘reputable persons in the locality’ (United Nations Development 
Programme, 2015, p. 17). Who exactly were these ‘reputable persons’? How were 
they appointed? Most importantly, what was their role in the grand scheme of state 
control at the local level?  
In these questions, we can find the clues to locating the nexus of power in the 
transition between macro co-optation policy and micro-level control. The state 
administrative system has undergone several changes, with new institutions being set 
up only to be replaced by the next governing regime. Some institutional structures 
only existed in form while lacking substance, whereas some century-old practices 
have survived the changes. The 2008 Constitution, which has been implemented 
since 2011, represents a sharp departure from the rules under the military regime. 
However, has it really changed the form and functions of the local institutions?  
3.5 The Self-Administered Zone Given Statutory Status 
Under the 2008 Constitution 
The new Constitution provided for the separation of the three branches of sovereign 
power (i.e. legislative, executive, and judiciary powers) at all levels of the state 
structure from the Union to Regions and States (Sections 199 (a) (b)) (Constitution of 
the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008). Accountability and representation 
appear to be the essence of the Constitution.  
Under Section 51, the hierarchical administrative structure of the Union is divided 
into several layers as follows (see Figure 5): 
a) Villages are organised as a village-tract; 




c) Village-tracts and wards or towns are organised as a township; 
d) Townships are organised as a district; 
e) Districts are organised as a region or state; 
f) Townships in a Self-Administered Zone are organised as a Self-Administered 
Zone; 
g) Townships in a Self-Administered Division are organised as a district, and 
such districts are organised as Self-Administered Divisions; 
h) If there are Self-Administered Zones or Self-Administered Divisions in a 
region or a state, those Self-Administered Divisions, Self-Administered 
Zones and Districts are organised as a region or state; 
i) Regions, states and Union territories are organised as the Republic.  
However, when it comes to ward and village administration, forms of the past are 
definitely familiar. Section 289 provides that ‘administration of wards or village-
tracts shall be assigned in accord with the law to a person whose integrity is 
respected by the community’. This is the same as leaving it to the ‘reputable person’ 
as in the previous regime. There is no mention of how this ‘reputable person’ should 
be selected, i.e. by election or by selection? 
 




3.6 Development Since 2011: The Enactment of the Village 
Tract System 
The ambiguity in the selection process of the village-tract administrator was clarified 
in February 2012 when the Ward and Village-Tract Administration Law was enacted 
by parliament. The new law stipulates that the administrator needs to be elected in an 
indirect process. Within the ward or village tract, heads of households are grouped 
into clusters consisting of ten households, then ten household leaders will be elected 
by secret ballot, and finally, these ten household leaders will nominate a candidate 
among themselves by secret ballot. The ‘election’ process is supervised by a panel 
consisting of five ya mi ya pha (village elders), who are appointed by the township 
administrator.  
It is important to note that these elections do not fall under the authority of the Union 
Election Commission. Instead, the GAD, under the Ministry of Home Affairs, is the 
body in charge of supervising the election (United Nations Development Programme, 
2015, p. 21). Section 260 of the Constitution provides that the ‘Head of the General 
Administration Department of the Region or State is the ex-officio Secretary of the 
Region or State Government is concerned. Moreover, the General Administration 
Department of the Region or State is the Office of the Region or State Government 
concerned’. Since it is constitutionally bound, under Section 232 (b)(ii), for the head 
of the Ministry of Home Affairs to be a military officer appointed by the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, local elections at wards and villages 
are, effectively, still under military control. Consequently, as the UNDP (2015, p. 23) 
report notes, ‘the 2008 Constitution does not provide for any statutory delegation of 
powers to bodies of local self-government or any specific model of setting up 
elected/representative bodies at the local level’. 
However, as reported in The Myanmar Times, village tract administrators are 
increasingly taking on important responsibilities, such as identifying development 
projects, providing recommendations to the development support committee, and 
overseeing the implementation of these projects. They also chair the local land 




the outcomes of land disputes.
45 
Their power has been increased, but without a 
corresponding increase in accountability. 
Another major development in local administration took place in 2013, but this time 
it was not through the regional government but by direct decree through Presidential 
Notification 27/2013 (issued on 26 February 2013). Making reference to Section 36 
(a) and (c) of the 2008 Constitution, the notification aims to ‘promote the 
development of national economy in collaboration with regional organisations and 
private individuals, and to strive to improve the economic, social and living 
standards of the people’.46 Under the notification, the Self-Administered Divisions or 
Zones had to set up the Ward or Village Tract Development Support Committees by 
31 March 2013. The recommendations of the Development Support Committee still 
needed to be implemented by the GAD; however, the notification can also be seen as 
legitimising the collaboration between private enterprises and local government on 
local governance.
47
 At the same time, the notifications paved the way for civil 
society groups to participate in the development of the Self-Administered Zones. 
3.7 The Current Status at the Village Tract Level 
It is important to note that these new administrative structures are designed for the 
delivery of public services, such as education, health, and transportation, to the local 
areas. The aim is to match the state development goals with local development needs. 
With the Ward and Village Tract Administration Law in force, village tract leaders 
now carry the official title of village tract administrators. However, what authority do 
they really possess? More importantly, has the traditional patron-client relationship 
that was established between the village tract leaders and the villagers been replaced 
by the Development Support Committee?  
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 As defined in the UNDP report, local government ‘refers to specific, semi-autonomous institutions 
or entities created by national or state constitutions, legislation of a higher level of government or by 
executive order to deliver a range of specific services to a geographical area’, whereas local 
governance is deemed to represent the ‘local-level formulation and execution of collective action’ 




Before addressing these questions, one issue needs clarification. Although village 
tract administrators now carry an official title, they are not civil servants. They are 
not on the payroll of the regional government. Chapter XII of the Ward or Village 
Tract Administration Law stipulates that the village tract administrator will receive a 
monthly subsidy and a lump sum subsidy after completing his term of office, which 
is the same five-year term as the regional government, up to a maximum of three 
terms (Chapter IV, sub-section 9). During separate interviews with three village tract 
administrators, the question of whether they were paid for their job as village tract 
administrator was put to them, and they all replied that they were not. Two of them 
went on to say they could claim for out-of-pocket expenditure, such as traveling and 
printing, but none of them mentioned anything about the monthly subsidy and the 
end-of-term lump sum payment provided under the law.
48
 In fact, all of them were 
reluctant to talk about the remuneration they were entitled to. 
These village tract leaders, or administrators as they have subsequently been called, 
have always performed the function of liaising between the sovereign (the saohpas, 
the superintendents under the British, and other regimes since independence) and the 
villagers. As the UNDP report notes,  
the new ‘Ward and Village-Tract Administration Law’, which was prepared by 
the Ministry of Home Affairs and regulates the operation of state 
administration at the local level below townships, essentially extends the 
system of village tract and ward administration already foreseen in earlier 
versions of the law for the past century, in that it places the overall authority 
under a Village Tract/Ward Administrator (United Nations Development 
Programme, 2015, p. 32).  
This UNDP statement is consistent with the information obtained from the 
interviews. When asked if there had been any changes in what they had been doing 
during their time as village tract leaders/administrators, all three separately replied 
that there had been no change, while a similar answer was given by a director of the 
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There has always been a lack of a precise job description relating to the actual 
function of village tract leaders. However, if their function has not changed for a 
century, as the UNDP report notes, then the Ward or Village Tract Administration 
Law 2012 provides vital clues as to what is expected of them. Under Chapter VII, 
Subsection 13(a)–(f), the functions and duties of village tract administrator are 
spelled out in detail. Apart from the expected duties, such as maintaining law and 
order within the village tract, there are some interesting ‘job descriptions’ in the 
chapter. Some are quite trivial, such as Subsection 13(f) requiring the administrator 
to submit comments on whether permits should be granted for public ceremonies; 
13(i) empowering the administrator to grant permits for using loudspeakers; and 
13(j) asking for comments regarding permission to establish businesses with billiard 
tables or for entertainment. Of course, in the old days, there were no loudspeakers or 
billiard tables, but the fact that the 2012 law spelled out these petty duties underlines 
the authority of the village tract leader/administrator both in the past and at present. 
These duties may seem trivial, but from the perspective of the villagers, if someone 
wants to open a billiard room or karaoke for business, the village tract 
leader/administrator’s comments could decide whether he/she is able to fulfil his/her 
entrepreneurial ambition. 
There are some serious duties as well. Subsection 13(l) confers the rights for the 
leader/administrator to search gambling houses, while Subsection 13(n) allows for 
the examination of any place for upholding the law. Given that many Shan villages 
grow opium, which is prohibited by the law, the right to search whenever and 
wherever necessary provides plenty of rent seeking opportunities, especially when 
the right is exercised in conjunction with 13(z), which requires the village 
leader/administrator to collect land revenues on behalf of the government.  
This review of the early political system to the present day strongly suggests that the 
position of the village tract leader/administrator has been strongly entrenched in the 
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rural system. Moreover, because this position is the main conduit between the ruling 
authority and local villagers, the village tract leader/administrator holds the key to 
the effective implementation of policies. That is to say, the state capacity relies on 
their abilities to execute the functions of penetration, regulation, extraction, and 
attribution. However, there are still some questions in need of clarification. Firstly, 
whose interests are the village tract leaders/administrators serving? Secondly, how do 
they fit into the role of the implementer within the triangle of accommodation 
suggested by Migdal? Finally, if the village tract leaders do have the power, in what 
shape or form is this power being exercised?  
These questions pave the way to answering the core research question regarding how 
the regime maintained control after decentralised authority. The centre holds much 
needed information about how the village tract leaders exercise their power in order 
to ensure that the villagers conform and comply, i.e. to maintain social control. 
However, in order to exercise the power, the political economy needs to facilitate the 
village tract leaders, while the political economy, in turn, needs to be constructed and 
understood in terms of the political structure of the emerging political complex in the 
Pa-O SAZ. In this regard, it is like peeling an onion, in that one skin needs to be 
removed before revealing the next. Therefore, the political structure will be 
delineated in the next chapter, followed by a chapter examining the political 
economy under such a structure. This should then inform the research so as to begin 
resolving the remaining questions regarding how the village tract leaders fit into the 
role of implementer in the final accommodation process, and how the power vested 




4   Chapter 4:   
The Players: The Political Actors in the Pa-O SAZ 
and Southern Shan State 
The previous chapter has examined the system of local governance in the rural areas 
from pre-colonial days to the present. Despite drastic changes in the country, from 
the feudal and colonial eras to independence under first democracy and then 
socialism, the rural governance appears to be relatively resilient against the changing 
tides. The role of the village tract leader has always been there, but who they have 
been answerable to varies. In the pre-colonial days, although they helped the 
sawbwas collect taxes, they were also respected by the villagers because their 
positions, like the sawbwas, were also hereditary. However, winding the clock 
forward to the present day, their selection process is supposed to be by nomination 
from the bottom. Therefore, theoretically, they should be accountable to the villagers. 
However, the whole selection process is not transparent. Therefore, who are they 
really answerable to? Answering this question requires understanding the political 
structure of the Pa-O SAZ. Since in this new frontier the rules and regulations are 
being shaped by the political actors, this chapter therefore turns to identifying these 
actors and examining their origins and agendas.  
The chapter begins by locating the Pa-O through an explanation of the origin of their 
struggle for self-determination and charting their development from a political party 
to an armed group through splits and internal fighting, before eventually attaining 
their own SAZ. In this process, the main Pa-O political actors will be identified. The 
investigation then expands to include other political actors who have vested interests 
in the Pa-O SAZ, including political actors from Shan State, nationwide political 
actors, and NGOs/CSOs.50 The reason for including these actors in the examination 
is that the Pa-O SAZ is not a closed entity. Being a frontier and an emerging political 
complex, these players interact and mutually constitute each other in determining the 
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political structure of the SAZ. Hence, it is necessary to explain their agenda in order 
to paint a full picture of the political landscape.  
The aim of this chapter is to draw the boundaries of the arena where the interests of 
these actors collide, thereby helping to flesh out the areas of conflict and the 
dynamics at play in each confrontation. 
4.1 Locating the Pa-O 
The story of the Pa-O’s struggle for self-determination was recounted by a 91-year-
old retired journalist, politician, and historian, who had witnessed first-hand why the 
Pa-O picked up arms against the government. His father was a Shan and his mother a 
Bamar. Although he is not a Pa-O, he worked for them and is very close to them. 
This background allowed him to observe the political development in the area at the 
time before and after independence from both the Shan and Pa-O perspectives. When 
asked whether the interview could be recorded, he said, without a second thought: 
‘Please record everything – they don’t know their history’. He went on to say that the 
‘UPNO, PNO, PNLO are all lies; they are armed groups doing things for 
themselves’.51  
The Pa-O people were traditionally farmers; the Burmese called them Taungthu, 
while the Shan called them Taungsu. Although Taungthu could mean southern 
people, referring to their habitat in the Southern Shan State, it is also a disparaging 
term meaning farmers or hill people. Indeed, according to the 91-year-old informant, 
they were only called Pa-O when the Karen wanted to bring them on side in the 
struggle against the government. The Pa-O settled in the hills and unoccupied the 
valleys, and, because of this, Scott (1901, p. 160) makes the point that ‘from its 
rather out-of-the-way position, partly, too, from the peaceful and industrious 
character of the Taungthu race […] Hsa Htung52 […] suffered little from the 
intestinal struggles of other Shan States.’ Scott’s narratives of the Taungthu are 
clearly very different from what transpired after independence. The Pa-O was among 
the first few ethnic groups that took up arms to demand self-determination when 
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Britain was planning its exit. What triggered these peaceful farmers to become armed 
militants?  
The earliest record of the Pa-O can be traced back to around 600 BC, when the 
kingdom in the Thaton area was under the reign of King Suriya Sandar. Indeed, the 
Pa-O’s National Day falls on King Suriya’s birthday (Chann, 2004). By tracing the 
linguistic characteristics of the Pa-O language, Hackett (1953) concludes that the Pa-
O is a sub-group of the Karen. Although the Pa-O are mainly Buddhists, they 
maintain their animist superstitions (the Nat), which prompted Lowis (1949, p. 102) 
to describe their religious system as ‘Buddhism, tempered with animism.’  
According to the 1983 census, the Pa-O population in the whole country amounted to 
560,740. In 2005, there was an estimated 426,122 Pa-O living in the Southern Shan 
State, which can be further broken down into around 59,494 residing in Sisaing; 
54,720 in Hopone; 47,152 in Pinlaung; 46,425 in Naungtayar; 39,795 in Taunggyi; 
35,896 in Kyauktalone; 26,880 in Loilem, and 23,201 in Pinlon. Other towns that 
have a noticeable Pa-O population are Kalow (22,294), Nansam South (18,934), 
Nyaungshwe (15,180), and Yatsawk (10,799).53 
On 11 April 1991, the PNO reached a ceasefire agreement with the SLORC and, as a 
result, Special Region 6 was demarcated under the control of the PNO. Under the 
2008 Constitution, Special Region 6 became the Pa-O Self-Administered Zone 
(SAZ). The Pa-O SAZ consists of three townships: Hopong, Hsi Hseng, and 
Pinlaung. Hopong and Hsi Hseng share borders, thus forming an elongated area to 
the east of Taunggyi. However, Pinlaung is separated from the main part of the SAZ 
by Taunggyi (see Figure 6). The PNO main administrative offices are located in 
Hopong.  
While the Pa-O SAZ is the main focus of this study, it is important to note that there 
are Pa-O living in other parts of Southern Shan State, most noticeably along the 
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corridor east of Hsi Hseng all the way towards the Thai border, in towns such as 
Maukmai, which has a Pa-O population of 9,338 (about 35% of the town’s 
population).54 These Pa-O areas are controlled by PNO’s rival group, the PNLO. 
Although the PNLO also reached a ceasefire agreement with the SLORC in 1994, 
they have not been demarcated with a territory like their counterpart, the PNO. 
Outside the SAZ, but in areas where Pa-O people also reside, the grey area of control 
invites competition for influence, with the PNLO, Shan political actors, and other 
nationwide actors vying for domination.  
4.2 The Origin of Pa-O’s Struggle for Self-Determination 
Before investigating the origin of Pa-O’s struggle for self-determination, the 91-year-
old informant’s comment about the Karen making use of the Pa-O’s predicament for 
their own struggle against the central government requires further clarification. His 
statement matches the observation by Hackett (1953, p. 531), who argues that ‘the 
Karen were well aware of the antagonism of the Taungthu towards the Sawbwas and 
capitalized on it.’ It is worth remembering that the Karen were not invited to the 
Panglong Conference in 1947 (Sakhong & Keenan, 2014, p. 2). Therefore, they sent 
U Hla Pe, a Pa-O from Thaton, to represent them in the Panglong Conference 
(Christensen & Sann Kyaw, 2006, p. 17). However, Hackett, Christensen, and Sann 
Kyaw all fail to articulate the role that U Hla Pe played in starting the Pa-O 
movement against the establishment, i.e. first the saohpas and then the Burmese 
government. Here, the 91-year-old informant provided some vital clues.  
He talked about a great Karen leader by the name of Zaw Bwa U Gyi, who was a 
close friend of U Hla Pe. U Gyi was directly involved in the Karen’s struggle against 
the newly formed independent Burma government. The Karen uprising in Taunggyi 
was defeated in August 1948.55 U Gyi left some of the arms with U Hla Pe and asked 
him to continue fighting. U Hla Pe did not know what to do with the arms, and 
therefore he went to the 91-year-old informant for advice. 
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 Figure 6: Map of the Pa-O SAZ in Southern Shan State
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He advised U Hla Pe to continue fighting against the saohpas. At that time, the 
informant was a reporter with the New Light of Burma. Using his reporter’s pass, he 
was able to travel around the country to drum up support for the anti-feudal 
movement and recruit fighters. He met with General Ne Win, who actually provided 
him with arms to fight against the saohpas, and, according to the informant, this was 
how the Pa-O, as a group, started its struggle for self-determination. Ne Win trusted 
him because he was not a communist and they shared common enemies, i.e. the 
saohpas and communists.57 In this sense, the informant was convinced that the origin 
of the Pa-O self-determination movement was not in struggle against the state but 
against the saohpas. This is consistent with the claim by Yawnghwe (2013) that the 
Pa-O’s main enemy was the Shan saohpas. 
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The 91-year-old informant’s account is obviously open to questions in terms of its 
accuracy, given how much time had lapsed and that he may have mixed up facts and 
the sequence of events, as well as the possibility of bias. However, in the biography 
of U Hla Pe, written by Khun Thet Lu and published by Taunggyi Time in November 
2001, all the characters mentioned by the informant match the report, and the 
sequence of events is in order (Khun Thet Lu, 2001). This report gives the 
informant’s account a certain credibility.  
Importantly, the biography of U Hla Pe adds further details to the background of the 
Pa-O struggle. Khun Thet Lu notes that U Hla Pe was actively involved in the 
political struggle of the Karen and was made the Vice Chairman of the Karen 
National Union (KNU). Furthermore, he was elected as the Pa-O national leader to 
carry out the duty of the KNU. To begin their own struggle for self-determination, U 
Hla Pe, U Kae, Po Mein, and U Pyu formed the first political organisation for the Pa-
O, the Pa-O National Organisation (PNO), on 30 June 1946 in the Nyaung Wun 
Temple in Thaton. In 1948, they organised a mass demonstration, where more than 
ten thousand Pa-O congregated in Taunggyi. During the demonstration, the PNO 
made two specific demands. First, they demanded that ‘our Nationals must be 
recognized and called “Pa-O” instead of being called “Thaung Thu”’. Second, they 
demanded two Pa-O battalions for the Pa-O people to be set up (Khun Thet Lu, 
2001). The first demand supported the 91-year-old informant’s claim that Pa-O was 
not the name used to describe the group before independence. 
The involvement of U Hla Pe in both the KNU and PNO also supports the argument 
that the Pa-O was mobilised, at least partly, as a result of the Karen’s anti-
government movement. Indeed, a Karen and Pa-O joint force occupied Taunggyi for 
five days in July 1949. Here, there is a slight discrepancy in the year of the event 
between the account of the 91-year-old informant and the historical records. The 
informant said the Karen uprising in Taunggyi was defeated in 1948, whereas reports 
in The Taunggyi Times and the Cultural Survival Quarterly Magazine placed the year 
as 1949. The year quoted by the informant is not necessarily wrong, however, 
because Prime Minister U Nu sent his troops to attack KNU headquarters on 9 




defence (Cultural Survival, 1989). Therefore, 1948 was the start of the KNU 
‘revolution’, and 1949 was the year the joint force tried to occupy Taunggyi, but the 
military regained control after five days. Importantly though, the informant and the 
newspaper and magazine were referring to the same sequence of events.  
With this point clarified, the informant’s next claim about the arms left by U Gyi to 
U Hla Pe carries credibility; importantly, this provided the means for the Pa-O to 
stage a worthy fight against the saohpas. As Hackett (1953, p. 530) notes during his 
time staying in Taunggyi in the 1940s and 1950s, although the villagers may have 
been able to obtain small arms and ammunition during the Japanese occupation in 
Shan State, because of the strict arms control by the British, the quality of these 
weapons was often very poor. The link between U Gyi and U Hla Pe therefore 
provides the answer as to where the Pa-O obtained quality arms. The Karen were 
fighting on the side of the British during the war against the Japanese, and therefore 
they had access to weapons provided by the British, which were far superior to those 
available locally. However, why would the Karen give valuable arms to the Pa-O 
when they also needed them for their own fight? According to Hackett (1953, p. 
531), after the Karen’s defeat, they left behind some military advisors to help the Pa-
O in order to keep ‘the military aspect of the Pa-O National Movement’ alive.  
By cross-referencing the 91-year-old informant’s account of the event with other 
sources of information, it can be ascertained that, although aspirations for the Pa-O to 
overturn the Shan oppressive feudal system existed before the Karen movement, the 
origin of their armed struggle only started in 1948, and the Karen pushed the Pa-O 
national movement to cross the line from peaceful negotiations to armed struggle.58 
In the following section, attention will be turned to the PNO in examining how a 
supposedly unified Pa-O national movement became disintegrated and split into 
separate armed groups fighting among themselves, against the Shan, and against the 
central government. 
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4.2.1 The Pa-O national movement: from solidarity to 
fragmentation, 1946–1988 
Initially, the PNO was against the oppression from the Shan sawbwas under the 
hereditary feudal system. They gained the moral high ground when they were joined 
by local Buddhist monks in opposing the sawbwas-sanctioned gambling and opium 
dens (Christensen & Sann Kyaw, 2006, pp. 18-19). Momentum started to gather 
when, in 1947, they began the ‘Pa-O Luong Bu’, or Pa-O Solidarity Movement. 
However, Hackett (1953, p. 700) notes that the PNO only had a small following at 
that time and ‘certainly was not a potent force in January 1949’.  
A turning point appeared in 1950, when U Gyi was killed in battle with the Burmese 
army near the Thai border. Without a leader, the KNU asked U Hla Pe to be the 
chairman, but he refused, citing his close relationship with the Pa-O.
59
 To have a 
clean break from previous associations with the KNU, the United Pa-O National 
Organisation (UPNO) was formed in August 1950, replacing the Pa-O Luong Bu. 
The UPNO was a registered political party and they won three seats in parliament in 
the 1951 election (Christensen & Sann Kyaw, 2006, p. 22). UPNO was the ‘above-
ground face’ of the Pa-O movement, but, by 1951, they had built up one of the 
largest insurgency armies in the country, the Pa-O National Army (PNA), with over 
5,000 volunteers operating in four military zones in the areas near Taunggyi and 
Lake Inle (Smith, 1999, p. 168).
60
 
However, while the PNA was amassing in strength and headcount, ordinary Pa-O 
villages were increasingly confused as to what they really represented. The PNA 
soldiers were roaming around the mountains of Southern Shan State. Wherever they 
went, they collected food and taxes from the villages in order to support their cause. 
They frequently demanded ‘support without regard to the burden upon the people 
and the inequity of their demands’ (Hackett, 1953, p. 534). Essentially, they were 
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roving bandits. To the villagers, there was no difference between being under the 
PNO or the hereditary system of the sawbwas. This caused discontent (Hackett, 1953, 
p. 535), confusion, and resentment (Christensen & Sann Kyaw, 2006, p. 23) amongst 
the villagers. 
Moreover, there were internal rivalries, and violence among the Pa-O leaders was 
common. During the second parliamentary election in 1956, U Aung Sa, who was a 
member of parliament at that time, was murdered, together with two other Pa-O 
leaders. Later that year, more Pa-O leaders ‘disappeared’. They were allegedly killed 
by political rival Bo Kyaw Win, who was an ethnic Pa-O (Christensen & Sann Kyaw, 
2006, p. 24). Notwithstanding the Pa-O movement being caught up in the ideological 
struggle of communism, the events support the claim of the 91-year-old informant 
that these armed groups were merely fighting for their own purposes. 
The political situation in the early 1950s was complicated not just because of the 
ethnic insurgencies across the country, but also because of the geopolitics at the time. 
After the CPC defeated the KMT in 1948, part of the KMT troops did not join their 
counterparts in Taiwan, but instead entered into Shan State. Wary about the 
expansion of communism in the country, the US supplied arms in support of the 
KMT. At one stage in 1952, the KMT force was within twenty miles of Taunggyi 
(Christensen & Sann Kyaw, 2006, p. 23). Although the Tatmadaw eventually stalled 
the KMT advancement, the KMT remained in Shan State and became involved in the 
opium trade. Some of them joined local ethnic armed groups (Lintner & Black, 2009). 
Meanwhile, backed by the CPC, the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) was 
becoming increasingly involved in local ethnic struggles. As Smith (1999, p. 221) 
puts it, ‘the situation was an unholy mess’. With this as the background, the 
fragmentation of the UPNO was only a matter of time.  
In a desperate attempt to restore law and order in the country, U Nu launched the 
‘Arms for Democracy’ initiative in 1958, pledging political reform in return for 
ethnic armed groups giving up their weapons. Answering the call, U Hla Pe, together 
with nearly two thousand Pa-O insurgents, surrendered their arms in Taunggyi on 5 




Therefore, as far as the UPNO was concerned, its demand for the end of the feudal 
system under the sawbwas had been met (Christensen & Sann Kyaw, 2006, p. 25).  
Although the main objective of the UPNO had been fulfilled, several Pa-O leaders, 
including U Hla Pe, U Kyaw Sein, and U Pyu, remained active in the political arena 
and won seats in the 1960 parliamentary election. However, the Pa-O leaders’ 
optimism regarding a democratic Burma was soon quashed when Ne Win staged a 
coup on 2 March 1962 (Lintner, 1999, p. 170).  
In the two years following the coup, senior Pa-O leaders, such as U Hla Pe, U Kyaw 
Sein, and U Pu, were arrested; Bo San Thein was the only Pa-O leader who escaped 
capture. He returned to the mountains to recruit the old units that had surrendered in 
1958 and formed the Pa-O National Liberation Organisation (PNLO). The Burmese 
army was not the only enemy the PNLO faced. The coup also triggered other ethnic 
groups to fight for their territories, one such group being the Shan United 
Revolutionary Army (SURA), who counted many KMT remnants as members. The 
SURA regarded the entire Shan State as its territory and demanded the PNLO to 
come under its command. When the PNLO refused, fighting broke out between the 
two groups, which resulted in the death of Bo San Thein in 1968. 
Without leaders, the PNLO fell into the hands of Tha Kalei in 1968. He renamed the 
group the Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organisation (SSNLO) (Callahan, 2007, 
p. 46; Christensen & Sann Kyaw, 2006, p. 37). While Tha Kalei was a nationalist to 
begin with, he and other members in the senior ranks became increasing influenced 
by communist ideology.
61 
The internal conflict between the nationalist and 
communist camps intensified after U Hla Pe and Kyaw Sein were released from 
imprisonment and returned to SSNLO territories in 1972. By this time, a split 
between the nationalist and communist camps had become inevitable. In his 
interview with Tha Kelei, Martin Smith (1999, p. 337) quotes the latter as saying ‘the 
nationalist movement finished in 1958’.  
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In November 1973, fighting broke out between the nationalist and the communist 
camps. In March 1974, Tha Kalei formed an alliance with the Shan State Progress 
Party (SSPP) and held formal discussions with the CPB. Meanwhile, U Hla Pe 
regrouped his supporters and formed the Shan Nationalities Liberation Front (SNLF). 
Together with his trusted lieutenant Aung Kham Hti, they moved to Taunggyi region 
and began fighting with the SSNLO. In December 1974, they besieged the SSNLO 
positions and managed to push Tha Kalei’s forces towards Pai River, where they had 
to seek shelter at the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) camp. Tha Kalei 
then escaped to Panghsang to seek help from the CPB. He returned with four 
platoons of CPB soldiers and re-captured the former SSNLO bases near the Thai 
border (Smith, 1999, pp. 337-338).  
Therefore, while supporters of Tha Kalei initially claimed he was really a nationalist 
at heart, it later became clear that the SSNLO had been sucked into the orbit of the 
CPB, and the original struggle for Pa-O self-determination had become a wider 
movement of class struggle. To avoid any doubt regarding its communist connection, 
Tha Kalei added ‘People’s’ to the name of the group in 1974, and so it became the 
Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organisation (SSNPLO) (Christensen & 
Sann Kyaw, 2006, p. 30).  
In 1975, U Hla Pe died of ill health, and the leadership fell into the hands of Kyaw 
Sein, who was the vice-chairman at that time. A year later, in 1976, the group 
reversed its name back to where it had all started: the PNO. The nationalist wing 
became known as the White Pa-O, whereas their SSNPLO counterparts were called 
the Red Pa-O (Christensen & Sann Kyaw, 2006, p. 30). The rivalry of the two camps 
became intense, with the effect that ‘clashes between the nationalist and communist 
Pa-O far outnumbered those with the Burmese army’ (Christensen & Sann Kyaw, 
2006, p. 15).  
In 1977, Ye Naung, a loyalist of Kyaw Sein, surrendered to the Tatmadaw and 
brought sixty soldiers and eight million baht (around £200,000) with him. Since 
Kyaw Sein had appointed Ye Naung to the post of liaison officer in Thailand, he 




leadership post (Christensen & Sann Kyaw, 2006, p. 31; Smith, 1999, p. 338).  
Under Aung Kham Hti, the PNO built up a force consisting of 800 ethnic Pa-O. In 
contrast, the SSNPLO only had 300 regular troops and 200 village militia, and only 
half of them were Pa-O (the rest were Karen and Shan fighters). However, the 
SSNPLO could count on support from the CPB (Smith, 1999, p. 338). The two sides 
tried to negotiate reunification in 1989, but, after fifteen years of internal fighting and 
repeated assassinations of PNO leaders, reconciliation proved difficult.
62
 In an 
interview, the chairman of the PNO stated that the ‘PNLO are communists […] they 
murdered our people’.63  
4.2.2 Development of local political actors since 1988 
The democracy movement on 8 August 1988 led to the end of the Ne Win era and 
the beginning of the military-led SLORC. The 1974 Constitution was immediately 
abolished. Amidst the chaos, the SLORC began ceasefire negotiations with various 
armed groups and achieved qualified success.
 
There were many explanations as to 
why the SLORC succeeded in what previous regimes had failed in regard to 
achieving settlements. One often-quoted reason is the battle fatigue of the ethnic 
armed groups (Callahan, 2007; Kramer, 2010; Zaw Oo & Win Min, 2007). Another 
often-cited reason is the increase in the military capacity of the regime. The year 
1990 witnessed the first major delivery of Chinese weaponry to the military junta, 
worth over US$1 billion (Christensen & Sann Kyaw, 2006, p. 37; Lintner, 1994).
64 
The promise of development and the ability to retain arms have also been mentioned 
as reasons for the settlements (Zaw Oo & Win Min, 2007).  
However, a fact that has been overlooked, but which contributed significantly to the 
desire of reaching a ceasefire agreement, was the demonetisation of the 25, 35, and 
75 kyat banknotes on 5 September 1987. In 1985, there had been a similar incident, 
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where the 100, 50, and 20 kyat banknotes were removed from the legal tender list. 
However, civilians were at least given a period of time to convert the redundant 
banknotes to new notes (Turnell, 2009, pp. 252-253).
65 
The taxes that the armed 
groups collected were naturally all in cash. The sudden demonetisation of banknotes 
in 1987, without a grace period, rendered the kyat held by the armed groups useless 
overnight, thus severely curtailing their ability to pay their soldiers or buy weapons. 
Furthermore, as David Steinberg (2001, p. 131) points out, ‘no one wanted to hold 
cash for fear of further demonetizations, […] Farmers held rice, their only major 
marketable asset”. Obviously, it was not the intention of Ne Win to use the 
demonetisation policy to bring the armed groups to the negotiation table, but the 
side-effect was that the ethnic armed groups were drained of hard currency and 
morale was hit hard.
66 
 
The loss in cash reserves and income, coupled with other factors such as war fatigue 
and the increased military capability of the regime, placed the ethnic armed groups 
between a rock and a hard place. The momentum of ethno-nationalism lost steam, 
and, because of ideological conflicts, lacked legitimacy. Such daunting push factors, 
and, by their own admission, the pull factor of allowing them to keep arms, brought 
about the right conditions for ceasefire negotiations.
67 
As a result, the PNO reached a 
ceasefire agreement with the regime in April 1991. Even more isolated, the SSPNLO 
followed its counterpart’s steps and reached a separate ceasefire agreement in 
October 1994. 
However, not all Pa-O political activists were happy with settling for peace with the 
military regime. When the PNO signed the ceasefire agreement in 1991, a handful of 
PNO rebellions, led by Col. Hkun Okker, continued the struggle against the central 
government and organised themselves into the Pa-O People’s Liberation 
Organisation (PPLO) on 18 June of the same year. This breakaway group positioned 
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itself near Na Awn along the Burmese-Thai border. Their revenues came from taxing 
cross-border trade in the area they controlled. Likewise, a splinter group led by 
Brigadier General Khun Ti Soung broke away from the ceasefire group SSPNLO and 
formed the Pa-Oh National Liberation Organisation (PNLO) on 10 June 2007.  
In 2009, the PPLO agreed to merge with the PNLO after the Pa-Oh National 
Conference on December 7–9. The name PPLO was dropped, and PNLO became the 
official name of the merged group. Col. Okker was nominated as chairman and Brig. 
Gen. Khun Ti Soung was elected vice-chairman. The head office was located near 
the Thai-Myanmar border. 
In 2010, the PNO registered as a political party and then contested and won seats in 
the state parliament. In contrast, the PNLO remained simply a ceasefire group and 




There remains a third group of Pa-O political activists who were not satisfied with 
both the PNO and PNLO, claiming that the PNO was corrupt and worked for the 
government.
69 
When the political climate in the country became more relaxed and 
liberal, they took an earlier name and formed the Union Pa-O National Organisation 
(UPNO) in 2013. The group was officially registered as a political party, which 
allowed them to contest the 2015 general election. The party’s main objective is to 
preserve Pa-O identity. To this end, they demand freedom, equality, and self-
determination to be supported by education based on Pa-O culture and language. On 
this platform, they have already recruited over 10,000 members. They do not trust 
the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi, as they believe that Suu Kyi has been co-opted into 
the pro-regime camp. They position themselves as an alternative to the PNO, who 
they describe as ‘corrupt’ and not representative of the interests of Pa-O people.70 
However, their penetration in the Pa-O community is questionable, as they did not 
win any seat in the 2015 election. 
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In summary, the Pa-O national movement was started in 1946. However, due to the 
influence of communism and the geopolitical environment after independence, the 
movement fragmented into two camps, with the white (nationalist) Pa-O camp 
represented by the PNO and the red (communist) Pa-O camp represented by the 
PNLO. Since the PNO was regarded as pro-regime, some of its members were not 
satisfied with the lack of representation. Therefore, when the political climate 
became more tolerant, they formed the UPNO to contest for representation and 
control. The development of the Pa-O political movement is summarised in Figure 7.  
However, because the Pa-O SAZ is confined within the Southern Shan State, there 
are other political actors that have vested interests in the area; they, too, want to 
contest for influence and control. These external actors can be sub-divided into two 
groups: political actors at the state level and political actors at the national level. The 
following sections will reveal these actors.  
4.3 Political Actors in the Southern Shan State 
Taunggyi in the Southern Shan State is the state capital and hosts the state 
government. This makes the area the ideal incubator for political actors seeking 
representation and control, especially when central authority is waning. These actors 
do not just consist of political parties, but also ethnic armed groups with their own 
agendas and interests. The following sections identify the key actors that have direct 
contact with the Pa-O. 
4.3.1 The Shan Nationalities League for Democracy  
The Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) was founded in 1988, with 
Khun Htun Oo as the first party chairman. They were registered as a political party, 
and then they contested and won the second highest number of seats in Shan State in 
1990. However, the SLORC nullified the election and arrested some of the senior 
members of the party. Similar to the NLD, they also boycotted the 2010 election, but 
when the political climate became warmer, they re-registered as a political party and 
were one of the biggest winners in the 2015 election, with three seats in the House of 




Representatives (Pyithu Hluttaw, the lower house), and twenty-six seats in the State 




Figure 7: Development of the Pa-O political movement in chronological order
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While the SNLD share many values with the NLD, the most important of which is 
the forming of a federated union, they are nonetheless different from the NLD in that 
the latter accepts the current position of seven states and seven divisions, whereas the 
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SNLD insists on eight states on an equal footing.
73 
 
4.3.2 The Shan Nationalities Democratic Party  
After senior members of the SNLD were arrested in the 1990s, the party was 
practically ‘dissolved’ by 1998.74 Since there was no party to represent the Shan 
nationality in the 2010 election, Sai Ai Pao led some old members of the SNLD to 
form the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP) in 2010. Their mission is to 
achieve full democracy within a federal state, and they have demanded the release of 
all political prisoners. They are also known as the White Tiger Party or the Tiger 
Head. Shan legend believes that a white tiger protects the Shan.
75 
They have claimed 
to have over 200,000 members, making them one of the largest ethnic political 
parties in the country.
76 
 
The party has been accused by many locals of being too close to the regime. A 
comment by the party leader Sai Ai Pao quoted by the BBC serves best to sum up the 
position of the party in relation to the regime:  
we assume that the military is now ruling the country with 100%. In the future, 
civilians will participate in the administration with 75% - and isn’t getting 
75% better than nothing? We are working with our hearts full of patriotism; if 
we don’t contest, who will speak for Shan state?77 
In the 2010 election, they won three seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw and eighteen seats 
in the Pyithu Hluttaw. According to the SNLD, their achievements in the 2010 
election and the 2012 by-election can be boiled down to the close relationship they 
enjoyed with the regime – the SNDP and USDP had an undisclosed understanding in 
relation to not competing with each other in areas where one side was stronger.
78 
There were also rumours that the SNLD and SNDP would merge before the 2015 
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election or at least ‘co-operate’ in the election in order to avoid duplication of 
representation. However, the SNLD claimed that the rumours were started by the 
SNDP and there was no truth in them whatsoever.
79 
On the day before the public 
went to the polls in 2015, the party was still confident that it would be the king-
maker and have a say in who would be the president.
80 
In the end, the SNDP suffered 
a heavy defeat at the hands of the SNLD and NLD in the 2015 election by managing 
to keep only one regional parliament seat. This voter ‘betrayal’ is strong evidence 
that the party was seen as a crony of the regime and lacking local support.  
4.3.3 The Shan State Army: North/Shan State Progressive Party 
The Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) can trace its origins from the Shan State Army, 
which was established in 1964. The military coup by Ne Win in 1962 re-ignited the 
ethnic armed struggle in Shan State, among which was the Noom Suk Han, Shan 
State Independent Army (SSIA), Shan National United Front (SNUF), and Thailand 
National Army. In 1964, the SSIA and SNUF merged to form the SSA. In its prime, 
the SSA could call on over 9,000 soldiers. However, similar to other ethnic armed 
movements, the SSA was caught between fighting against the Tatmadaw and other 
ethnic armed groups, such as the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), while 
trying to resist the influence of the CPB (Smith, 1999, pp. 333-334).
81 
 
In 1971, its political wing Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP) was formed with the 
objective to negotiate settlements with various parties, which included the regime 
and other ethnic armed groups.
82
 Since both the Tatmadaw and the SSA had a 
common enemy in the shape of the CPB, the regime launched the Ka-Kew-Ye (KKY) 
initiative and began to recruit ethnic armed soldiers to fight the CPB in return for 
concession to trade along the borders of the Golden Triangle. This resulted in many 
SSA soldiers defecting to the KKY. By this time, the SSA, as with many other ethnic 
armed groups, was effectively a narcotic army (Lintner & Black, 2009; Smith, 1999). 
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For those who did not join the KKY, some worked closely with the KMT on the drug 
trade in order to secure a supply of weapons. Others were influenced by the CPB and 
joined their cause instead.
83 
By 1976, the SSA was practically dissolved, with the 
result of one group based in the north, the SSA-N, being lured to the CPB ideology, 
whereas another group, which became known as the Shan State Army–South (SSA-S) 
remaining resistant to the idea of a people’s movement.  
The alliance with the CPB was confirmed when the ‘Voice of the People of Burma’, 
broadcasting on 30 January 1977, declared that the SSPP would ‘march together with 
the CPB towards a communist world’ (Smith, 1999, p. 341). However, with the 
mutiny of the CPB in 1989, the SSPP all of a sudden lost its patron both in terms of 
financial support and ideological backing. Therefore, the group was among the first 
batch of ethnic armed groups to reach a ceasefire agreement with the regime in 1989, 
and the territories they controlled were rewarded by being demarcated as Special 
Region 3.  
However, despite the ceasefire agreement, the Tatmadaw has renewed clashes in 
Northern Shan State, and several SSA-N bases have been under attack since 2012.
84
 
This prompted the SSPP/SSA-N to back off from the Nationwide Ceasefire 
Agreement talks in 2015.
85 
The renewal of hostilities shows how fragile these 
ceasefire agreements were, and how fluid the political situation was, and still is, in 
Shan State. 
4.3.4 The Shan State Army: South/Restoration Council of Shan 
State 
Whilst the SSA, led by Sai Myint Aung in the north, was increasingly influenced by 
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the CPB ideologically, militarily, and financially,
86
 the SSA, led by Sai Pan and Seng 
Harn
87 
in the south, continued to resist communist ideology. However, the break did 
not materialise until after the second Shan Congress in 1981, when the SSPP 
reaffirmed the national democracy line and rejected the defence pact with the CPB 
that began in 1975.  
The conflict in the south was complicated by the ‘returning’ of the narcotic army led 
by the notorious opium king Khun Sa,
88 
who had originally been trained by the KMT 
and had formed a local militia, KKY, in 1963, with financial and weapons support 
from Ne Win in order to fight against the SSA. However, the KKY initiative was a 
failure.
89 
After Ne Win withdrew support for the KKY programme, Khun Sa relied 
on the opium trade to expand his narcotic army. The army was based on the Thai side 
of the Thai-Burma border, but when the Thai government began to eradicate the 
opium trade under international pressure, especially from the US Drug Enforcement 
Agency, Khun Sa fought his way back into Burma under the banner of the Shan 
United Army (SUA) and severely weakened the position of the SSA based in the 
south. By the time the SSPP and SSA-N reached a ceasefire agreement with the 
SLORC in 1989, the SSA based in the south had already faded into the distance, with 
no leadership or moral to continue fighting.  
At this time, there were several active ethnic armies contesting for control in the 
Southern Shan State, among the more powerful of which were the Shan United 
Revolutionary Army (SURA) and the Thailand Revolutionary Council (TRC). 
However, these groups were no match for Khun Sa’s SUA, which benefited from 
heavy and modern weaponry bought with opium money. Eventually, they were 
forced to merge with the SUA, and the entire border between Shan State and 
Thailand, of about 150 miles, came under the control of Khun Sa, who now had a 
combined force of over 4,000 soldiers (Smith, 1999, p. 343). In 1985, Khun Sa 
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renamed the merged group of the SUA and TRC as the Mong Tai Army (MTA).
90
 
However, battle fatigue, internal grievances, and a worldwide clampdown on the 
opium trade forced Khun Sa to surrender in 1996.
91
 Liet. Gen. Yawd Serk, who was 
from the former SURA before merging with the SUA, refused to put down his 
weapons. He led about 800 breakaway soldiers to form the Shan State Army-South 
(SSA-S) in the same year. The Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), the 
political wing of the SSA-S, was formed in 2000. The RCSS/SSA-S joined a six-
party military alliance in March 1999. The alliance consisted of ethnic armed groups 
of the Karen National Union (KNU), Chin National Front (CNF), Arakan Liberation 
Party (ALP), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), and Kachin National 
Organisation (KNO).
92
 In May 2011, the RCSS/SSA-S announced that they would 
combine military operations with the SSPP/SSA-N, as hostilities with the Tatmadaw 
renewed. Before the RCSS/SSA-S began negotiations with the government on a 
ceasefire agreement in 2011, they had an estimated 7,000 soldiers (Keenan, 2012a). 
On 12 January 2012, the RCSS/SSA-S signed a ceasefire agreement with the 
government; however, fighting with the Tatmadaw still continued in Northern Shan 
State. 
4.4 Political Actors from the National Level 
Similar to the situation in Shan State, nationwide political actors also have an interest 
in the Pa-O emerging political complex in regard to consolidating their local, 
regional, and national support. 
4.4.1 The military in civilian clothing: USDP  
After the 8888 uprising, the military took power by replacing the BSPP with the 
SLORC. In 1993, the military junta formed the USDA, with headquarter in 
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Effectively, the USDA served the purpose of softening the image of 
military control by trying to function as a ruling political party (Network for 
Democracy and Development, May 2006; Taylor, 2009, pp. 446-447).  
In 1997, the SLORC was dissolved, and the SPDC came in its place. Although the 
name was changed, the people behind the scene were still men in uniforms. In 2010, 
the USDA was dissolved. Its members and assets were transferred to a newly 
registered political party, the USDP, which contested and won the general election 
later that year. Therefore, from 1988 to the present day, the military regime in 
Myanmar was, at various times, represented by the SLORC, USDA, SPDC, and 
USDP. Although the names have changed, the contents remain the same. 
4.4.2 The National League for Democracy 
After the brutal clampdown of the 8888 movement, the newly formed SLORC issued 
a statement declaring that the military had no intention to stay in power and a 
multiparty election would be held as soon as law and order was restored (Guyot, 
1991). The NLD, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, was duly formed as a political party and 
won over 60% of the valid vote in the general election held on 27 May 1990.
 
However, General Khin Nyunt refused to relinquish power by arguing that the 
purpose of the election was not to form a parliamentary government, but simply to 
establish a parliamentary-like constitutional committee in order to prepare a new 
constitution (Steinberg, 2010, pp. 90-93). However, there was no disguising the 
military junta’s true intentions, as senior NLD leaders were subsequently imprisoned 
and Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest on-and-off for sixteen of the following 
twenty-one years. 
It took the regime eighteen years before the 2008 Constitution was eventually 
introduced under controversial circumstances.
94 
The 2008 Constitution laid the 
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foundations for a general election, which was held in November 2010. However, 
many senior members of the NLD were barred from taking part in the election 
because they had previously been put in jail by the regime. The NLD boycotted the 
election and did not re-register as a political party. Consequently, the NLD was 
disbanded under the political party registration law at the time.
95
 
The 2010 election returned Thein Sein as president. His warming to the West had 
surprised many Western observers. A historical meeting between Thein Sein and 
Aung Seng Suu Kyi was held in August 2011, which prompted the latter to re-
register the NLD as a political party in order to contest the 2012 by-election. 
After re-registering as a political party, the NLD have been very active in Shan State, 
including in the Pa-O areas. In a Pa-O village about 20km from Taunggyi, despite 
the PNO flags flying atop the village school and general store, indicating that the 
PNO had a clear presence in the village, 9 out of 20 villagers said they would vote 
for the NLD in the 2015 election. More importantly, only 5 said they would vote for 
the PNO.
96 
Indeed, a PNLO leader said that many Pa-O people did not trust the PNO 




When the NLD refused to take part in the 2010 election, some senior members broke 
ranks and formed the National Democratic Force (NDF) in order to take part in the 
election. They won twelve seats in the election. However, when the NLD re-
registered as a political party for the 2012 by-election, some NDF members resigned 
and re-joined the NLD. Although the party took part in the 2015 election, it did not 
win any seats. The NDF serves to remind readers that internal splits are very 
common in Myanmar politics.  
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4.5 Non-State Actors: Political Activists, NGOs, and CSOs 
Although the 2008 Constitution was heavily criticised for being draconian and non-
democratic, it opened up a new chapter in Myanmar history as it paved the way for a 
general election in 2010 after 20 years of absence. Some activist groups took 
advantage of the situation and organised themselves into political parties to contest in 
the election.  
One such party is the 888 Generation Student Youths. Coming from the background 
of the 8 August 1988 uprising, this group mainly champions democracy and closely 
aligns itself with ethnic groups who are seeking self-determination. As the group’s 
resources are limited, the reach of the party is confined to major cities such as 
Yangon and Mandalay. At township and village levels, activists who took part in the 
original uprising or are sympathetic to the 8888 movement formed the 88 Group. The 
group mainly organises campaigns to promote democratic values and to raise 
awareness about issues such as human rights, land grabbing, and corruption.  
A prominent feature of the post-2010 political landscape is the significant growth of 
civil society organisations (CSOs).
98 
During interviews, some CSOs claimed to be 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), without realising the difference between 
the two. There are stringent registration requirements for NGO by the central 
government, which are not only procedurally prohibitive, but registration is seldom 
granted unless the organisation has strong regime backing. A case in point is the 
Kanbowze Youth Library Reading Club (KYLRC). The person in charge in their 
Taunggyi office explained that it was a lot easier to register as a reading club (CSO) 
related to education than to register as an NGO. Therefore, although one of the 
missions of the reading club is to educate villagers about the benefits of organic 
farming and the impact of pollution on their agricultural products, the hidden agenda 
is to promote equality, human rights, and democracy. The group also acts as an 
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independent peace monitor reporting to overseas observers.
99
 
Likewise, the Kaung Rwai Social Action Network (KRSAN) is a CSO that aims to 
promote English education to Pa-O youth at village level because the group believes 
that knowing English will help them find a better job and escape the poverty trap. 
However, the group is also very active in promoting self-determination and 
democracy to Pa-O youth. For the 26
th
 anniversary of the 8888 movement, the group 
led about 20 students to sing songs and raised about US$1,000. The lyrics of the 
songs were in Pa-O, but there was one English word that kept repeating – 
democracy.
100 
The group often performs in the Taunggyi town centre, outside the 
hospital and the university campus in order to raise funds. During a visit to their 
centre on 10 August 2014, a group of ten Pa-O youth aged between 12 and 16 were 
attending a class on reading English. Later, they were shown a video called “Vote for 
me”, which told the story of how to choose a class representative in school. The 
message of the video was clearly focused on the importance of representation, i.e. 
that everyone should have the right to decide on the candidate, and the result should 
be based on a majority decision. KRSAN is openly against the ruling regime and 
their cronies, which include the PNO. 
However, not many local CSOs adopt a direct confrontational approach against the 
PNO. The Democracy for Ethnic Minorities Organisation (DEMO) span off from 
KRSAN in 2012. According to an interview with the individual in charge of DEMO, 
he found the leadership at KRSAN to be ‘too strong’ and ‘confrontational’.101 The 
two groups are still friendly, however, and the spin-off simply allows for a better 
division of responsibilities. While KRSAN performs the function of political activists, 
DEMO concentrate on running capacity-building programmes, which aim to enhance 
ethnic minorities’ knowledge about their rights and build consensus regarding self-
determination. Their target audiences are also Pa-O youth.  
Land grabbing and pollution have been a few of the major social issues in the Pa-O 
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community in recent years. The widely reported yet secretive uranium finds in Leng 
Ngock, a Pa-O village located about a two-hour drive from Taunggyi, have forced 
the relocation of thousands of villagers. The country’s largest open-pit coal mine and 
power plant in Tigyit are located just 12 kilometres from the famed Lake Inle. 
According to Poison Clouds: Lessons from Burma’s largest coal project in Tigyit, 
the pollution from open-pit mining and emissions from the power plant have already 
forced the relocation of two villages, Lai Khar and Taung Pola, and affected over 
12,000 people (Pa-Oh Youth Organization & Kyoju Action Network, 2011). The 
Tigyit report was the work of the Pa-O Youth Organisation (PYO). Formed in 1998, 
PYO was based in Chiang Mai, Thailand, because of the hostile political climate in 
Myanmar at that time. While promoting democracy, human rights, and equality are 
the usual local CSO objectives, the group has developed into being a claim-making 
specialist.
102 
According to Hannigan (1995), environmental issues need a claim-
maker in order to galvanise grievances, focus the issue, and spread the word before 
mobilising the public to form an environmental social movement. PYO fills the role 
of claim-maker, helping Pa-O villagers to focus on the issues, understand their rights, 
make their claims, and voice their grievances through publishing reports in English 
so that more people in the world are aware of their problems.
103 
 
Apart from ideology, KRSAN, DEMO, and PYO share several things in common. 
Their leaders are young (under 30 years old), they all speak very good English, they 
learned or refined their English skills in the American Center in either Chiang Mai or 
Yangon, and, most important of all, their source of funding has a US background 
(this point will be further developed in the next chapter, which examines the political 
economy of various actors). These groups are very well trained, highly organised, 
and publicly visible. They fully understand the importance of using the media to 
articulate their cases. These civil society groups are anti-establishment and believe 
that the PNO no longer represents the interests of the Pa-O people.  
The pro-establishment camp is not without its answers to the rising resistance from 
civil society groups. The Parami Development Network (PDN) was set up in 2010 
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and is registered as a NGO under the PNO’s social department. According to 
Buddhism teaching, Parami means fulfilment. Its objectives are to improve education, 
healthcare, and infrastructure throughout the Pa-O communities.
104 
An example of its 
work was given by the chairman. After the PNO reached a ceasefire agreement with 
the SLORC in 1991, the PNO assumed administrative responsibilities within the 
demarcated area. Until 2010, due to financial constraints, the PNO was only able to 
provide free primary education. However, from 2010, free education was introduced 
for secondary schools. The party was able to afford this because of a resourceful 
regulatory arbitrage. Under the Political Party Registration Law, Section 6(f), 
political parties are forbidden from accepting foreign donations. Without outside help, 
the local Pa-O economy simply could not afford to build schools. By setting up the 
PND, and with the NGO status that allows it to accept foreign donations, the PNO 
have been able to circumnavigate the regulation. The PDN have been working 
closely with the Japan Nippon Foundation to build schools and restore monasteries in 
Pa-O villages. A school built near the Kakku Pagodas was funded by the Nippon 
Foundation with a US$70,000 contribution in 2012. On bigger projects, such as 
building roads and hospitals, the PDN received funding from the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), a Japanese government-backed international 
organisation focusing on ‘supporting the socioeconomic development, recovery or 
economic stability of developing regions’.105 These new local development initiatives 
have earned the PNO much needed credibility amid questions regarding its 
legitimacy. 
In 2006, a group of Myanmar nationalists formed the Myanmar Egress to promote 
civil society organisations throughout the country and provide training to young 
people on capacity building. Like PND, Egress is a registered NGO. The chairman of 
the organisation is Tin Maung Thann, Vice President of the Myanmar Fisheries 
Federation. Vice President and Director of Communication of Egress is Hla Maung 
Shwe, who is also the Vice President of the Republic of Union of Myanmar 
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Federation Chambers of Commerce and Industries.
106
 Evidently, Egress is a pro-
establishment non-governmental organisation aiming to deliver state messages 
through the civil society channel. According to KRSAN, Pa-O youth who attended 
the capacity-building programme organised by Egress in Yangon usually returned 
believing the government would gradually move towards democracy.
107 
A 88 Group 
leader further pointed out that Egress ‘accept the 2008 Constitution when other 
democratic parties (are) against’ it.108  
The Myanmar Egress fizzled out towards 2012, and in its place is the Myanmar 
Peace Centre (MPC), which opened offices in Yangon in November 2012 to provide 
advice on ceasefire negotiations and implementation, peace negotiations and political 
dialogue, coordination of assistance in conflict affected areas, outreach and public 
diplomacy, and mine actions.
109 
The MPC is funded by the European Union, the 
United Nations, and Japan. Headed by Aung Min, Thein Sein’s Office Minister, the 
top level of the MPC is mainly made up of government officials and members from 
Egress. Although the MPC can count on international donors to provide it with 
legitimacy, it cannot shake off the shadow of the regime.  
4.6 Interactions of the Various Political Actors  
When talking to a member of the peace monitoring committee of Shan State, she 
pinpointed ‘trust’ as the main problem with the peace process in Shan State. The 
armed groups do not trust the government, they do not trust other ethnic armed 
groups, and they do not even trust armed groups of the same ethnicity. She cited that 
White Tiger (SNDP) and the PNO as government cronies, and therefore groups like 
the SNLD and PNLO did not trust them.
110
 
The peace monitor’s comment is a reminder of the complexity of the intertwining 
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relationships between political actors in Southern Shan State. Notwithstanding the 
aforementioned political actors having different cultural identities, ideologies, and 
backgrounds, in general, they can be divided into two camps: the pro-establishment 
and the anti-establishment camps. The annual 8888 remembrance gathering provided 
a snapshot of this pro/anti-establishment divide. At the 26
th
 anniversary of the 
uprising on 8 August 2014, in a small village near Taunggyi town centre, civil 
society groups and anti-regime political parties gathered, displaying photographs and 
newspaper cuttings on the democracy movement. In the two-hour proceeding, with 
about 60 participants, leaders from political parties, political organisations, and civil 
society groups took turns to give speeches, among them the NLD Shan State 
chairperson, NLD Taunggyi leader, NLD Nyeung Shwe Township leader, 
chairperson of the SNLD, senior leaders of the UPNO, and representatives from the 
88 Group. With regard to CSOs, KRSAN, DEMO, and PYO were present. Three 
Buddhist monks were seated centre stage, but they only acted as observers and did 
not give any speeches. Political parties absent from the gathering were the PNO, 
PNLO, USDP, and SNDP.  
In regard to what the gathering was representing, namely resentment against the 
military regime and a demand for democracy and self-determination, the absence of 
the PNO, SNDP, and USDP should be understood and expected. The first two are 
regarded as the cronies of the regime, whereas the USDP is a reincarnation of the 
regime in political party form. However, the position of the PNLO is a little 
ambiguous. Due to their communist background, the PNLO is neither pro-regime nor 
are they considered to be pro-democracy, which is one of the core values of other 
anti-establishment groups. In situations that are beneficial to them, the PNLO can 
work with the government, as in the case of a development project in Maukmae, 
where they agreed to allow the government to occupy several buildings in the 
development.
111 
Yet, they are also quite willing to tag along with other groups that 
are against the PNO. Therefore, in the simple classification, the PNLO is regarded as 
neither pro-regime nor anti-establishment (see Figure 8).  
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Myanmar Egress; MPC 
Figure 8: Classification of political actors related to the Pa-O 
4.6.1 Intra-level relationship 
The relationship between the various political actors at the local, state, and national 
levels is reflected in the pro/anti-establishment divide. At the local level, the PNO 
and PNLO have their historical and ideological differences, which were deepened by 
the regime’s divide-and-rule. Moreover, confrontation between local CSOs and the 
PNO are common. In the PNO general meeting on 14 December 2014, KRSAN was 
declared ‘the enemy of the party’.112 The KRSAN leader explained that they had 
stepped on the toes of the PNO because they had exposed the PNO’s hypocrisy on 
issues of land grabbing. 
At the state level, the pro/anti-establishment divide correctly marked the differences 
between the SNLD and SNDP. The SNLD claimed that the latter were just a crony of 
the state and had lied to the people. In their own defence, the SNDP chairman 
claimed that there was no one to represent the people in Shan State in 2010 after the 
SNLD refused to take part in the election, they were always seeking to work together 
with the SNLD, and they would not rule out the possibility of a merge between the 
two parties.
113 
However, the rumour of a possible merger was denied by the SNLD. 
One of the executive members of the SNLD stated categorically that a merger had 
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never been on their party’s agenda: ‘the SNDP were only trying to make waves’.114  
Finally, at the national level, the NLD has sought to oust the USDP from power to 
reclaim what should rightfully have been theirs since 1990. The divide between the 
USDP and NLD could not be any wider because the USDP were seen as merely 
representing the interests of the military, whereas the NLD claimed to represent the 
people. 
4.6.2 Inter-level relationship 
However, the relationship between these actors across the spectrums of different 
levels is not as clear cut and require further clarification.  
4.6.2.1 Inter-level armed groups’ relationships 
The PNLO and SSA-S are both ceasefire armed groups. While they regard the 
Tatmadaw as their common enemy, they fight against each other over interests and 
control. Recent fighting took place in September 2014. The SSA-S was accused of 
burning down new facilities built by the PNLO in Maukmae. The township is a 
disputed territory between Pa-O and Shan, but the main population of the township is 
Pa-O. The PNLO obtained permission from the central government to build two 
complexes in the township for administrative purposes. In return for the ‘favour’, the 
PNLO allowed one of the buildings to be used by the central government. The 
RCSS/SSA believed that the land was on their territory, and the presence of 
government officials would be too close for comfort, so they burned it down when 
the buildings were 90% complete.
115 
 
There has not been any reporting on confrontations between the SSA-S and the PNA, 
the armed wing of the PNO. However, this is only because the PNA are confined 
within Special Region 6, or now the Pa-O SAZ. Under the ceasefire agreement with 
the Tatmadaw, they are not allowed to carry weapons outside their zone. It is worth 
remembering that fighting between the two groups was common before 1989, as 
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revealed in the previous sections of this chapter.  
4.6.2.2 Inter-level political parties’ relationships  
At the interface between the local and state levels, since the PNO has the 
administrative power within the Pa-O SAZ, granted to them under the 2008 
Constitution, they do not have any direct confrontation with the SNLD on local 
affairs. However, it is important to note that the SNLD are sympathetic to Shan 
armed groups and have enjoyed a good relationship with the RCSS/SSA-S. In May 
2014, a leader of the SNLD from Namlinmau village was arrested by the Tatmadaw. 
He was accused of possessing firearms supplied by the RCSS/SSA-S. The SNLD 
issued a statement on 15 May 2014 denying the accusation. However, the statement 
did not deny the SNLD member being in possession of a gun supplied by the 
RCSS/SSA-S.
116 
The close relationship between the SNLD and RCSS/SSA-S has put 
the PNO on guard, as the SSA-S and PNA have obvious potential conflicts of interest 
regarding the control of trade routes for illegal smuggling and the opium trade. 
At the interface between the local and national levels, the PNO and NLD do not see 
eye-to-eye. Although the PNO has become the de facto leader in the Pa-O SAZ, its 
legitimacy is often brought into question due to its close ties with the regime. In 
addition, the PNO has been accused of being the backer for many land-grabbing 
incidents. The victims of land disputes had no one to turn to, so they inevitably asked 
the NLD for help. In 2014, two members of the NLD were murdered for helping Pa-
O villagers, who lost their land. The persecutors were men in uniforms. The family 
recognised one man in the group, who was a PNA soldier.
117 
The killing was reported 
in the national news magazine, The Irrawaddy. The NLD leader in Taunggyi 
revealed that it was a deliberate killing aimed to send a strong message to the NLD, 
warning them not to interfere in local Pa-O affairs.
118 
In the 2015 election, the NLD 
contested seats in the Pa-O region, but the PNO managed to cling on to all of its 
previously-held seats.  
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At the interface between the state and national levels, the SNDP was openly against 
the NLD. The chairman of the SNDP explained that if the NLD was truly committed 
to granting self-determination to the ethnic minorities, why would it compete with 
them in the election for seats in Shan State?
119 
The SNDP were also sceptical about 
the 88 Group. The Chairman of the SNDP complained that the 88 Group always 
organises protests that disturb local peace: ‘People just want to get on with their lives 
after so many years of fighting’.120  
However, the SNLD appears to enjoy a better relationship with the NLD. Although 
they disagree on issues, such as how many states should be under a federal 
government, in terms of ideology on democracy, the two political parties are on the 
same wavelength. There were reports that the NLD would not compete with the 
SNLD in the 2015 election where the SNLD had strong holding.
121
 
4.6.2.3 Other inter-level relationships 
The local CSOs are sceptical of the work carried out by Myanmar Egress. One of the 
tasks of DEMO is to provide capacity-building training for the Pa-O youth. A 
DEMO leader revealed that some Pa-O young people attended capacity training 
sponsored by Myanmar Egress in Yangon. However, after they returned, their 
attitudes on the 2008 Constitution and the pace of democratic transition had changed. 
Whereas the youth would previously have strongly demanded a change in the 
Constitution and an immediate return to full democracy, after the training in Yangon, 
they began to take the stance that transition would require time and patience.
122 
 
The USDP also found the activities of the KRSAN somewhat of an annoyance. The 
KRSAN always organises singing activities in Taunggyi town centre. On several 
occasions, the USDP called the police to stop them singing outside their offices.
123 
As a case in point, a KRSAN leader led a group of Pa-O youth, around 20 in total, 
boarded two pick-up lorries, and headed to the town centre to continue singing and 
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raising money after the 26
th
 anniversary ceremony of the 8888 Movement.
124 
The 




Figure 9: Charting the relationships between the political actors in Southern Shan State 
In summary, there are clear cleavages among the political actors in Southern Shan 
State, along the pro/anti-establishment divide that transcends all three levels of 
interactions, namely at the local level where Pa-O actors are dominant, at the state 
level where Shan political actors have become involved, and the national level where 
state actors hold an interest. Based on the information obtained from scholarly 
literature, public media, and interviews, the relationship between the political actors 
in Southern Shan State is charted in Figure 9.
126 
The solid lines depict positive 
relationships, whereas the dotted lines indicate negative relationships. 
4.7 Towards a Critical Political Economy Approach to 
Understand the Power Dynamics in the Pa-O SAZ 
The answer to the research question of how the military regime maintained control 
after decentralisation of power lies in the way the regime enforced social control in 
the emerging political complex of the frontier. Although the political landscape has 
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changed, Furnivall (1960) and Scott (1976) point out that history and customs cannot 
be easily obliterated. Therefore, Chapter 3 focused on the search for clues as to 
which customs and traditions have survived the change. It was revealed that, 
historically and at present, village tract leaders play an important role in the 
administration of the rural areas. Therefore, if the regime can find a way to 
manipulate the village tract leaders, this may be the answer to the question of social 
control. However, to whom are these village tract leaders answerable?  
To this end, identifying the political actors and how they interact in the emerging 
political complex, or what Migdal calls the arena, can inform the research in finding 
the agent through whom the regime can manipulate the village tract leaders. This 
layer of political structure also serves two additional functions, which are vital in 
establishing the village tract leaders as the implementers. First, as a result of the 
interactions of the actors, the political structure helps to shield the village tract 
leaders from the sight of the regime. Second, the additional political structure 
prevents the village tract leaders from posing a threat to the regime. Both of these are 
prerequisites for the implementer to be considered in the final level of 
accommodation. 
There are many political actors from the local, state, and national levels who have 
vested interests in the Pa-O SAZ. After analysing their backgrounds and agendas, 
this chapter has categorised them into two main groups: those who are supportive to 
the regime and those who are against the regime. This narrows down the options for 
co-optation to the PNO at the local level. Although it may have been apparent from 
the outset that the PNO was the obvious choice, this chapter has highlighted that the 
power of the PNO is not uncontested.  
Indeed, the political order in the Pa-O SAZ and the Southern Shan State is so 
complex and fluid that implementing the second level of accommodation is not as 
straightforward as it may seem. If the regime simply co-opted the PNO/PNA without 
dealing with the PNLO or RCSS/SSA, these rival armed groups would simply 
challenge the PNO in their own terms – after all, they do not have ceasefire 




control, it is not simply about pacifying the Pa-O SAZ; instead, the whole area of the 
Southern Shan State needs to be taken into account.  
Consequently, what is holding this emerging political complex together? The 
construction of the relationships between the political actors does not provide all the 
evidence to suggest how the regime managed to maintain control in the area; on the 
contrary, it reveals more cracks and divides.  According to Woods (2011), the regime 
adopted ceasefire capitalism as its main pacification strategy in the Frontier Area. 
Therefore, an analysis of the form and substance of the ceasefire capitalism may 
explain how the Pa-O emerging political complex is being held together, and this 
should shed light on how the regime executes its second and third levels of 





5  Chapter 5:     
 The Rules of the Game: The Political Economy of 
the Pa-O SAZ 
 
With the political actors identified in the last chapter, the thesis moves on to uncover 
the mechanism that holds these actors together in the Pa-O SAZ, and, more 
importantly, within the orbit of the military regime. The aim is to establish the 
second level of accommodation that ties the warlords to the state project.  
However, given that there are various political actors from different backgrounds and 
agendas, the accommodation process did not just relate to the co-optation of local 
elites but also served as a divide-and-rule tactic to keep the players on their toes. 
Therefore, within this accommodation process is also a hidden agenda of setting the 
rules of the game based on political economy. This is no ordinary political economy, 
but a form of production of capital that relies on a specially constructed setting that 
allows state penetration, regulation, extraction, and attribution when state capacity is 
weak, or what Woods calls ceasefire capitalism. Therefore, this chapter does not stop 
at just identifying who the regime accommodated, but also goes on to examine the 
structure of the accommodation.  
Accordingly, this chapter is divided into five parts. The first part looks into the 
events that led to the development of these emerging political complexes. What 
triggered their development after 1988 and why not before? This informs the 
conditions the political actors faced at the time of the accommodation and why they 
would agree to the new rules of the game. The subsequent section then looks into the 
political economies of in the Pa-O SAZ before and after the ceasefire agreement and 
explains how different camps were pitted against each other under the new 
configuration. The content of the ceasefire agreements will then be analysed in depth, 
and, based on the analysis, the veil of the co-optation strategy will subsequently be 
lifted. The chapter concludes by providing an assessment on the co-optation strategy 




5.1 The Dawn of Emerging Political Complexes 
The ceasefire initiative started in 1989 has redrawn the political landscape of the 
conflict areas. These ceasefire agreements facilitated the formation of emerging 
political complexes, allowed the regime to appoint their agents in the elite 
accommodation strategy, and divided the resistance all in one stroke. Therefore, it is 
vital to understand how these ceasefire agreements, which created the unique post-
1988 political landscape, were reached.  
5.1.1 The ceasefire agreements 
The ceasefire initiative after the 8888 uprising was a defining moment in the 
pacification project of the regime, for it abandoned the ‘four cuts’ counter-insurgency 
strategy administrated in the 1970s and 1980s, and began to respond to the demands 
of the ethnic armed groups on the issue of self-determination.127 However, there was 
a lack of transparency when it came to the terms of the ceasefire agreements. To 
begin with, these early ceasefire agreements were merely verbal agreements and 
therefore subject to interpretation (Zaw Oo & Win Min, 2007, p. xii). As South 
(2008, p. 125) states, ‘the lack of objective information and analysis on the PaO and 
other ceasefires makes it difficult for observers and actors to judge the desirability of 
and prospects for truces in areas of ongoing armed conflict’.  
According to Zaw Oo and Win Min (2007), the early ceasefire agreements can be 
divided into three waves. The first wave consisted of agreements reached in 1989; 
the agreements made between 1991 and 1992 constitute the second wave, while the 
third was those agreed in 1994–95 (see Appendix 3).128 The significance of this 
classification is that the outcomes of the agreements reflected the bargaining 
positions of the armed groups, their significance in the eyes of the regime, and how 
the armed groups were divided.  
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The first wave of ceasefire agreements, concluded in 1989, was a breakthrough in the 
sense that the agreements represented a strategical departure from previous peace 
efforts. Whereas previous negotiations were along the lines of conventional conflict 
resolution protocols of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR), the 
ceasefire initiative of the SLORC, controversially, did not require disarmament. The 
ethnic armed groups insisted on keeping arms because they did not trust the 
government, and, more importantly, they needed the weapons to protect their 
interests from competing armed groups. Apart from agreeing to the armed groups’ 
demands for keeping arms, the early ceasefire agreements contained two essential 
ingredients: financial incentives and a demarcation of territories. The cases of the 
Myanmar National Democracy Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the United Wa State 
Army (UWSA) should help to illustrate the typical ceasefire terms. 
The MNDAA were based in the Kokang area. As the first group to agree to ceasefire 
in March 1989, they were allowed to keep their arms within their controlled area, 
which was then demarcated as Special Region 1, Northern Shan State. Moreover, the 
2,000-man army was given 500,000 kyat, two cars, food, and, more importantly, 
consent to increase opium production (Smith, 1999, pp. 378-379).  
The second group that came to the negotiation table was the UWSA. They reached 
agreement with the regime in May 1989 and walked away with a similar deal to that 
of the MNDAA. Again, they were allowed to keep their arms within their territory, 
which was designated as Special Region 2, Shan State. They too received food, fuel, 
money, and consent to carry on the drug business. In general, the groups that entered 
into ceasefire agreements with the regime in the first wave enjoyed favourable deals 
when compared with subsequent deals (Zaw Oo & Win Min, 2007, p. 16). 
These ceasefire agreements were viewed as a divide-and-rule tactic. They were not 
political settlements, and the continual possession of arms meant future conflict 
could easily flare up, as has been proven.129 Moreover, the regime was selective with 
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whom it would negotiate, with the CPB of the 101 region in Panwa being a case in 
point. The 700-strong CPB militants based in the 101 region requested ceasefire talks 
with the regime in September 1989. However, the SLORC refused to talk until the 
militants severed ties with the CPB central command by forming a breakaway group, 
the New Democratic Army–Kachin (NDAK). The NDAK reached a ceasefire 
agreement with the regime in December 1989. The remainder of the 101 regional 
force also wanted to hold ceasefire talks with the regime but was refused. These CPB 
remnants had nowhere to turn but to seek refuge in China (Zaw Oo & Win Min, 
2007, p. 16).  
Zaw Oo and Win Min (2007) do not really explain why agreements made between 
1991 and 1992 should be regarded as the second wave and not treated as a 
continuation of the first wave; after all, the content of the terms was pretty much the 
same, which involved the provision of financial baits and the demarcation of 
territories. However, the second wave of ceasefire negotiations came on the back of 
two major developments, which perhaps helped to demarcate the difference. First, 
the SLORC had strengthened its military power when it took delivery in 1990 of 
US$1.2 billion worth of weapons from China (Lintner, 1994). Second, the regime 
refused to transfer power after the NLD won a landslide victory in the 1990 general 
election. The first development gave the SLORC the upper hand at the negotiation 
table. However, the second development further weakened the regime’s legitimacy to 
rule the country. Therefore, both the regime and the ethnic armed groups were 
willing to continue ceasefire talks, but the former was in a far better position to 
deploy its divide-and-rule tactics. This imbalance was reflected in the difference in 
the terms of the agreement made during the second and third waves. 
The clear difference between the second and third waves is that special regions were 
not granted to ethnic armed groups in the agreements made after July 1994. As a case 
in point, agreement with the PNO fell within the second wave, whereas the 
agreement with the SNPPLO (later the PNLO) came in the third wave. Consequently, 
the PNO was rewarded with Special Region 6, whereas the SNPPLO received no 
such treatment.  
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In refusing to demarcate territories to certain ethnic armed groups, the regime had 
laid plain its objective to maintain control through divide-and-rule. The political 
landscape was one in which certain groups enjoyed preferential treatment at the 
expense of other stakeholders. These newly created local hegemons fed on the 
ceasefire terms, but would the resulting political economies be conducive to state 
control?  
5.2 The Political Economy of the Pa-O SAZ 
As outlined in the previous chapter, there are three main types of political actors in 
the Pa-O SAZ: political parties, political activists, and CSOs/NGOs, which can be 
located in the pro-regime camp or the anti-establishment camp (see Figure 8). These 
political actors were not static but evolved and transformed through time. The first 
transformation took place in 1989, when the PNA reached a ceasefire agreement with 
the regime, which was followed by the SSNPLO (later the PNLO) in 1994. The 
second transformation took place after 2011, when the new regime under U Thein 
Sein permitted the rapid development of CSOs/NGOs and encouraged political 
activists to form political parties. These transformations not only precipitated new 
political actors, but, crucially, they also altered the structures of the previous patron-
client relations. 
5.2.1 The political economy in Pa-O before 1989 
The PNO was the first of the two Pa-O armed groups to reach a ceasefire agreement 
with the regime in 1989. In order to understand the transformation that took place 
after 1989, it is necessary to apprehend how the PNA, as an armed group, survived 
during the hostile years prior to the ceasefire agreement. What were its sources of 
income? Where did it get the arms and the money to pay the soldiers? Such 
background is relevant to an investigation related to the construction of the current 
political economy because the networks established by the PNA before 1989 would 
not simply be dismantled after the ceasefire agreement; if anything, the new found 




In outlining the evolution of the PNO in the previous chapter, mention was made of a 
PNA operative by the name of Ye Naung, who defected to the regime in 1977 with 
eight million baht.
130 
This incident is of interest because it sheds light onto one of the 
income sources of the armed group. Before Ye Naung surrendered to the Tatmadaw, 
he was the ‘liaison officer’ stationed in Thailand to collect taxes on behalf of the 
PNO. In 1975, he set up a ‘customs post’ at Koung Neing near the Thai-Burma 
border to collect ‘taxes’ on illegal smuggling (Christensen & Sann Kyaw, 2006, pp. 
31-33).
131 
This outpost had a commanding view of the narrow valley underneath, 
thus providing the perfect spot for the PNA to control access to the important trade 
route between Burma and Thailand (Boucaud & Boucaud, 1988, p. 152). Indeed, 
smuggling was an important business in the cross-border trade between Burma, Laos, 
and Thailand, infamously dubbed the Golden Triangle. The SURA, KMT, and PNO 
were all stakeholders in these important trade routes.
132 
The PNO imposed a tax of 50 
kyat per head for every Pa-O trader going through the route. For caravans carrying 
jade and not escorted by SURA soldiers, the PNO would charge 400 baht per horse. 
These were the windfalls that the PNO gained on top of what they taxed from Pa-O 
people at a bi-annual rate of 50 kyat per household (Boucaud & Boucaud, 1988, p. 
153).  
In contrast, the main backer of the SSNPLO before 1989 was the CPB. Without the 
CPB, the political map of the Pa-O would have been very different, for Tha Kalei 
would not have been able to borrow troops and reclaim their territories when they 
fought with their arch rival, the PNO, in 1974.
133 
In turn, the CPB was supported by 
the CPC (Lintner & Black, 2009, p. 18). However, after the CPB mutiny in 1989 and 
the CPC also having their own problems in China, the SSNPLO suddenly found 
itself short in ideological, material, and financial support. When the PNO reached a 
ceasefire agreement with the regime, the SSNPLO was left with no choice but to 
accept the inevitable, i.e. much inferior ceasefire terms. 
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Unlike the PNO, there is no evidence to suggest that the SSNPLO relied directly on 
taxing the opium trade as their income. Although the CPB used to impose a 10% tax 
on opium farmers and traders in areas that it controlled, this practice was condemned 
by its main patron, the CPC, to the point that ‘anyone caught with two kilograms or 
more of heroin […] would face execution’ (Lintner & Black, 2009, p. 18). Therefore, 
taxing the opium trade was not a reliable income source for the SSNPLO. Instead, 
like the PNO, they levied a bi-annual rate of 150 kyat (three times the rate charged 
by the PNO) on each Pa-O household in their territories, in addition to asking for a 
rice contribution (Boucaud & Boucaud, 1988, p. 153). Although the SSNPLO also 
levied taxes on other illegal smuggling apart from opium, the revenue received from 
taxing the opium trade was far more lucrative, which explained the PNA being better 
funded and armed than the SSNPLO. 
Essentially though, before the ceasefire agreements, both the PNA and the SSNPLO 
were simply, in Mancur Olson’s (1993) terms, roving bandits. They tried to 
maximise their short-term gains at the expense of the long-term prosperity of the 
people on whom they relied. There was no patron-client relation, just blatant 
extortion. However, this situation changed after 1989. The PNO got its own 
administrative territory in Special Region 6, whereas the SSNPLO did not receive the 
same treatment. This had a significant effect on the development of the subsequent 
political economy, for the PNO has since become a stationary bandit, whereas the 
SSNPLO remains a roving bandit to this day.  
5.2.2 The political economy in Pa-O after the ceasefire agreements 
The ceasefire agreement the PNO agreed with the regime fell into the second wave. 
However, the terms of the ceasefire agreement were very different from the previous 
ones. According to a senior executive of the Central Committee of the PNO, the 
armed group did not ask for economic incentives: 
[O]ther organisations asked for business opportunities for their organisations 
and living costs for army members and their families. They asked for car 








Other armed groups who were negotiating a ceasefire told them ‘our organisation is 
an organisation that doesn’t know how to take its opportunities’.135  
This account by the senior executive of the PNO differed from the accounts in the 
literature that cover the ceasefire deal. Zaw Oo and Win Min (2007, p. 28) state that 
‘a business committee was set up under the PNO and was given a fairly large set of 
business deals including logging and jade’. Likewise, South (2008, p. 124) remarks 
that ‘the PNO was granted various business concessions’; however, he further 
comments that the group also received substantial government development 
assistance, which appeared to tie in with the senior executive’s account. The 
accounts made by the ceasefire scholars are not necessarily incorrect, since they 
simply point out that business incentives were provided. However, they do not pay 
sufficient attention to the actual mechanism of how these interests were transferred, 
and therefore they ignore the subtle change in ceasefire strategy from ceasefire 
settlement to warlord co-optation. This change in strategy will be examined further in 
the next section, but the ceasefire agreement with the SSNPLO needs to be 
investigated in order to demonstrate that the deal with the PNO was indeed a co-
optation strategy. 
The ceasefire agreement with the SSNPLO, which fell into the third wave of 
ceasefire deals, is an interesting case for comparison. The SSNPLO reached a 
ceasefire agreement with the regime in October 1994. Under the ceasefire terms, the 
SSNPLO was given 15 free car permits, worth around US$50,000 at that time in the 
black market, and another 30 permits that were 60% tax-exempted, with the eventual 
buyers needing to pay 40% tax to the government.
136
 The deal appeared to be very 
generous, especially considering that the first ceasefire group, the MNDAA, was 
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only given two cars. However, there is a substantial difference in the arrangement 
with the SSNPLO in that they were not granted a special region like other ceasefire 
groups before them. Indeed, in the subsequent third wave ceasefire agreements, 
special regions were not granted to the Shan State National Army (SSNA) or to the 
New Mon State Party (NMSP) (see Appendix 3). 
While, on the surface, is seems as if the SSNPLO received more than their rival, the 
PNO, the reality was the complete opposite. The fact that the PNO was granted 
Special Region 6 made them the de facto sole administrator in the designated area. 
This gave the PNO legitimacy and recognition, but, more importantly, the PNO was 
effectively transformed from being a roving bandit to a stationary bandit, thus 
allowing them to impose control over the Pa-O people. However, the PNO activities 
did not go unchecked. The rise of CSOs in the Pa-O community since 2011 has 
challenged the PNO on issues such as land grabbing, pollution, and corruption. 
Hence, it is necessary to look at the effects of these CSOs on the local community. 
5.2.3 The effect of CSOs on the Pa-O political economy after 2011 
After the general election in 2010, the repressive Than Shwe regime was replaced by 
that of Thein Sein, a reform-minded military in civilian uniform. The West began to 
re-engage with Myanmar, and international actors entered the scene in the Pa-O 
community. One of the most prominent features of the post-2010 political landscape 
was the significant growth of CSOs in the area. While these CSOs had different 
objectives, they had several similarities.  
First, they received financial support from international donors. The main patron of 
KRSAN was the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), an international non-
governmental organisation funded by the US Congress. Their three-store office, 
which cost $250 a month to rent, was underwritten by the NED.
137 
DEMO was 
another group that was funded by the NED. In October 2014, a senior officer in 
charge of DEMO was invited by the American Center in Yangon to participate in a 
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capacity-building workshop in New York for three weeks.
138 
The PYO was funded 
by Open Society Foundations, an international NGO backed by the famous financier 
George Soros. They also received financial assistance from the Burma Relief Centre, 
based in Thailand, and Volunteer Service Overseas.
139 
The significance of having 
foreign patrons is that the CSOs could claim the moral high ground, as they did not 




Second, the leaders of these CSOs were very young, mostly under 30. In addition, 
they were well-educated, spoke fluent English, were ideologically oriented towards 
democracy, and, more importantly, were politically mobilised. The success of these 
individuals motivated other youths to follow their cause. In villages, where job 
opportunities were minimal, the opportunity to go abroad and work for CSOs had 
become an attractive job alternative to being farmers. This had inspired many youths 
to take English lessons at the KRSAN centre and participate in activities organised 
by these CSOs. Importantly, these international actors had empowered the pro-
democracy actors in the Pa-O community to provide resistance against the regime 
and their affiliates.  
These local CSOs were not acting alone. They had links with political activists at the 
state level, in particular with the 88 Group, because they shared similar ideas on 
democracy and self-determination. Therefore, these CSOs, with international actors 
as their patrons, formed a formidable alliance with state activities in a united front 
against the regime and the PNO, which has been regarded as a state crony (see 
Figure 10). With the help of the CSOs, cases of land grabbing were exposed and 
culprits for pollution were reported – the work of the PYO on the Tigyit coal mine 
being a case in point (Pa-Oh Youth Organization & Kyoju Action Network, 2011). 
Of course, these CSOs only became active after 2011, but this only serves to 
underline the difficult task in controlling a frontier that had been embroiled in 
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conflict since independence. Therefore, how could the regime make the co-optation 
work? Choosing the right agent would appear to be a prerequisite (Aspinall, 2014). 
Therefore, the following section looks into the regime’s co-optation strategy. 
 
Figure 10: Organisation of local resistance against pro-regime political actors 
5.3 Ceasefire Capitalism and the Co-optation Strategy 
Recalling the remarks made by a senior executive of the PNO, the organisation did 
not ask for any financial rewards from the regime when negotiating a ceasefire. If the 
PNO did not ask for any financial incentives in the ceasefire deal, where did it get the 
money from in order to support its operation? The following sections aim to explain 
how the PNO was co-opted into the state system and, by so doing, to identify the 
political-business collusion that facilitated the identity transformation.  
5.3.1 The business network of the PNO/PNA 
The question of where the PNO got its finances from was put directly to the 
chairman of the organisation, who stated that the PNO got its money from ‘donors’. 
He went on to explain that the PNA had business investments, and the PNO was 
given shares in those investments by the PNA (hence the use of the term ‘donor’). 
The distributed profits from these investments funded the PNO’s activities.141  
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Based on a separate interview with a senior PNO member in charge of the business 
division, it can be revealed that the PNA owns two hotels in the famous tourist 
hotspot Lake Inle, under the corporate name Golden Island Hotel Group.
142 
The 
Nampan Hotel (Golden Cottages Nampan) was opened in 1996. It was the first 
floating hotel on the lake and had 20 rooms to begin with. In 1999, five more rooms 
were added, and then an extra five more in 2000, with the final expansion taking 
place in 2001, which took the total number of rooms to 40. The Golden Island 
Cottages Thale U was opened in 1999. Located on the eastern bank of Inle Lake, it 
was started with just ten rooms, but another 15 rooms were added in 2004. Even with 
the room expansion, the total capacity of the two hotels is very moderate. The lack of 
capacity limited the scope of co-operation with tour operators, therefore substantially 
undermining the occupancy rates. The group did not keep data regarding occupancy 
levels in the early years, but because, by law, each visitor has to fill in a registration 
form, the number of tourists staying in the hotels was available (see Table 2). 
Being the first floating hotel on Lake Inle, the Nangang Hotel had its obviously 
appeal in the early days. Coupled with the room expansion two years later, the hotel 
benefited from increased tourist traffic and saw its guest-to-room ratio rise from 135 
in 1998 to 207 by the end of the millennium. However, even with the completion of 
the Golden Island Cottages Thale U in 2000, the guest-to-room ratio actually fell 
consistently to a low of only 99 tourists to a room in 2006 (with the only exception in 
2003). Increase in competition was one of the reasons for the fall in occupancy rates. 
The number of hotel rooms operated by private ownership in Shan State was 1,709 in 
2000. However, the number of rooms had almost doubled to 3,216 by 2006 (Central 
Statistical Organisation, 2012). In Nyaung Shwe, the village where tourists would 
board sight-seeing boats for Lake Inle tours, there were 42 hotels run by private 
entrepreneurs by 2011 (MMRD Business Insight, 2013). Moreover, the capacity 
utilisation rate for the most part of the first ten years of operation was below 20% 
(see Table 2). The average expenditure per tourist per day was estimated at US$60 in 
2000, rising to US$94 in 2006 (MMRD Business Insight, 2013). Assuming that a 
typical tourist would spend one night at the hotel, the revenue that the hotel group 
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could receive would still be very limited.
143
 Without looking at the actual accounts of 
the hotels, it is not possible to ascertain if the hotels were profitable. However, given 
the limited room capacity, which inevitably hindered economies of scale, it is 
doubtful that the hotel business could make a substantial contribution to the PNA and 
the PNO. However, according to the PNO chairman’s account, the organisation does 
not have any other disclosed business apart from the hotels. Therefore, there must be 
other sources of income to support the PNA and the PNO. 













1998 20 2703 135.2 18.5% 
1999 20 4699 235.0 32.2% 
2000 25 5185 207.4 28.4% 
2001 40 5926 148.2 20.3% 
2002 50 5842 116.8 16.0% 
2003 50 7122 142.4 19.5% 
2004 50 5540 110.8 15.2% 
2005 65 7086 109.0 14.9% 
2006 65 6437 99.0 13.6% 
Source: Golden Island Hotel Group  
5.3.2 The ‘Donor’ of the PNO 
When the chairman of the PNO said that the organisation received contributions 
from ‘donors’, apart from the hotel business, he was referring to the organisation’s 
main patron Nay Win Tun. A former PNA General, Nay Win Tun was the key figure 
in the regime’s co-optation strategy in Pa-O. Before becoming one of the richest men 
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After the PNO reached a ceasefire agreement with the regime, Nay Win Tun dropped 
his gun and became an entrepreneur. Under the Ruby Dragon Group of Companies, 
the former enemy of the state controls seven companies. The Ruby Dragon Jade and 
Gems Company Limited and the Ruby Dragon Mining Company Limited have been 
granted concessions to operate jade mines in Pha Kant and Tawmaw in Kachin State, 
Khamti in Sagaing Division, Mogok in Mandalay Division, and Mongshu in Shan 
State. His business empire does not stop at mining but also stretches to retailing and 
tourism. Kyauk Sein Nagar (Gems) Limited is a retail jewellery operation based in 
Yangon. The Ruby Dragon Trading Company Limited focuses on trading precious 
stones. In 2004, Nay Win Tun formed the Ruby Winery Factory in Nyaung Shwe in 
Southern Shan State. In 2005, amid controversies of land grabbing and pollution, he 
set up the Dragon Cement Factory on a 728-acre site in Tigyit. In 2007, he opened 
the Ruby Jade Hotel Resort and Spa in Yangon. Part of the profits from these 
businesses goes to funding PNO operations.
146
 
When the executive of the PNO said that the group did not ask for any monetary 
benefits from the regime in the ceasefire talks, he was withholding information about 
the transfer of interests through the newly co-opted agent of the state, Nay Win Tun.  
5.4 Lifting the Veil of the Co-optation Strategy 
In lifting the veil of the co-optation strategy, this section asks three questions. First, 
what is the relationship between Nay Win Tun, the PNO, and the regime? Second, 
why should the hotel operation and Nay Win Tun’s business empire be regarded as 
the regime’s co-optation strategy for its frontier pacification project, and not just a 
normal local development after ceasefire agreement? Third, why was the co-optation 
strategy also a divide-and-rule tactic? The answer to the first question can be found 
in a speech by Nay Win Tun during a presentation ceremony for the biggest jade find 
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in Myanmar’s history. The answer to the second question can be found by 
scrutinising the locations of the businesses that the PNO and Nay Win Tun operated. 
Finally, the revelations to the first two questions should provide the answer to the 
third. 
5.4.1 The relationship between the regime, the PNO, and Nay Win 
Tun 
In a presentation ceremony in May 2002, during which the Ruby Dragon Jade 
Company donated the biggest jade find in the history of Myanmar to the regime, Nay 
Win Tun gave a speech with Secretary-1 of the SPDC Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt in 
attendance: ‘as a private enterprise, […] uncut jade was mined during the period of 
seven years and it fetched K200 million and US$10 million. Altogether […] US$1 
million of gem tax has already been paid to the state’.147 However, this tax 
contribution paled in comparison to the donation of 3,000 tons of jade that was found 
by the Ruby Dragon Jade Company in Phakant, Kachin State. The jade stone was of 
good quality, measured seventy feet long, 20 feet high, and 16 feet wide, and its 
colour consisted of white, purple, blue, and deep green.
148 
No valuation was given to 
the stone, but, to put it into perspective, the country extracts around 30,000 tons of 
jade each year, worth an estimated total of US$42 billion (Global Witness, 2015a). 
Therefore, the stone donated by Nay Win Tun could account for 10% of the 
country’s annual extraction and could be worth over US$4 billion, depending on the 
quality of the stone.  
The reason for donating something of such magnitude was nicely summed up by Col. 
Hkun Okker, chairman of the PPLO, which subsequently merged with the PNLO, the 
main local opposition to the PNO. In answering questions from a reporter, Col. 
Okker had this to say about the donation: ‘We know what kind of donation this is […] 
The enemy is destroying our revolution with economic opportunities’. When further 
asked whether there was a rift between the SPDC and PNO, which caused the 
donation, Col. Okker said: ‘I don’t think so because, among the ceasefire leaders, U 
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Aung Hkam Hti always gives the most respect to SPDC officials’.149 It is important 
to note that the comments by Col. Okker carry weight because he was in charge of 
foreign affairs for the PNO before the split, and therefore he was an informed person 
who could see the issues from both sides.
150 
 
There are three points in Col. Okker’s comments that require further clarification. 
First, the relationship between the regime and the PNO had always been good. 
Second, the donation by Nay Win Tun was seen as a bribe for more business 
opportunities for the state crony. Finally, these new business opportunities would 
mean more potential revenues for the PNO, which, in turn, was seen as bad news for 
its opposition.  
The donation reflected the intricate patron-client relations in the Pa-O area. The tax 
paid by Nay Win Tun to the state was just the tip of the iceberg. According to a 
report by Global Witness, based on official import data from China, the production 
of jade in 2014 was around US$12 billion.
151 
However, the report states that the 
black market for jade could be as much as three times the official figure (Global 
Witness, 2015a). As one of the biggest jade operators in the country, Nay Win Tun 
was at the centre of one of the most lucrative businesses in Myanmar.
152 
For a long 
time, the mining business in the country has been under tight state control. According 
to a Kachin leader, ‘Hpakant is one of the most valuable places on earth because you 
can earn billions from a very small area […] and yet only a small number of people 
are getting the advantages” (Global Witness, 2015a, p. 5).153 Nay Win Tun was 
awarded several mining concessions in Kachin State, so obviously he was immensely 
rewarded, but for what? The interviews with the chairman and executives of the PNO 
confirm that Nay Win Tun was the patron of the organisation. Consequently, it can 
be argued that the regime co-opted Nay Win Tun and relied on his influence over the 
PNO to control Special Region 6, which later became the Pa-O SAZ. Therefore, it 
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was a three-way patron-client relation between the regime and Nay Win Tun, Nay 
Win Tun and the PNO, and the PNO and the regime. The first part of the three-way 
relation saw the transfer of lucrative state assets to former ethnic armed rebels, or 
what can be called elite accommodation. To maintain this relation, Nay Win Tun 
donated the 3,000-ton jade find to the state in 2002. Thus, the second part of the 
relation can be seen as what Wong (2013) describes as an identity transformation – 
the conversion of a former state enemy into a state ally, an entrepreneur who 
maintained control of his armed group through patronage. Without the financial 
support from Nay Win Tun, the PNO would not have sufficient resources to 
administrate the Pa-O SAZ by purely relying on the two hotels at Inle Lake. But why 
would Nay Win Tun maintain ties with an armed group? The answer could only be 
because, in order to perpetuate his wealth, he needed to fulfil his side of the bargain 
to deliver the state ceasefire objective of decentralisation without losing control. In 
essence, the regime, through Nay Win Tun, enrolled the support of the PNO to fulfil 
its grand pacification strategy. The PNO became a pro-regime establishment and 
supported the policy of the state. This is the third part of the three-way patron-client 
relation, in addition to completing the second level of accommodation as suggested 
by Migdal (see Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11: Co-optation strategy in the Pa-O SAZ 
The other point that needs to be clarified is what Col. Okker meant in stating that the 
donation would destroy their revolution? In making this statement, Col. Okker 




The Pa-O nationalist movement was started against the Shan sawbwas, and after the 
sawbwas surrendered their hereditary rights to the state, their struggle began 
targeting the ruling regime. The word ‘revolution’ reflects the communist 
background of the PPLO and PNLO. Yet, why would the donation destroy their 
revolutionary ambitions? The devil is in the detail. Recalling the different ceasefire 
terms between the PNO and the SSNPLO, although, on the surface, the SSNPLO 
appeared to have received much more than its counterparts, car permits were just 
one-off financial gains. The regime never tried to co-opt the group into the state 
system. In contrast, the three-way patron-client relation that tied Nay Win Tun and 
the PNO to the state was given perpetual funding through business concessions. 
Therefore, the donation by Nay Win Tun was seen by Col. Okker as another nail in 
the coffin of the revolutionary struggle.  
5.4.2 Business opportunities as co-optation strategy 
In trying to lift the veil of the co-optation strategy, the beginning of this section 
asked why the business granted to Nay Win Tun and the PNO should be regarded as 
a co-optation strategy instead of normal state-sponsored development after the 
normalisation of relationships and ceasefire. The answer can be found in the location 
of these businesses.  
The Golden Island hotels are located on the banks of Inle Lake (see Figure 12). 
Specifically, they are located outside Special Region 6 but inside the Shan territories. 
Given that Shan and Pa-O have not been peaceful neighbours, it would be 
inconceivable that the PNO could operate two hotels in the popular tourist area 
without the backing of the SLORC. A similar hotel proposal at the time perhaps best 
illustrates the difficulties in getting a hotel built in the Lake Inle area. 
In 1994, the Shangri-La Group, owned by Malaysian and Hong Kong tycoon Robert 
Kuok, reached an agreement with the regime to build the Traders Hotel (renamed the 
Shangri-La Hotel in 2014) in central Yangon.
154 
To capitalise on the successful 
conclusion of the Traders Hotel agreement, a proposal to build a hotel at Inle Lake 
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was put forward to the then Director General of the Directorate of Hotels and 
Tourism at a meeting in Yangon. However, the director general immediately rejected 
the idea by citing problems of land ownership.
155 
 
However, the person in charge of the Golden Island Group provided a different 
perspective. On the question of land, he claimed that it was never an issue because 
the government owned all the land. He suggested that the hotel project was a gesture 





Figure 12: Locations of the Golden Island hotels (Source: Golden Island Hotel Group) 
At a time when Western sanctions were beginning to bite on the economy and the 
country badly needed foreign investment, it appeared illogical that the more qualified 
Shangri-La group was not offered the hotel project, and yet the PNO, which had no 
previous experience in managing a hotel, instead obtained permission.  
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The pattern of offering business opportunities outside the Pa-O SAZ and in sensitive 
areas is not uncommon in the case of the Pa-O pacification project. Jade mining is 
one of the most lucrative businesses in Myanmar, and licenses to operate jade mines 
are tightly controlled by the regime (Global Witness, 2015b). However, the Ruby 
Dragon Company controlled by Nay Win Tun was granted mining licenses in 
Hpakant, Kachin State. While these mining licenses have transformed Nay Win Tun 
into a crony of the state, they also indirectly enriched the PNA and pitted the Kachin 
against other ethnic groups. As Global Witness (2015a, p. 14) points out, ‘watching 
licensed companies controlled by the worst enemies gobble up their natural 
inheritance is a source of simmering resentment amongst the Kachin people’. 
More importantly, these businesses, located outside the Pa-O SAZ, brought little or 
no benefits to the ordinary Pa-O people. They did not contribute to employment. 
They only served to empower the PNO at the same time as weakening the capacity of 
their opponents.  
5.4.3 Co-optation as a divide-and-rule tactic 
Shan State is a multi-ethnic yet resource-rich area. However, uneven development, 
centre-periphery rivalry, inter-ethnic hostility, and intra-ethnic conflict have ridden 
the country since independence. The divide-and-rule administration of the British 
was recycled in the post-colonial period under the military regime. Rebranded into 
self-administrated zones, these ceasefire ethnic armed groups had interests 
overlapping each other. The state had, on the surface, decentralised authority to local 
ethnic elites, but, in reality, the regime had pitted these political actors against each 
other in what can be called the 21
st
 century divide-and-rule. Unlike the British 
version, which simply divided the country geographically into Burma Proper and the 
Frontier Areas, the 21
st
 century divide-and-rule was more meticulous. It divided 
groups of the same ethnicity by creating exclusive self-administrated zones. It 
created irreconcilable conflict among different ethnic groups by dividing up 




The preferential treatment to the PNO against the PNLO is a case in point. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the two armed groups had their differences even before 
the intervention of the regime, the situation after 1991 made this worse. The ceasefire 
agreements installed the PNO as the stationary bandit and bestowed them with the 
monopoly use of force in the demarcated area, whereas the PNLO was left stranded 
as the roving bandit without its own territories. The lucrative business concessions to 
Nay Win Tun ensured that the PNO had recurrent income to sustain its dominance, 
yet the PNLO had not been given the same opportunities. In fact, until after the 
PNLO signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in October 2015, the group was 
still on the list of illegal organisations under the Unlawful Association Act, and, as 
such, they could not register any company to conduct business.
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More alarming though, the divide-and-rule strategy deliberately pitted rivals at the 
local and state levels against each other. Conflicts between Shan armed groups and 
Pa-O armed groups regularly flared up. Recent fighting took place in September 
2014, when the SSA fought with the PNLO. The SSA was accused of burning down 
the new facilities built by the PNLO in Maukmae, a town outside the Pa-O SAZ.
158
 
The business concessions granted to the PNO and Nay Win Tun were also sources of 
discontent. The hotels at Inle Lake are in Shan territory. Likewise, the jade mines 
controlled by Nay Win Tun are in Kachin State. The Kachin and the Shan rightly feel 
that their interests are being taken away from them. For most ethnic minorities who 
demanded federalism and self-determination, this issue needs to be addressed. 
However, existing beneficiaries of this unfair allocation would resist any attempt to 
change the status quo. This is where the Murdoch school of critical political 
economy becomes relevant because it argues that the collusion between the state and 
business elites would prevent the introduction of any reforms that may harm their 
interests, and consequently any state-society relations would remain tense and 
confrontational. 
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5.5 Assessing the Co-optation Strategy 
Ceasefire capitalism and elite co-optation have transformed the political economy of 
the Pa-O SAZ. The PNO became the stationary bandit and were given sole 
administrative responsibility. The lucrative business concessions given to Nay Win 
Tun ensured that the group had abundant financial resources at their disposal. 
However, given the rise of civil society groups and political reforms introduced since 
2010, has the co-optation strategy worked for the regime? 
Assessing the question from the perspective of the results from the two general 
elections in 2010 and 2015, it can be argued that the strategy was successful because 
the PNO won both elections. The 2010 election may not be that relevant because it 
was generally regarded as flawed (The Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 2011). 
Interviews with villagers also reveal that many of them believed the PNO rigged the 
result through fraud at the polling stations. More importantly, the PNO had no real 
competition in the 2010 election. Their main political rivals, the NLD, SNLD, and 
UPNO, did not participate in the election. However, the success of the PNO in the 
2015 election was a surprise to many people. They were the only pro-regime ethnic 
political party that retained all its seats from the 2010 election. This success came 
amid three negative developments as far as the PNO was concerned. First, the 2015 
election was hotly contested, and the PNO was not the only Pa-O political party to 
represent the Pa-O. The UPNO was registered as a political party in 2013, and they 
were campaigning on the grounds that the PNO was just a crony of the state and did 
not really serve the interests of the Pa-O. The NLD and SNLD were also courting Pa-
O voters. Therefore, Pa-O voters had genuine choices. A second factor that might 
have affected the chances of the PNO was the participation of independent watchers 
to monitor the election. The 2015 election caught the attention of the world as it was 
a showcase of liberal political development, which justified the West’s warming 
relationship. Over 2,000 independent observers from all over the world took part in 
monitoring the election process. Under such circumstances, it would be very difficult 
for anyone to rig the result. Therefore, the 2015 election was generally considered to 
be fair and open. Lastly, the 2015 election was more challenging for the PNO 




shown dummy polling cards so that they would not make mistakes in filling them 
out. They were also informed about their rights. Therefore, how did the PNO manage 
to secure their win in the 2015 election? 
Ceasefire capitalism and elite co-optation provided alternative strategies from the 
conventional conflict resolution of disarmament, demobilisation, and re-integration. 
Although they are different in form, they do not deviate from the embedded objective 
of any conflict resolution, i.e. the return of order and control to central authority. 
However, after applying these concepts to the case of Myanmar, the quest for the 
conduit through which political authorities constructed at the macro level are 
transmitted to the micro level is still missing. Under ceasefire capitalism and elite co-
optation, a three-way patron-client relation can be identified between the regime, 
Nay Win Tun, and the PNO, and, because of this patronage relationship, the PNO 
was converted into a state crony. They were given unrivalled financial resources. 
Yet, how did the PNO deliver their side of the bargain in helping the regime to 
secure control? The PNO won the elections in their area of control, but how did they 
achieve it amid challenging circumstances? The PNO is the political wing of the 
PNA, and while they are two sides of the same coin, what is the role of the PNA in 
the ceasefire zone? Did the PNA play any part in the election victory of the PNO? 
In terms of the regime’s pacification project, the Pa-O SAZ was a new frontier where 
political order was being reconstituted. There are layers of political order, with the 
state at the top and moving down through the region to the SAZ. This chapter has 
constructed the political order at the SAZ, the third layer, and contextualised it in 
terms of political economy and the patron-client relationship. However, in order to 
find out how the PNO could assist the regime in maintaining control, the 
investigation needs to extend one level deeper to the village level, which is the aim 





6          Chapter 6:     
Deciphering Control: The Manifestation of Power at 
the Local Level 
 
The previous chapter explained the co-optation strategy of the regime through 
providing lucrative business concessions to an ex-PNA general Nay Win Tun, who, 
in turn, used part of the profit to fund the PNO, the political wing of the armed 
group. The PNO became a pro-regime ethnic political party and, in the 2010 and 
2015 elections, won all the seats in the Pa-O SAZ. The victory in the last election 
was particularly worth noting in that the PNO were the only pro-regime political 
party that managed to retain all their seats in a relatively free and fair election, which 
was closely monitored by independent international observers. How did the PNO 
achieve the result amid resentment from the locals over issues, such as land grabbing 
and corruption? The elite accommodation strategy, or what Woods terms ceasefire 
capitalism, could only explain this up to the point of stopping armed confrontation 
with the regime; in this sense, it fails to illuminate how social control could be 
implemented in favour of the regime in the Pa-O SAZ. According to Migdal, social 
control can be observed from how society complies with the rules of the game, 
participates in the state project of extraction and attribution, and provides authority 
for the legitimation, even though it may be against the will of the people. Unlike the 
2010 election, the locals had choices in the last election. Instead of the PNO, they 
could have voted for the NLD or another Pa-O political party, the UPNO. Therefore, 
this chapter aims to determine how the PNO managed to secure its seats in the 
election amid strong competition and an adverse election climate. This involves 
identifying the implementer and explaining the process of the final level of 
accommodation to complete Migdal’s triangle of accommodation in the survival 
strategy. To recall, the implementer is someone who is ‘usually far from the sight of 
state leaders’, and, in terms of the overall power configuration, is someone who 
would ‘pose little danger of creating power centers that could threaten the position of 
state leaders’ (Migdal, 1988, p. 238). Therefore, whoever is identified as the 




Accordingly, this chapter is divided into three sections. Using the election result as 
the reference point for measuring success in control, the first section focuses on the 
issues of what the ordinary Pa-O want from their political parties and how the 
election results reflected these realities. This section offers plausible explanations for 
the victory, thereby highlighting the work done by the PNO behind the scenes. It is 
important to stress that this analysis is not assuming the election success was 
necessarily a manifestation of control, but rather, it purports to offer an objective 
insight into how the PNO operated in order to maintain social control. In the course 
of the analysis, a figure between the PNO and the villagers in the shape of the village 
tract leader (VTL) was mentioned in several interviews, which suggests that they 
could be the implementer that this research is looking for. They would certainly fit 
the description of being far away from sight of the leader and not posing a challenge 
to the power of the regime. Therefore, the next section aims to contextualise the role 
the VTLs played in the PNO social control strategy. Finally, the conclusion of this 
chapter consolidates the argument that the VTLs are indeed the nexus of power 
between the state and villages. 
6.1 What Do the Pa-O Want from Their Rulers? 
The fight for self-determination was embedded in the ethnic struggle even before the 
independence of the country. The desire for self-determination was often mixed with 
other demands by political actors at various times, on issues such as democracy, 
federalism, and even independence. Yet, with the ceasefire agreement and the 
eventual establishment of a SAZ, have these political appeasement measures satisfied 
the demands of the Pa-O? With regard to the ordinary Pa-O, the majority of whom 
are farmers, do they really understand what democracy or federalism entail? 
Alternatively, as Scott (1976) has postulated under a moral economy, do they simply 
want justice in the form of the right to subsistence and reciprocity? Further, from a 
different perspective, could these ordinary farmers simply be looking for a way to 
escape the wrath of the state, as argued by Scott (2009) in his study of Zomia, a 
highland area of 2.5 million square kilometres covering five countries and populated 
by ethnic minorities? However, if they cannot escape the inevitability that the arms 
of the state will encircle them in one way or the other, would they be content with 




the Prince, as offered by Machiavelli (1992)? In this regard, their actions could be 
the result of rational calculations, or what Popkin (1979) calls trade-offs. The only 
way to find out is to follow Scott’s (1976, p. 160) approach, which ‘must start 
phenomenologically at the bottom and ask what the peasants’ or workers’ definitions 
of the situation is’. 
Having an understanding of what the ordinary Pa-O want from their rulers could 
offer an explanation of the PNO’s success, or contradictorily, expose the harsh 
reality of oppression. In explaining the election victory, the findings could provide 
evidence to support the argument that the PNO has transformed from a roving bandit 
to a stationary bandit. On the other hand, if the evidence raises doubts about the 
PNO’s support, then alternative reasons need to be identified. 
6.1.1 Questionnaire design 
In order to understand what the Pa-O people really want from their leaders, a simple 
questionnaire was compiled to lay the groundwork for further inquiry. The 
questionnaire contained two parts, the first of which consisted of personal 
information on ethnicity, religion, and the participants’ professions.159 The second 
part of the questionnaire, in multiple choice format, was formulated into three main 
themes. The first theme was focused on social infrastructure delivery, or assets that 
accommodate the provision of social services, including the provision of schools, 
hospitals (healthcare), roads, jobs, and, in more general terms, living standards. The 
second theme related to the notion of stability, since, without stability, there is no 
sustainable development and there will be no peace. Accordingly, this group of 
questions focused on the issues of peace, protection of ethnic rights, equality, 
environmental protection, democracy, sustainable development, and the 2008 
Constitution. There were also questions on which political party the participants 
voted for in 2010 and which party they would most likely vote for in 2015. The final 
theme raised the issue of overseas investments, and the people’s opinions on these 
investments in relations to social problems, such as increasing corruption, land 
grabbing, and pollution (see Appendix 4: Questionnaire). The inclusion of the 
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questions on attitudes towards foreign investment was informed by leaders of CSOs, 
who argued that some of these projects were the source of major social grievances, 
such as land grabbing, pollution, and corruption. Since these projects could not have 
been undertaken without the collaboration with the PNO, therefore, interviewees’ 
attitudes and experiences on these investments could offer rich insights into how the 
PNO dealt with resistance.  
The questionnaire, written in English, was translated into Burmese by Informant 1 
and checked by Informant 2 in order to ensure that the meaning of the questions had 
not been lost in translation.
160
 The target was to have 150 completed questionnaires 
generated from seven different locations: twenty questionnaires from each village 
(i.e. two villages from each of the three Pa-O SAZ townships) and thirty 
questionnaires from Taunggyi.
161
 To strike a balance between efficiency and 
effectiveness, participants were divided into groups of three to four and the questions 
were explained to them when necessary. 
The questionnaire was carried out over ten days between 2–11 August 2015. Given 
the time constraints and transportation logistics, village selection was confined to 
those that could be reached on a day-return basis from Taunggyi.
162
 The PNO were 
informed of the plan to undertake the questionnaires and interviews, but the exact 
dates of the visit and names of the villages were not disclosed to them. For each 
township, one village was selected by consulting both informants and the other 
village was based on the suggestion of locally active CSOs, such as KRSAN and 
PYO.  
6.1.2 Summary of questionnaire findings 
A total of 150 questionnaires were collected, 30 from Taunggyi, 20 from Village A 
(HPA) and 20 from Village B (HPB) in Hopong Township, 20 from Village A (HHA) 
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and 20 from Village B (HSB) in Hsi Hseng Township, and finally, 20 from Village A 
(PLA) and 20 from Village B (PLB) in Pinlaung Township.
163
 Village A refers to 
villages that were chosen after consultation with Informants 1 and 2, whereas Village 
B represents villages that were suggested by local CSOs. The gender and age 
distributions of the participants are summarised in Table 3: 
Table 3: Particulars of the participants that took part in the questionnaire  
 Total Taunggyi HPA HPB HHA HHB PLA PLB 
Total No. of 
Participants 
150 30 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Male 93 22 11 13 14 11 11 11 
Female 57 8 9 7 6 9 9 9 
Age: Mean 31.86 31.9 25.2 32.45 35.5 32 35 30.95 
Age: Median 29 32.5 23 28 34 30.5 33.5 29 
Age: Mode 24 33 22 19 39 24 28 29 
Age Range: 
Oldest 
73 54 47 63 73 60 60 47 
Age Range: 
Youngest 
18 18 18 19 21 18 18 18 
(Note: HPA=Village A in Hopong Township; HPB=Village B in Hopong Township; HHA=Village A 
in Hsi Hseng; HHB=Village B in Hsin Hseng Township; PLA=Village A in Pinlaung Township; and 
PLB=Village B in Pinlaung Township)  
The development that the villagers would like to have is summarised in Table 4. As 
can be seen, the provision of social infrastructure received over 60% support from 
the participants. The villagers wanted their political party to build more schools 
(61%), hospitals (67%), roads (69%), create more jobs (75%) and improve the living 
standards (71%). On the contrary, the questions regarding the issue of stability 
received a less favourable backing. Apart from the demand for maintaining peace 
(59%), the other issues such as promoting ethnic rights (46%), equality (36%), 
environmental protection (35%), development (45%) and change in the Constitution 
(17%) received below-average support. The initial findings suggest that the villagers 
are more sensitive to issues where they can see direct benefits, as opposed to issues 
that were more ideologically driven. 
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On the question of whether Chinese investment would be welcomed in the area, only 
10% responded positively (see Table 5). In Pinlaung Township, no interviewee 
supported Chinese investment in Village A, and the attitude towards Chinese 
investment fared only slightly better in Village B, with just 5%. Coincidentally, these 
two villages also recorded the strongest resentment against Chinese investment, as 
many believed that they were the cause of pollution (60% for both Villages A and B), 
land grabbing (Village A: 60%; Village B: 55%), corruption (Village A: 55%; 
Village B: 45%), and other social problems (Villages A and B both at 35%). 





Taunggyi HPA HPB HHA HHB PLA PLB 
Build more 
schools 
61% 40% 75% 60% 65% 60% 55% 85% 
Build more 
hospitals 
67% 37% 75% 70% 60% 70% 85% 90% 
Build more 
roads 
69% 37% 75% 55% 80% 85% 85% 85% 
Better job 
opportunities 
75% 60% 85% 80% 85% 75% 65% 85% 
Improve living 
standards 
71% 60% 80% 65% 75% 70% 65% 85% 
Maintain peace 59% 43% 65% 55% 55% 65% 60% 75% 
Protect ethnic 
rights 
46% 27% 50% 40% 55% 55% 35% 70% 
Promote 
equality 
36% 23% 50% 40% 25% 35% 30% 55% 
Protect the 
environment 
35% 20% 50% 35% 35% 25% 30% 55% 
Promote 
democracy 
50% 63% 60% 60% 30% 40% 35% 55% 
Promote 
development 
45% 63% 60% 50% 25% 25% 45% 40% 
Change in the 
Constitution 
17% 7% 35% 25% 20% 10% 10% 20% 
This finding was not unexpected because the highly controversial Tigyit coal mine 
and power plant are both located in Pinlaung Township.
164
 Yet, when asked which 
political party they would vote for in the 2015 election, 75% of interviewees in 
Village A said they would vote for the PNO, while only 20% said they would vote 
for the NLD. The responses from Village B were not as extreme, in that 45% of the 
interviewees said they would vote for the PNO and 50% said they would vote for the 
NLD. Although 65% and 45% of these interviewees voted for the PNO in the 2010 
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election, and the PNO therefore appear to have a strong follower base, it needs to be 
kept in mind that the PNO had no competition in the 2010 election, whereas the NLD 
was a formidable opponent in the 2015 election. Therefore, such a situation begs the 
question as to why the PNO are still well supported despite the Tigyit controversies.  
Table 5: Attitudes on Chinese investments in the area 
 Total Taunggyi HPA HPB HHA HHB PLA PLB 
Good for development 
(Yes) 
15% 10% 10% 30% 25% 15% 10% 10% 
(No) 13% 7% 0% 5% 0% 25% 30% 25% 
Welcomed 10% 10% 10% 20% 15% 10% 0% 5% 
Caused pollution 31% 20% 10% 20% 25% 30% 60% 60% 
Caused land grabbing 38% 30% 10% 25% 35% 55% 60% 55% 
Caused corruption 33% 27% 15% 15% 30% 50% 55% 45% 
Caused social problems 25% 17% 10% 20% 40% 25% 35% 35% 
Prefer other countries 22% 7% 10% 20% 25% 40% 25% 35% 
2010 Election
165
         
   - voted for the PNO 39% 17% 30% 25% 55% 45% 65% 45% 
   - voted for the USDP 11% 0% 5% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 
2015 Election         
   - will vote for the PNO 42% 3% 55% 25% 55% 55% 75% 45% 
   - will vote for the NLD 35% 50% 10% 45% 25% 35% 20% 50% 
6.1.3 Explaining the support for the PNO 
The replies to the questionnaire strongly suggest that the Pa-O voters wanted to have 
more social infrastructure built. The following sub-sections will examine the delivery 
of education and healthcare in the Pa-O townships since the PNO became the main 
administrator in 1991. 
6.1.3.1 The provision of education 
There was no surprise that the questionnaire found that Pa-O voters placed a lot of 
emphasis on education. In a meeting with the students who attended an English class 
organised by the KRSAN, many despaired about the lack of development in the Pa-O 
area and believed that a good education could help them to improve their job 
opportunities and escape the poverty trap.
166 
The following charts show what the 
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PNO achieved in delivering education in terms of the total number of students in 
each of the township from 1991 to 2015 (see Figure 13),
167
 the number of Grade 11 
students from the same period (see Figure 14), and the total number of schools, 
compared to other areas in Shan State (see Figure 15). 
 
Figure 13: Number of students in the three townships of the Pa-O SAZ, 1991–2015 (Source: 
Department of Education, Taunggyi). 
 
 Figure 14: Number of grade 11 students in the three townships of Pa-O SAZ, 1991–2015 (Source: 
Department of Education, Taunggyi). 
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Southern Shan State Area 
Primary Schools Middle Schools High Schools Total Increase 
% 1991 2015 1991 2015 1991 2015 1991 2015 
Pa-O SAZ  
(3 Townships) 
458 488 15 62 4 30 477 580 22% 
Other Pa-O Areas  
(7 Townships) 
865 863 60 117 24 94 949 1074 13% 
Danu SAZ  
(2 Townships) 
207 158 9 30 2 17 218 205 -6% 
Other Southern Shan State  
(9 Townships) 
435 525 18 40 9 34 462 599 30% 
Figure 15: Comparing the number of schools in different parts of Southern Shan State (Source: 
Parami Development Network [an NGO established by the PNO]). 
As can be seen in Figure 13, based on the data provided by the Department of 
Education in Taunggyi, the increase in the total number of students between 1991 
and 2015 was impressive. The slowest growth was in Hopong, but it still registered a 
63% increase in the twenty-six-year period. In Hsi Hseng, the total number of 
students grew 143%, from 11,072 to 26,877. The sharpest increase of student 
numbers was recorded in Pinlaung, where the twenty-six-year period witnessed a 
173% increase, from 12,194 to 33,318. More tellingly, the number of grade 11 
students also showed a sharp increase, as shown in  Figure 14. This indicates that 
more students received an education to a level that allowed them to pursue a 
university degree.  
The PNO were also building more schools in the Pa-O SAZ than other comparable 
areas. From 1991 to 2015, there was a 22% increase in the number of schools in the 
Pa-O SAZ, compared with just 13% in other Pa-O areas (Figure 15). In contrast, the 
Danu SAZ, another SAZ in Southern Shan State, actually experienced a 6% decline 
in numbers. Therefore, it can be argued that the PNO deserves credit for the delivery 
of education to the Pa-O SAZ. Indeed, the person in charge of the PDN proudly 
claimed that most of the students attending the University of Taunggyi were Pa-O 
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6.1.3.2 The provision of healthcare 
The delivery of healthcare was another major concern for the Pa-O voters. At the 
township level, there are three main types of healthcare provision. At the basic level 
are sub-rural health centres, which only have midwives. At a higher level are the 
rural health centres, which are staffed by health assistants and nurses. At the top level 
are the station hospitals, where, finally, one can find qualified doctors. The Township 
Health Department in Taunggyi did not provide data before 2001; however, the 
information obtained was nonetheless valuable in assessing the achievement of the 
PNO with regard to healthcare delivery. The numbers of the various centres at each 
PA-O township in 2001 and 2015 are outlined in Figure 16. 
As can be seen from the data, the PNO administration have added substantially to the 
number of sub-rural health centres in all townships. Although the sub-rural health 
centres only have midwives, they symbolically conveyed a message of care to the 
villagers who, for centuries, had been deprived of basic needs at childbirth. Moreover, 
the facilities at the station hospital have also been improved over the years. For 
example, according to the person in charge of the PDN, the hospital in Pinlaung only 
started with 10 beds, which increased to 25 over the years.
169
 Furthermore, new 




Township No. of Station Hospital 
No. of Rural Health 
Centre 
No. of Sub-Rural Health 
Centre 
2001 2015 2001 2015 2001 2015 
Hopong 1 1 (50 beds) 2 4 6 21 
Hsi Hseng 0 1 (50 beds) 2 6 8 26 
Pinlaung 0 1 (25 beds) 2 6 5 32 
Figure 16: Number of hospitals and health centres in the Pa-O SAZ, 2001–2015 (Source: 
Township Health Department, Taunggyi). 
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PDN did not have the figures at hand. 
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6.1.4 How contentious issues were dealt with by the PNO 
The above two sub-sections have illustrated that the PNO had delivered its obligation 
as a stationary bandit to provide public goods to its people in the form of education 
and healthcare. However, the PNO was not without any blame. How did the political 
group still manage to command support from the people when contentious issues 
such as land grabbing were rampant? In this section, attention is drawn to the 
development in Pinlaung Township, where the country’s largest open-pit coal mine 
and the nearby power plant have resulted in pollution and large-scale land grabbing. 
Yet, the questionnaire demonstrated that the PNO still had strong support among the 
local people worst hit by the projects. What accounted for this voter behaviour?  
According to a report, the coal mine was first contracted by a consortium of 
companies led by the China National Heavy Machinery Corporation (CHMC), with 
the Shan Yoma Nagar Company, Eden Company, and Special Region (6) Business 
Group among the initial investors for the US$10 million project (Pa-Oh Youth 
Organization & Kyoju Action Network, 2011, p. 23). The CHMC is a Chinese state-
owned company with a substantial domestic and overseas mining portfolio.
171 
The 
Eden Company is owned by one of the regime’s cronies, Chit Khaing.172 The Special 
Region (6) Business Group is strongly related to Nay Win Tun and the PNO, 
although ownership cannot be confirmed.
173 
As the biggest open-pit coal mine in the 
country, it supports a 120 megawatt coal-fired power plant located about one and a 
half miles away. The CHMC and the Eden Company were commissioned to operate 
the power plant. Work began in 2002 and it became fully operational in 2005. Two 
villages were relocated by force, and over 500 acres of farmland were confiscated. 
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The air and water pollution from the mining and coal-fired plant affected over 12,000 
people living within a five-mile radius of the site. According to the report, over 50% 
of the people living in the area suffered from skin rashes and breathing difficulties 
(Pa-Oh Youth Organization & Kyoju Action Network, 2011). Although the 
government promised jobs to the locals, the PYO claimed that most of the employees 
were not from the villages affected. Indeed, over 1,000 farmers lost their land, and 
only a handful of them were employed by the project, mainly as truck drivers (Pa-Oh 
Youth Organization & Kyoju Action Network, 2011, p. 35). 
With the Tigyit project as background, perhaps it is not difficult to understand why 
Villages A and B in Pinlaung Township showed resentment against Chinese 
investment and held it to blame for the social problems. However, if this assessment 
is correct, how can it be reconciled with the strong support shown to the PNO, who 
was also involved in the project? When asked who they would vote for in the 2015 
election, 75% of participants from Pinlaung Village A said they would vote for the 
PNO, and 45% would do the same from Village B. In contrast, only 20% and 50% 
respectively indicated they would vote for the NLD. If the NLD were the voice of the 
oppressed, then surely they should do well in Pinlaung Township. 
An intriguing development took place in late 2014, which may perhaps explain the 
support for the PNO in the 2015 election. The Tigyit power plant stopped operations 
in October 2014. There was no official announcement, nor was there any media 
coverage from the newspapers at the time, and therefore it was not known to people 
outside the circle. The villagers knew about it because the factory chimney stopped 
producing toxic smoke. An interview with ten villagers representing three villages 
next to the power plant reaffirmed that there was no official announcement, and they 
had only heard about the stoppage during a meeting with the VTL in early 2015.
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Government policy on the coal power project in 2015 appeared to back the villagers’ 
optimism. In July 2015, the Ministry of Electric Power (MOEP) cancelled the 
280MW Htantabin coal-fired power project near Yangon. In this regard, the then 
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Deputy Minister of MOEP was quoted as saying, ‘We want people to know that the 
environmental and social impacts of greater power projects are guaranteed. We will 
implement such projects in the least social and environmental impactful way.’175  
Later on, before the election, a PNO candidate went to the villages and told the 
villagers to vote for the PNO. The villagers obliged because they felt happy about the 
stoppage.
176 
The PNO candidate won by 85.7% of the vote in the 2015 election and 
successfully became a Member of Parliament (MP). He revealed that, during the 
election campaign, the issue of Tigyit had never come up.
177
 
6.2 The Shadows of the Village Tract Leaders: Re-
establishing the Patron-Client Relations in the Pa-O 
SAZ 
The previous sub-sections have highlighted what the PNO has done for the local 
community in terms of building schools and health centres. However, given that 
resources are limited and accessibility is a concern, who determines which village 
gets what, how, and when? Bearing in mind that, in the Tigyit saga, the villagers only 
found out about the stoppage from their VTLs, does the VTL also have a role to play 
in the allocation of resources? The following cases reveal the extent of the VTLs’ 
influence on major local issues. 
6.2.1 The agony and irony of living next to a power station 
The village concerned was located at the back of the Tigyit power plant, and to 
access the village one needed to pass through the front of the station. The village had 
about 500 villagers, divided into around 95 households. The meeting was with the 
village headman, who was later joined by three villagers. The village headman 
provided a description of the role and capacity of the VTL. 
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The village headman recalled that, when the factory was being built, villagers were 
forced to take a long detour around the construction site in order to get into the 
village. It was only in the last few years that the road was built and they could use the 
direct access route into the village. The villagers dared not complain because there 
were soldiers (Tatmadaw). He added that even the then VTL was afraid: ‘the 
Tadmadaw told him (VTL) to do as he was told’.178 He recalled that, in the old days, 
the VTL was normally the most knowledgeable person in the village tract and 
therefore commanded respect. However, after the PNO became the administrator, the 
VTL was appointed by the PNO, and the current VTL had not been changed for over 
ten years. Given that the current VTL confirmed that he had been in the position for 
fifteen years, by deduction, there had been a change in VTL in 2002, around the 
same time as the Tigyit coal mine and power plant started construction.
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According to the village headman, the relationship between the PNO and the VTL 
was very close. He cited an example in which, during the 2015 election, when the 
PNO asked for a meeting, the VTL told the villagers that everyone had to go. Also, 




However, the irony of the case is that, despite the village being next to the power 
plant, the entire village did not have electricity. The village headman revealed that he 
was scared to talk to the media. He gave a television interview, which was aired,
181 
and the same evening he received a call from the VTL, who told him not to talk to 
the media again, otherwise the village would not receive funding for the schools and 
the road. The village headman ended the meeting by saying that he did not want to 
talk any further because he was applying for electricity for the village and was scared 
that the VTL would find out and stop the application process. 
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6.2.2 Re-examining the patron-client relations at village tract level: 
a tale of two villages 
The ceasefire agreement in 1991 installed the PNA as a stationary bandit. As 
informed by the village headman in the previous section, the choice of VTL was 
changed from electing the one who was most knowledgeable to being appointed by 
the PNO; so, how did this change alter the patron-client relations at the village tract 
level? The following sections examine the patron-client relations between the village 
and the administrator (PNA/PNO) and how this change affected the delivery of 
social infrastructure.  
6.2.2.1 The right to tax 
‘Soldiers come and ask for money; no money, and they take away our harvest’.182  
This was the harsh reality of life in a Pa-O village prior to 1991. For confidentiality 
reasons, this village will simply be called Village M. The interview was conducted at 
the home of the village headman, and he was joined by six other members of the 
village, two men and four women. The village was chosen for an in-depth interview 
because, during the questionnaire exercise conducted earlier in August 2015, the 
participants were very proactive in asking questions, and, on the subject of building 
the road, they were clearly agitated.  
The soldiers to whom the villagers referred to were from everywhere: Tatmadaw, 
sometimes PNA, SNPLO, and even Wa soldiers. The villagers saw the practice as a 
form of taxation. Resentment was strong among villagers because they believed that 
they paid their dues but did not get the protection in return: ‘one group comes and 
then another group’.183 Yet, this scenario was to be expected, given that there was no 
local hegemon and everyone was behaving like a roving bandit. 
The ceasefire agreement between the PNA and the SLORC turned a new chapter for 
the Pa-O, and the change was immediately felt in the village. The villagers recalled 
that, after Special Region 6 was demarcated under the administration of the PNA, no 
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one came to ‘collect tax’ from them.184 However, this did not mean that the 
livelihoods of the villagers improved. These villagers were farmers living on a 
subsistence level. They grew rice, vegetables, fruit, and betel vines, and, like many 
villages in Shan State, some of them also grew opium.
185
 
The villagers in Village M recalled that, at first, they did not grow opium because 
they had heard of the harmful effects of opium on society. However, around 1996, 
they began to grow opium because other villages were also growing it. Pointing 
towards a mountain at a distance from the village, the village headman claimed that 
Wa villages were on the other side of the mountain: ‘The Wa grow opium. […] They 
become rich and they use the money to buy guns. […] We need to buy guns to 
protect ourselves’.186 Other village members nodded in agreement.  
At a time when growing opium was illegal, the practice provided rent-seeking 
opportunities for the local strongmen. Being the sole administrator in Special Region 
6 meant that the PNA enjoyed the monopoly right to collect the ‘opium tax’ from the 
Pa-O people. Despite the political rhetoric of getting rid of opium plantations, the 
decades-long practice of Pa-O farmers growing opium remains under the protection 
of the PNA. The village headman of Village M recalled that the PNA charged the 
village five lakh per annum for the concession to grow opium, which was equivalent 
to around US$400 per annum.
187 
According to the headman, the actual amount the 
PNA charged varied according to the size of the village. At the time of the interview, 
Village M had 84 households made up of around 477 villagers. If a village was 
caught growing opium without paying the proper dues, the PNA would burn down 
the opium plantation and report the incident to the state government in order to claim 
the credit for opium eradication.
188 
At around the turn of the millennium, the opium 
tax was raised to ten lakh for the village. However, Village M had stopped growing 
opium by 2003. The village headman explained that the villagers got scared after 
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hearing stories about opium fields in other villages being attacked by the United Wa 
State Army and the Tatmadaw. 
The practice of collecting opium tax is not a new form of patron-client relations. In 
the colonial days, Pa-O farmers had to pay taxes to their sovereign, the Shan 
sawbwas. However, after the sawbwas surrendered their heredity rights in 1959 and 
various ethnic groups began their armed struggles with the central government, 
stationary bandits became roving bandits, and the conventional patron-client 
relations at different layers of society were destroyed.  
However, the ceasefire agreements reached in 1991 installed the PNA as the sole 
administrator in the region. Despite this, development did not follow automatically 
after peace had returned. The headman of Village M revealed that opium growing is 
ongoing in Pa-O villages. This activity offers rent-seeking opportunities for the PNA. 
However, offering protection is just one form of patron-client relations between the 
PNO/PNA and the villagers; another form materialises in the shape of social 
infrastructure delivery. Indeed, the questionnaire revealed that Pa-O villagers showed 
more desire for building roads, schools, and hospitals than superficial stability. The 
stability is superficial because, even though the PNA and the Tatmadaw have 
stopped fighting, there are still internal conflicts with the PNLO and external 
conflicts with their Shan neighbours. Moreover, when land grabbing is rampant, 
villagers still feel insecure. 
In the following sections, the patron-client relation is re-examined in light of social 
infrastructure delivery. To do this, the development in Village M is compared with a 
nearby village. The crucial difference between the two villages is that one had 
stopped growing opium since 2003 while the other was still paying an ‘opium tax’ to 
the PNA. Would this make any difference to the delivery of social infrastructure?  
6.2.2.2 A tale of two villages 
The two villages in question are close to each other. Village M had a population of 
around 477 villagers, made up of 84 households. In contrast, Village N was much 




M was closer to the main road than Village N. It took about thirty minutes by car to 
reach Village M from the main road. The road was a typical dirt road full of potholes. 
During the rainy season, both villages would become inaccessible by car. Village M 
and Village N shared the dirt road from the main road for about two kilometres, and 
then there was a split in the road to the left for about two kilometres that would lead 
to Village N. Village M would continue from the split in the road for about one 
kilometre. On the day of the visit, there were piles of stones on both sides of the dirt 
road at an interval of about 100 meters all the way from where it left the main road to 
the point where the dirt road split. The way the stones were piled at a regular distance 
suggested that the dirt road was going to be paved.  
For three years, Village M had been asking the PNO, as the administrator of the Pa-O 
SAZ, to speed up development at the village. Specifically, the villagers were asking 
for funding to build a primary school, to build a reservoir, and to pave the dirt road 
so that the villagers could have easier access to the market without being held 
ransom by the weather.
189 
The village headman explained that the villagers had no 
money to pay the VTL, and therefore there was no approval for the school and 
reservoir. When asked to clarify, the village headman said that the VTL needed to 
prepare a proposal on their behalf, and, without offering money to the VTL, the 
proposal did not go very far.
190
 
Similarly, there was no response regarding the road. In March 2015, the villagers 
collected money and prepared to build the road themselves. At this point, a PNO 
Member of Parliament (MP) came to the village and stated that the village could only 
use his men to build the road. He told the villagers that the money was not enough, 
and therefore the money collected by the villagers would be used to buy stone, but 
the villagers had to provide accommodation and food for his workers. The villagers 
had no alternative but to agree. However, it subsequently transpired that the PNO 
was going to build the road for Village N all along. The PNO MP basically took the 
money and resources from Village M to build the road for Village N. Village M, 
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which had started the application to pave the road first, ended up having to pay for 
the stone and provide food and accommodation for the workers, but they would not 
even get the road paved for the remaining part that led to the village. The villagers 
had no more money, and some of them blamed the headman for the result. Some 
villagers also claimed that Village N had bribed the VTL in addition to growing 
opium. In any case, there was prima facie evidence that Village N had received more 
favours from the PNO than Village M.
191 
 
On the day of the visit to Village N, there was a fallen tree about one kilometre from 
the split in the road. The car could not drive through, and therefore everyone had to 
walk for about forty minutes to reach the village. Along the sides of the dirt road, 
there were also piles of stone similar to those before the split in the road, which lent 
credibility to the claim by Village M that a stone road would be paved for Village N. 
The walk to Village N was treacherous. The road was muddy and full of potholes, 
making the journey by foot extremely difficult and dangerous due to the slippery 
surface.
192 
Village N lay deeper in the valley and closer to the mountain. The view of 
the village from the dirt road was blocked by dense trees, as if being deliberately 
hidden from sight. However, once passing the vegetation, the view opened up and 
revealed a great deal of construction work going on. The driver had informed the 
headman of Village N of the visit, and he was therefore expecting the arrival of the 
team. The meeting was held in his house, but, in comparison to the meeting with 
Village M, he was not joined by village members.  
According to the Village N headman, the initiative for paving the dirt road was 
started by Village M. He learned about it when Village M made a request to the VTL, 
and he simply asked the VTL to extend the work to his village. He was not aware 
that Village M would not get the section of the road paved all the way to their village. 
When asked why he thought his village had received preferential treatment on the 
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road, he said he did not know but suggested that perhaps because the village was 
building a primary school and a rural health centre funded by the PNO, which was 
the construction going on at the front of the village. He explained that he had applied 
to the PNO through the VTL in 2014, and work on the two projects had started 
around July 2015, just under nine months from the initial approach to the VTL.
193
 
In this sense, Village N was not just having a paved road paid for; they were also 
getting a primary school and a clinic in a location that was more remote than Village 
M. It could perhaps be argued that since Village N had almost three times the 
number of households than Village M, they would receive a larger allocation of 
resources. However, in rural areas, where it is not uncommon for several villages to 
share facilities such as primary schools and clinics, the location and accessibility 
should carry greater importance than size. Therefore, the preferential treatment of 
Village N requires explanation. 
When asked about why the village was bigger in size despite its remote location, the 
Village N headman was very open about growing opium. He explained that, in the 
late 1990s, the village had tried to replace growing opium with other crops. They had 
tried sugar cane, garlic, sunflowers, and many other crops, but, because they had not 
known the market price and demand for these crops, and no one had given them any 
advice, the crop substitution had not worked. Consequently, the villagers returned to 
growing opium after two or three years. He agreed that the villagers no longer 
needed to pay tax to their rulers, but he admitted that the village had to pay twenty 
lakh to the PNA each year for the concession to grow opium.
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During the discussion, a contradiction revealed itself. According to the Village N 
headman, the only reason why Village M had given up growing opium was because 
their village was more exposed and therefore vulnerable to inspection. After the turn 
of the millennium, there was a drive by the Shan government to eradicate opium 
plantations in the state. In this sense, rewards were given to people who reported the 
locations of opium fields. At that time, every village grew opium. The PNO had to be 
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seen to be following orders and report the destruction of opium fields to the state 
government. For this reason, villages that were close to the main transport route were 
sacrificed, while those that were nearer the mountains were protected. Being close to 
the mountains and hidden among dense forest, Village N was spared. Without the 
benefit of natural protection, Village M was reported a few times and suffered heavy 
fines.  
In other words, the Village N headman implied that Village M was being penalised 
despite paying their opium dues. Therefore, Village M had only stopped growing 
opium after realising that the PNA were not protecting them. However, whether this 
was the real reason why Village M had given up growing opium is irrelevant. This 
alternative view is only recounted in order to offer a balanced perspective. The fact 
remains that Village M has not maintained the same patron-client relation with the 
PNA as Village N.  
Not surprisingly, the Village N headman was full of praise for the PNO. At the time 
of the interview, the general election was in full swing. He said that there had been 
no pressure from the PNO and no vote buying: ‘the PNO has been doing good 
development work; it’s the best party for the village’.195 After the interview, he took 
the team to inspect the construction of the school and clinic. Along the way, all the 
passing villagers greeted him and, from the smile on his face, one could see that he 
was full of pride. 
The two adjacent villages, separated by a dirt road, had their own stories to tell, so 
the only way to verify the stories was to interview the VTL. In this regard, an 
appointment to meet the VTL had previously been arranged by the PDN, the NGO 
that was formed in 2010 under the PNO to oversee local development, and he was 
informed that the main subject of the meeting would be development in the villages. 
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6.2.2.3 Encountering the village tract leader 
The dwelling of the VTL was located just off the main road, about 20 minutes by car 
from the junction that Village M and N deviated from. It was a relatively big 
structure, over two levels. On the ground level, there was a general store and a 
garage, which catered for roadside repairs. The team was led to the second level, 
where the family rooms and the ‘office’ were located. Attention was immediately 
attracted to the sight of four plastic boxes, each about the size of 18”x25”x16”, 
stacked up against the wall at the back of the office.
196 
There was writing on the 
boxes for identification purposes, and there were folded papers inside each box. They 
were ballot boxes, and there were ballots inside the boxes. The VTL obviously 
noticed the observation and quickly explained that they were the early ballots 
collected from people who could not make it to the voting station on the day.
197 
The 
team was seated at the back of the office.  
The VTL revealed that he had held the position since 2006: ‘the government (PNO) 
removed the former one because at that time there was a change in 
administration’.198 The village tract consisted of twenty villages, and the village he 
belonged to had about 650 villagers.
199 
When asked to clarify what he meant by there 
being a change in administration, he said he did not know what the actual change 
was but that the PNO had the right to change the VTL at their discretion. When 
asked about whether he was therefore appointed by the PNO, he said that he was 
voted into the position by the 20 village headmen. However, when further pressed on 
whether there were other candidates available for the 20 village headmen to choose 
from, he said that he was not aware of the situation. It may be true that he was not 
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aware if there had been other candidates, but his side of the story has to be put into 
context of what Village M had claimed, i.e. the villages had no choice, the PNO 
nominated their candidate, and the village headmen simply endorsed him. 
After ascertaining how he had become the VTL, the focus of the interview turned to 
development, and, in particular, how to determine which village would get what 
within his village tract. He explained that if a village wanted to have something built, 
the village headman had to first justify the need and then work out a budget. He (the 
VTL) would then prepare a formal proposal and submit it to the township officer. 
During the explanation, he pointed to a pile of files on his desk, suggesting that they 
were the proposals he was working on. When asked if there was a log to register all 
the proposals that came in, he said it was impossible because there were so many 
requests from the villages. He continued explaining that once the proposal was in the 
hands of the township officer, the latter would check if there would be any donations 
available, and, failing that, if there was sufficient justification for the project, he 
would table it in the meeting for budget proposal at township level. If the size of the 
project was beyond the funding and operational capacity at the township level, the 
case would be transferred to the PNO head office in Hopong.  
Therefore, it would appear that there was a formal system of application and the 
hands of the VTL were tied. However, the system was not without loopholes. The 
first potential flaw in the system would be the absence of a logbook to register all the 
requests that were submitted to the VTL. Without a logbook, there would be no way 
of finding out if all the cases had been presented. From the point of view of the VTL, 
he did not see the necessity for a logbook because there were many unreasonable 
requests, which he could reject off hand. He gave an example of a village sometimes 
wanting to build a school, but there was a school already in a nearby village: ‘the 
villagers just want convenience’. The second potential flaw in the system was in the 
proposal, which was supposed to be prepared by the VTL. It appeared that the VTL 
had total discretion over what to include in the proposal and, not to mention, what his 




With an understanding of how development proposals were dealt with, the meeting 
turned to development in the local area. Perhaps the VTL was informed in advance 
that the meeting would focus on development, as he immediately started talking 
about building roads and schools. He explained that, at the beginning of the year, the 
PNO had allocated funds to build a primary school in Village N and paved the road 
leading to it, and work had started after the rainy season. When asked to clarify that 
the initiatives for building the school and road had not been started by the village, he 
explained that, each year, the PNO had development funds available after meeting 
with the state government. When further pressed on whether the funds were in 
response to the proposals that he helped the villagers make, he simply said he did not 
know, but added that the PNO had a development plan for the whole area, and 
sometimes it was just a coincidence that their plan was the same as the village 
proposal.
200 
Further questions were to be asked about the school and the health centre 
being built at Village N, but the VTL suddenly received a call and ended the meeting 
by saying that the PNO were coming to his office.
201
 
While the meeting with the VTL finished without all the questions answered, it was 
nonetheless helpful on several counts. First, he offered an account of how 
development work was conceived at the village tract level. Bottom-up proposals 
required his input and approval from the township officer, whereas it did not appear 
that he was involved at all in the development plan laid down from the township 
administration. Second, he indirectly confirmed the account of Village N’s headman 
that the village did not initiate the request for building the road and school, but they 
were, in fact, provided for in the PNO grand plan right from the start. Most 
importantly, however, his account strongly suggests that the role of the VTL was to 
serve his immediate master, the PNO, and not the villagers. This point is borne out 
by the fact that the VTL did not prevent the PNO MP holding Village M to ransom, 
even though he knew that the road was going to be paid for under the township 
planning budget. 
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6.2.3 Other traces of the village tract leader 
Apart from playing a pivotal role in submitting proposals to the township officer on 
behalf of villages for social infrastructural funding, where else did the VTLs leave 
their fingerprints? As can be seen in the following sub-sections, the VTLs left their 
marks in some key areas, such as during elections and disputes over land grabbing. 
6.2.3.1 The role of the VTL in the election campaign 
To begin with, since all VTLs were appointed by the PNO, it is logical to assume 
that they were all PNO supporters. This was certainly the view of the advisor to the 
PNO on constitutional affairs.
202 
With this in mind, the following examples show 
how the VTLs helped the PNO during the election campaign of 2015. 
The UPNO was the direct competitor to the PNO in the 2015 election because they 
were the only other Pa-O ethnic political party contesting for seats in the parliament. 
Just before the election, a meeting was held with one of the founders of the party, 
who was also an electoral candidate.
203
 When asked about the challenges he faced in 
the election campaign, he complained that they were contesting on an unequal 
footing. In several village tracts, the PNO used monasteries as the venues to talk to 
villagers, and they could do this because the PNO had been the main patron to the 
monasteries and had a good relationship with the monks. Since most Pa-O are 
Buddhists and pay great respect to the monks, being able to conduct an election 
campaign in a monastery would send a powerful symbolic message that the PNO had 
the support of the religious leaders. However, when the UPNO wanted to use the 
same facilities, they were refused. On one occasion, when a religious leader 
consented to the use of the monastery, the VTL told the villagers not to go because 
he could not guarantee their safety.
204 
 
Telling the villagers not to attend a meeting was just one example of meddling by the 
VTL; the UPNO candidate described an even more alarming example of interference 
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in the party’s election campaign. He explained that the UPNO was originally going 
to contest 15 seats; however, one candidate withdrew due to pressure. The candidate 
and his family were staying with his mother-in-law. One evening, the VTL visited 
the mother-in-law and told her that her son-in-law could not stand for the UPNO or 
his family had to move out. Since he could not afford to move out, he was forced to 
withdraw.  
Apart from direct and indirect meddling in the election campaign, a village headman 
also revealed that, prior to the PNO coming to the village for political campaigning, 
the VTL went to each household to check names against the voter list and collect 
data on anyone who would qualify for advance voting. The VTL also told the 
villagers that they must attend the PNO meeting, which was held in the local 
monastery.
205
 While these activities could be considered as normal and legitimate, 
they nonetheless underline the role of the VTL as the conduit between the PNO and 
the villagers. Indeed, in a meeting with a member of the Central Committee and a 
Director of Operation of the PNO, he confirmed that the mobilisation of villagers in 




While the VTLs worked closely with the PNO on checking the voter list and 
preparing advance voting, they were less co-operative with outsiders. The SNLD also 
wanted to campaign in the villages. When their candidates approached the VTLs for 
the voter lists, which were public documents and should be displayed in a prominent 
place for everyone to inspect, they were refused access.
207 
 
6.2.3.2 Do all village tract leaders work for the PNO? 
The above narratives tend to paint a picture that all VTLs were the pawns of the 
PNO, but were there any examples where a VTL refused to co-operate with the 
stationary bandit? The following case shows what happened to one of these leaders. 
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The father of the youth leader of KRSAN was once a VTL. He recalled how the PNA 
took land from his village tract.
208 
It was around 2002 when the PNO went to his 
village and, in his absence, asked his brother to draw the boundaries of the village 
tract on a map. The PNO officer explained to his brother that the purpose was to 
protect them from the Tatmadaw. His brother did not understand the map, but he 
pointed in a direction of the forest to indicate the boundary of one direction. The 
PNO officer pointed at a contour on the map and told the brother that he was 
referring to the forest and asked him to use a pen to mark the territory. The pen given 
to him was a red felt-tip pen. The brother duly marked the territory, and the officer 
went away. Slightly over a year later, land was seized from the village tract by the 
PNA. The affected villagers went to the VTL and asked him to take up the issue with 
the PNO. He went to the PNO office in Hopong and was shown the map with the 
brother’s marking. Although the marking was obviously not accurate, this was not 
important, since the officer pointed out that the boundary of the village tract only 
went as far as the nearest part not covered by red ink. As it was thick felt-tip applied 
on a scaled map, the area covered by the red ink was substantial, and that was the 
parcel of land being taken away.  
The villagers staged a protest. One night, when most of the villagers were already 
asleep, PNA soldiers broke into the home of the brother, pointed a gun at his head, 
and told him not to cause any more trouble. Faced with a physical threat to his 
family, and resigned to the fact that nothing could be done, the VTL crumbled to the 
pressure and resigned. A new VTL was appointed by the PNO. The new VTL told 
the villagers to stop complaining and, if they wanted to blame someone, to blame it 
on the brother instead of the PNO. He also said that if they stopped complaining, the 
PNO would build roads for them. 
The PYO, a CSO that had been helping villagers on the Tigyit issue, made the point 
very clear on lodging complaints in regard to land grabbing. Among the three ways 
of making a complaint, approaching the VTL was the most ineffective.
209 
The 
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General Secretary of the PNLO, a rival Pa-O armed group, which also reached a 
ceasefire agreement with the regime in 1994 but did not get a demarcated territory, 
perhaps best summarised the dilemma faced by VTLs: ‘the PNO appoint village tract 
heads (leaders). A lot of villagers do not want to be the head in their area because it 
is a difficult job – every time there is trouble they need to stand up.’210  
6.3 Village Tract Leader as the Implementer 
At this juncture, it is necessary to recap what has been revealed so far. In the analysis 
of what the Pa-O people wanted from their leaders, it can be argued that the PNO had 
delivered development in terms of increasing the provisions for education and 
healthcare during its tenure, but its administration was not without contentious issues. 
On the Tigyit coal mine and power plant, it appears that the PNO had kept 
information tightly controlled, and communication was mainly relayed through the 
VTL. From the village next to the power plant, it was learned that the old VTL had 
been replaced by one appointed by the PNO, and the new one warned the villagers 
not to complain if they wanted to have their road and school built. As a result, the 
villagers were too scared to talk to the media because they were hoping to bring 
electricity to their village. Then, there were the two villages next to each other: one 
wanted to have a road paved and had to pay for it by themselves, whereas the other 
village did not even need to ask for it. The procedures for social infrastructure 
requisition were revealed by the VTL, but there was no evidence to suggest that the 
process was fair because the VTL could, to a certain extent, control the input. In 
addition, there was a further question: if the VTL knew the PNO township planning 
had already budgeted for the road, why did he not inform Village M, instead of 
turning a blind eye to the PNO MP who had demanded that the village provide 
accommodation and food for his workers? Therefore, this begs the following 
question: Given that the PNO can now appoint the VTLs, does this mean that, apart 
from the physical threat imposed by the PNA, the VTL is also a tool for the PNO to 
control the villagers?  
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If the VTL is the tool for the PNO to enforce its control over the villagers, two more 
questions need to be addressed. First, why did the PNO choose the VTL and not the 
village headman for the job or simply use its army to take control? This leads us to 
the question of the source of authority, and the administrative system discussed in 
Chapter 3 becomes relevant. Second, if the PNO is using the VTL as the tool to 
control the villagers, can this be proved objectively? Accordingly, the next chapter is 






7   Chapter 7:   
The Role of the Village Tract Leader 
 
After the PNO became the administrator of Special Region 6, they made it their right 
to appoint the VTL. While the village headmen were still being elected by the 
villagers, the VTLs were disconnected from the villagers; instead, they were only 
answerable to their immediate master, the PNO. However, the authority of the VTL 
over the villagers did not only remain but was further underpinned by The Ward or 
Village Tract Administration Law enacted in 2012. Therefore, the VTL, as a position 
in the command chain of control, could be the nexus of power connecting the 
authority made at the macro (state) level to the implementation at the micro (village) 
level. Consequently, the following section sets out to prove that the PNO made use 
of the ‘position’ of the VTL to implement state decisions, even though some of these 
decisions were against the interests of the Pa-O people. In particular, this chapter 
investigates the Tigyit coal mine and power plant, in addition to analysing the effect 
of the forceful implementation of these projects on the appointment of the VTL in 
the township concerned.  
Accordingly, this chapter is divided into three parts. The first part uses hypotheses 
testing to prove that the VTL was the implementer, the tool for the PNO to 
implement social control in the SAZ. The second part contextualises the meaning 
behind the data in the first part. Finally, the chapter revisits the theoretical framework 
of critical political economy and explains how various actors mentioned in this thesis 
were tied into a game of manipulation and exploitation that allowed the regime to 
decentralise authority without losing control. 
7.1 Village Tract Leader as a Tool of Control 
From the perspective of the PNO, one of the meanings of control is the ability to 
implement policies that are against the wishes of the people.
211
 If the VTL is the tool 
for the PNO to control the villagers, then what are the implications of this 
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assumption? First of all, if everything is smooth and works seamlessly, the need for 
the VTL to control the villagers would be minimal. Since the tenure of a VTL was 
not constitutionally defined until after The Ward or Village Tract Administration 
Law was enacted in 2012, the VTL could theoretically hold on to the position until 
he could no longer fulfil his duties, such as when he becomes seriously ill or dies.
212
 
Therefore, on the basis that nothing needs to be changed if the house is in order, then 
one would assume that the VTL would hold onto his position until he is released 
from his duty by the PNO. Conversely, if the service of the VTL is required and he 
fails to get the job done, then one would assume he would be replaced by the PNO, 
and the replacement process would continue until a suitable candidate was recruited.  
7.1.1 Setting the hypotheses 
Putting the above deductions into context so as to be objectively examined, one 
should expect the tenure of the VTL to be stable across all townships within the Pa-O 
SAZ over a long period of time. For the purpose of hypothesis testing, the timeframe 
was set from 1991 to 2015 for the reason that 1991 was the beginning of the PNO 
being recognised as the administrator of the demarcated area, and 2015 was the cut-
off period for this research.  
As revealed in Chapter 6, the Tigyit coal mine and power plant projects in Pinlaung 
Township were started in 2002, which was when land was being confiscated without 
compensation and man-made explosions to prepare land for coal mining began to 
affect villagers. Therefore, this year should mark the turning point when local 
resistance against the projects began to emerge, and theoretically, based on the 
understanding of the role of the VTL, they should have been called into action to 
suppress the resistance. Some VTLs who still felt they were answerable to the 
villagers would not have been able to handle the pressure. In this situation, they 
would either have resigned or been removed. The VTL, whose brother ‘signed’ away 
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a huge plot of land by mistake, is a case in point.
213 
While the practice of land 
grabbing was rampant in the whole Pa-O SAZ, the areas affected were mainly local 
and isolated. In contrast, the Tigyit projects have a direct impact on an immediate 
area within a five-mile radius of the sites, and the indirect effect stretched over 
thirteen miles to Inle Lake (Pa-Oh Youth Organization & Kyoju Action Network, 
2011). Consequently, one should expect the average number of VTLs in the Pinlaung 
Township before 2002 to be in line with the other two townships, but after the 
projects were launched, the resulting resistance would affect the VTL turnover.  
Therefore, there are two tests that need to be implemented. The first test (Test 1) 
aims to verify if a difference did indeed exist in the average number of VTL between 
the period before the Tigyit projects and the average number of VTL after the 
projects were introduced, or, in other words, whether there was a difference in the 
average number of VTLs between the periods 1991–2001 and 2002–2015. The 
second test (Test 2) aims to verify if a difference existed in the average number of 
VTLs among the three townships. 
For the purpose of the first test on the difference between the periods before and after 
the Tigyit projects, a simple test on the means of the number of VTLs in the two 
periods (PrePost) was performed using SPSS. The number of VTLs in the period 
1991–2001 (pre-1991–2001) were compared to the number of VTLs in the period of 
2001–2015 (post-2002–2015). The hypotheses for Test 1 are therefore: 
H0 = There is no difference in the average number of VTLs between the periods 
1991–2001 and 2002–2015 
The alternative hypothesis is therefore: 
H1 = There is a difference in the average number of VTLs between the periods 1991–
2001 and 2002–2015 
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For the second test on whether there was a difference in the average number of VTLs 
among the three townships both before and after the Tigyit projects were introduced, 
the hypotheses are therefore: 
H0 = There is no difference in the mean number of VTLs in all three townships in the 
period 1991–2015 
The alternative hypothesis is therefore: 
H1 = There is a difference in the mean number of VTLs in the three townships in the 
period 1991–2015 
Since the Tigyit projects did not start until 2002, there should not be any difference 
in the average number of VTLs in the three townships in the period 1991–2001; 
hence:  
H2 = There is no difference in the mean number of VTLs in the three townships in the 
period 1991–2001 
H3 = There is a difference in the mean number of VTLs in the three townships in the 
period 1991–2001 
However, when the coal mine and the power plant projects began to break ground in 
2002, land was confiscated and the daily lives of the nearby villagers began to be 
affected. Local resistance began, and the VTL should have been called into action. 
Those who could suppress the resistance would retain their jobs, while those who 
could not stand the pressure or did not deliver the objectives would be removed. 
Therefore, one should expect a difference in the average number of VTLs in the three 
townships beginning to emerge in the period 2002–2015; hence: 
H4 = There is no difference in the mean number of VTLs in the three townships in 
2002–2015 





The following sections outline the data collection methodology, sampling techniques, 
and the type of tests employed for determining the above hypotheses. 
7.1.2 Data collection and sample size 
The Pa-O SAZ consists of three townships, namely Hopong, Hsi Hseng, and 
Pinlaung. According to the classification by the PNO under their administrative 
system, Hopong has 22 village tracts, Hsi Hseng has 19, and Pinlaung has 21.
214
 The 
PNO kept records of all the VTLs in their Hopong office. This investigation aimed to 
cover half of the total number of village tracts. Hence, 11 village tracts were 
randomly selected for Hopong. Similarly, 10 village tracts were selected for Hsi 
Hseng and 11 village tracts were selected for Pinlaung. The random selection process 
was carried out by pre-numbering village tracts for each township from 1 to the total 
number of village tracts in that township; hence, for Hopong, it was from 1 to 22, for 
Hsi Hseng it was from 1 to 19, and for Pinlaung it was from 1 to 21. Using the 
random number generating function in Microsoft Excel, 11 numbers were randomly 
generated for Hopong, 10 numbers were generated for Hsi Hseng, and 11 numbers 
were generated for Pinlaung. Consequently, the village tracts that corresponded to 
the random numbers were selected for data collection.  
Before the ceasefire agreement and the demarcation of Special Region 6 in April 
1991, the village tract system existed in tradition but was dysfunctional in practice 
because the area was like a war zone and people in arms behaved like roving bandits. 
However, after the PNO was installed as the sole administrator in the area and 
development began to take shape, the function of the village tract system returned. 
Hence, in 1991, each village tract had a VTL on the books of the PNO. For the 
purpose of the hypotheses testing, the existing VTL in 1991 was counted as one, with 
a subsequent change in the VTL counting as two, then three, and so on. Likewise, for 
the period of 2002 onwards, the existing VTL was counted as one, and subsequent 
changes were added to this figure. The number of VTLs in each chosen village tract 
for Hopong, Hsi Hseng, and Pinlaung townships are shown in Tables 6, 7, and 8 
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respectively. In one of the village tracts in Hsi Hseng Township, a VTL died during 
his tenure and was replaced. This incident was not counted as a change because the 
appointment of a new VTL was the result of natural causes. 
Table 6: Number of VTLs in Hopong Township, 1991–2015 
Hopong Township 
                No. of Village Tract Leaders 
Village Tract 1991 – 2015   1991 – 2001   2002 – 2015 
1 2 1 2 
2 2 1 2 
3 2 1 2 
4 2 1 2 
5 2 1 2 
6 1 1 1 
7 2 1 2 
8 2 1 2 
9 2 1 2 
10 2 1 2 
11 2 1 2 
Source: PNO 
Table 7: Number of VTLs in Hsi Hseng Township, 1991–2015 
Hsi Hseng Township 
             No. of Village Tract Leaders 
Village Tract 1991 – 2015   1991 - 2001     2002 – 2015 
12 3 2 2 
13 2 2 1 
14 2 1 2 
15 3 3 1 
16 2 1 2 
17 3 2 2 
18 1 1 1 
19 1 1 1 
20 1 1 1 








Table 8: Number of VTLs in Pinlaung Township, 1991–2015 
Pinlaung Township 
             No. of Village Tract Leaders 
Village Tract 1991 - 2015  1991 - 2001      2002 – 2015 
22 4 1 4 
23 2 1 2 
24 3 1 3 
25 2 1 2 
26 4 2 3 
27 3 1 3 
28 3 2 2 
29 3 1 3 
30 3 1 2 
31 1 1 1 
32 4 2 3 
Source: PNO 
7.1.3 Checking to ensure the data is suitable for variance analysis 
Analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA) was used to determine if there are 
differences in the average number of VTLs in the three townships. For the one-way 
ANOVA result to be valid, the data needs to satisfy four conditions. First, the 
dependent variables should be continuous.
215 
Second, the data should come from an 
independent random sample. Moreover, the data should contain no significant 
outliers that could distort the overall picture. Lastly, the data needs to conform to a 
normal distribution.  
The first three conditions can be checked for compliance without any extra statistical 
testing. The analysis looks at two different dependent variables. In the first test, the 
difference between two time periods is checked, and therefore the time periods 
1991–2001 and 2002–2015 are the dependent variables. The second test aims to 
establish if there is a difference in the townships, and therefore the townships are the 
dependent variables. Since the time periods and townships are interval numbers, they 
are deemed to be continuous, and the first condition is satisfied. The number of 
VTLs is the independent variable. Since a VTL belonged to just one village tract and 
could not represent another, the observation is therefore deemed to be independent 
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and the second condition is also satisfied. Finally, since the number of VTLs ranged 
from 1 to 4, with no gap in between, there do not appear to be any outliers. Therefore, 
the first three conditions for using one-way ANOVA have been satisfied.  
The fourth condition requires conformity to a normal distribution. A histogram has 
been plotted by using the plotting function in Excel to show the shape of the 
frequency distribution of the number of changes in the VTLs. As can be seen in 
Figure 17, the resulting shape resembles a bell curve, which indicates that the data 
conforms to a normal distribution; therefore, all the conditions required under 
ANOVA have been satisfied. 
 
Figure 17: Histogram showing the frequency of change in VTLs 
7.1.4 Analysis of Test 1 to determine if there is a difference between 
the two periods 
The objective of Test 1 is to verify if there was indeed a difference in the average 
number of VTLs in the pre-Tigyit period of 1991–2001 when compared to the post-
Tigyit period of 2002–2015. As a recap, the null hypothesis H0 states that there is no 
difference in the average number of VTLs in the two periods, and the alternative 
hypothesis H1 states that there is indeed a difference. A simple means test performed 






















Table 9: Means test results comparing the average number of VTLs, 1991–2001 vs. 2002–2015 
Case Processing Summary 
 
  
          Cases 
 Included    Excluded Total 




64 100.0% 0 0.0% 64 100.0% 
 
        Report 
    NoVTL 
NoVTL1991_2015 
       
PrePost PrePost Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
    1 Pre1991-2001 1.28 32 0.523 
    2 Post2002-2015 1.97 32 0.740 
    Total 1.63 64 0.724 
    











(Combined) 7.562 1 7.562 18.432 0.000 
Within Groups 25.438 62 0.410     
Total 33.000 63       
Based on the number of VTLs in the two periods, there was a statistically significant 
difference between the two periods: pre-1991–2001 (M=1.28, SD=0.53) and post-
2002–2015 (M=1.97, SD=0.74), p = 0.000. Therefore, the null hypothesis that there 
is no difference in the two periods is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis that 
there is indeed a difference is accepted. 
7.1.5 Analysis of Test 2 to determine if there is a difference among 
the townships 
While the objective in Test 1 was to verify if there was a difference in the average 
number of VTLs between the pre-Tigyit period of 1991–2001 and post-Tigyit period 
of 2002–2015, Test 2 aims to test if there was a difference in the average number of 
VTLs among the three townships of Hopong, Hsi Hseng, and Pinlaung. Mindful that 
the Test 1 results confirmed that there was a difference between the period before 
and after the introduction of the projects, Test 2 needs to ascertain the difference 




number of VTLs in the three townships throughout the period under investigation. In 
this regard, the null hypothesis H0 states that there is no difference in the average 
number of VTL among the three townships in 1991–2015, and the alternative 
hypothesis H1 states that there is a difference. Then, the analysis needs to verify if 
there was a difference among the three townships for the period 1991–2001. Hence, 
H2 states there is no difference in the average number of VTLs in the three townships 
during the period 1991–2001, and the alternative H3 states that there is a difference. 
Finally, the analysis examines if there was a difference among the three townships in 
the post-Tigiy period of 2002–2015. Hence H4 states there is no difference in the 
number of VTLs in the three townships during 2002–2015, and the alternative 
hypothesis H5 states that there is indeed a difference.  
The analysis used SPSS to carry out one-way ANOVA to test for the differences. 
However, three townships are being tested, and if there is a difference, ANOVA 
cannot distinguish which township caused the difference. Hence a post-hoc test using 
Fisher LSD was performed to identify the culprit. The result of the SPSS analysis is 
shown in Table 10. 
As can be seen from the results in Table 10, there was a statistically significant 
difference among the townships for the period 1991–2015, as determined by the one-
way ANOVA (F(2,29)=6.316, p=.005). Therefore, the null hypothesis H0, stating 
that there is no difference in the average number of VTLs in the three townships 
during the period 1991–2015, is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis H1, stating 
that there is a difference, is accepted.  
However, hypothesis H2, stating that there is no difference in the average number of 
VTLs in the three townships for the period 1991–2001, cannot be rejected because of 
the one-way ANOVA result (F(2,29) = 2.929, p = 0.069); thus, the alternative 






Table 10: One-way ANOVA and post-hoc LSD results for the differences between the three 
townships 
ANOVA 
  Sum of Squares Df 
Mean 





7.282 2 3.641 6.316 0.005 
Within 
Groups 
16.718 29 0.576     





1.423 2 0.712 2.929 0.069 
Within 
Groups 
7.045 29 0.243     





6.932 2 3.466 10.016 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
10.036 29 0.346     
Total 16.969 31       
       Multiple Comparisons 
LSD 
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 0.257 0.000 0.62 1.67 




For the period 2002–2015, there was a statistically significant difference between the 
three townships, as shown by the one-way ANOVA results (F(2,29) = 10.016, p = 
0.000). Therefore, hypothesis H4, stating that there is no difference in the average 
number of VTLs in the three townships for the period 2002–2015, is rejected, and the 
alternative hypothesis H5, stating there is indeed a difference, should be accepted. 
Since the ANOVA results cannot indicate which township was responsible for the 
difference, a Fisher LSD post hoc test was carried out. The test reveals that, for the 
period 1991–2015, there was no statistically significant difference between Hopong 
and Hsi Hseng (p=0.978), but there was a statistically significant difference between 
Hopong and Pinlaung (p=0.004). Furthermore, the post hoc test indicates that there 
was also a statistically significant difference between Hsi Hseng and Pinlaung 
(p=0.005). Therefore, for the period 1991–2015, Pinlaung was the main cause of the 
difference among the townships. 
As for the period 1991–2001, the post hoc test reveals that there was a statistically 
significant difference between Hopong and Hsi Hseng (p=0.027). However, there 
was no statistically significant difference between Hopong and Pinlaung (p=0.094) or 
between Hsi Hseng and Pinlaung (p=0.532). Therefore, the township that accounted 
for the difference in the period 1991–2001 was Hopong. 
Finally, for the period 2002–2015, the post hoc test reveals that there was no 
statistically significant difference between Hopong and Hsi Hseng (p=0.057). 
However, there was a statistically significant difference between Hopong and 
Pinlaung (p=0.017) and also between Hsi Hseng and Pinlaung (p=0.000). Therefore, 
Pinlaung township was responsible for the difference in the period 2002–2015.  
The post hoc test shows that Pinlaung was responsible for the differences in 1991–
2015 and 2002–2015, whereas Hopong was the main cause for the difference in 
1991–2001. Although Hopong and Pinlaung both caused differences, there is a 
fundamental distinction between the two in that the difference in 1991–2001 was 




and 2002–2015 were caused by the volatility of changing VTLs in Pinlaung. The 
same VTLs held office for the entire period of 1991–2001 in the eleven Hopong 
village tracts (see Table 6), whereas there was a tendency for the VTLs to be 
changed more regularly in Pinlaung during the periods 1991–2015 and 2002–2015.  
The PNO’s head office was based in Hopong, and therefore the township was its 
power centre. The PNO would be able to impose a more direct influence over local 
affairs, thus reducing the reliance on the VTLs to control the villagers. Besides, the 
research is more interested in determining how the PNO dealt with resistance, and 
therefore the following sections mainly focus on explaining the phenomenon in 
Pinlaung. 
7.2 The Eye of the Storm in Pinlaung Township: 
Explaining Tigyit 
After decades of economic mismanagement, Myanmar desperately needs 
development, which, in turn, puts pressure on electricity supply. Yet, the power 
generating capacity of the country in 2015 was no more than 5,000 megawatts, 
supplying to less than 25% of the population.
216 
At a conference with international 
investors in Nay Pyi Taw on 17 May 2016, the Ministry of Electricity and Energy 
highlighted the chronic shortage of the power supply and the challenges faced by the 
country’s power sector. The minister stressed the immediate need to increase the 
country’s power generation capacity.217 Also revealed in the conference was the fact 
that the country only had one coal-fired power plant with a capacity of 120MW 
hooked up to the national grid, which was the Tigyit power plant.
218 
 
While the Tigyit plant is small in terms of capacity, it nonetheless represents 
something more significant than its size. A PNO report prepared by the Institute for 
International Development on development in the Pa-O SAZ clearly states that the 
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objective of the report was to ‘serve as an important reference tool for co-operation 
between Pa-O political leadership and Myanmar State and Union Governments’ 
(Institute of International Development, 2012, p. III). Indeed, the policy of the SAZ 
needs to compliment that of the state, as Presidential Notification 27.2013 
specifically requires the SAZ to ‘promote the development of national economy in 
collaboration with regional organisations and private individuals’.219 In view of the 
shortage in the power supply throughout the country, the Tigyit project was a pilot 
case for the development of untapped coal-fired power and the involvement of 
Chinese investors, Nay Win Tun and other cronies of the state certainly fit the 
requirement of the notification. The Country Report of the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) estimated that Myanmar has 489 million metric tons of coal reserve, but the 
annual production in 2012 was just 764,000 tons.
220 
Thus, the daily yield of 2,000 
tons at the Tigyit coal mine accounted for almost the entire country’s annual 
production (Pa-Oh Youth Organization & Kyoju Action Network, 2011, p. 21). 
Notwithstanding the fact that coal-fired power sources cause pollution, it is still a 
viable alternative to the less than reliable hydro-electric power, which depends 
heavily on rainfall.
221
 In addition, hydro-electricity requires the damming of rivers, 
which inevitably affects water supply downstream and causes similar social 
problems, such as population displacement and land grabbing. Therefore, the Tigyit 
project could offer valuable experience to the central government on how to develop 
this underutilised source of power supply. The experience is not limited to the scope 
of co-operation with international operators and the technology employed to reduce 
pollution, but, more importantly, it also relates to the skill of how to overcome local 
resistance. 
In Chapter 6, it was explained how the VTLs were able to control the allocation of 
resources in the village tract, and their power could be cross-referenced to the 
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embedded power structure even before colonial times (as explained in Chapter 3). 
Moreover, the hypothesis testing performed in the earlier part of this chapter 
demonstrated that, since 2002, the VTL turnover was greater in the Pinlaung 
Township than the other two townships. Therefore, the objective of this section is to 
place all these elements of control into the context of Tigyit and examine the role of 
the VTL in helping to manipulate the villagers in the dispute over the Tigyit issue 
during the 2015 election campaign. The PNO was the only pro-regime ethnic 
political party that retained all its seats in the 2015 election. With stronger voter 
education, more formidable competition, and tighter international monitoring, the 
PNO was not being accused of vote manipulation.
222 
Therefore, how did they 
overcome criticism regarding the Tigyit project in the Pinlaung Township? During 
the investigation, it was discovered that the Tigyit power plant had actually been 
closed for operations since October 2014. For the villagers who were badly affected 
by the pollution coming from the power plant, this must have been very good news. 
Yet, the investigation found out that there was a major cover-up. Why was there a 
cover-up if the news was supposed to be favourable to the PNO and the regime? 
What was the role of the VTL in the cover-up, and how did they help to sway the 
opinion of the villagers towards the PNO? Accordingly, this section is sub-divided 
into three parts. The first part provides the background of the Tigyit project and 
explains why it has been a thorn in side of the relationship between the PNO and the 
people in the Pinlaung Township. The second part reveals the cover-up plot and aims 
to explain why it was necessary and who would benefit from it. Finally, the third 
section looks at the role of the VTL in the cover-up.  
7.2.1 Background to the Tigyit project 
Tigyit village is located in the Pinlaung Township, one of the three townships that 
make up the Pa-O SAZ. The scenic tourism hotspot Inle Lake is located about 13 
miles to the east of the village. It has a population of around 3,000, who are mostly 
Pa-O, but there are also Shan and Taung Yoe living in the Pa-O villages.
223 
The coal 
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mine and the power plant occupy a land area of about 500 acres. Land from five 
villages was forcefully taken away with little or no compensation.
224 
While these 
villages are the most affected villages by the coal mine and power plant, there are 
twenty-five villages with about 12,000 people living within a five-mile radius of 
Tigyit, whose lives are also directly affected by the pollution. The Balu Creek, which 
meanders through Tigyit and nearby villages, is one of the three main streams that 
discharges into Inle Lake. As the coal mine and power plant polluted the stream and 
the water table, Lake Inle has also been severely affected (see Figure 18).
225
 
The Tigyit mine is an open-pit coal mine. Excavation began in 2002, and the initial 
shareholders of the project were the CHMC, Shan Yoma Nagar Company, Mining 
Enterprise No. 3 (ME-3), Eden Company, Special Region (6) Business Group, Shwe 
Than Lwin Company, Eastern Development Company, and A-One Company (Pa-Oh 
Youth Organization & Kyoju Action Network, 2011). CHMC is a Chinese state-
owned company specialising in mining activities in China and abroad. The Eden 
Company is owned by the state crony Chit Khaing, who has strong ties with former 
President Than Shwe and the Tatmadaw. Shan Yoma Nagar is owned by ex-PNA 
General Nay Win Tun, who is the main patron to the PNO. ME-3 is a Myanmar state 
company under the Ministry of Mining. The Special Region (6) Business Group is 
closely related to the PNA and Nay Win Tun. The coal excavated is mainly used to 
support the Tigyit power plant and the Pinpet iron factory about 40 miles away. The 
Pinpet iron factory is operated by the Kanbawza Group, which is owned by Aung Ko 
Win, another state crony with close connections to Maung Aye, the Vice Senior 
General of the SPDC, or the second commander-in-chief of the military regime.  
The location of the Tigyit power plant was hand-picked by Vice Senior General 
Maung Aye in September 2001. The CHMC and the Eden Group were contracted to 
build and operate the plant. Construction started in 2002 and was completed in April 
2005. The power plant has two 60MW turbines that can produce 600 gigawatt hours 
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(Gwh) of electricity. It requires 640,000 tons of coal from the coal mine nearby. 
Water for cooling is pumped from the Balu Creek, one of the three main feeders for 
Inle Lake, causing severe pollution and a drop in water levels. Although the plant is 
linked to the regional grid, the electricity generated is mainly used to support the 
Pinpet iron factory and the Dragon Cement Factory. The latter, located just five miles 
from the power plant, is owned by Nay Win Tun.  
Apart from land confiscation and forced relocation with little or no compensation, 
the coal mine and the power plant have also severely undermined public health in the 
Pinlaung Township. The dust and ash emitted from the mine and power plant have 
been major health hazards, causing skin rashes and respiratory problems. Villagers 
were not knowledgeable and did not know their health was being affected by the 
pollution; in addition, they could not afford to see doctors.
226 
Even the religious 
leader at the Tigyit Monastery suffered as a direct result of the pollution.
227 
Admission data from the Pinlaung Hospital provides an idea of the problem (see 
Table 11).  
Yet, amid all these negative developments, the PNO candidate won his seat in 
Pinlaung Township and became a Member of Parliament (MP). He was only 34 
years old when the election took place and had been a farmer all his life before 
turning to politics.
228 
How did he avoid harsh questioning from the villagers on the 
Tigyit problem? The fact was that he did not have to, given that the issue never came 
up in his election campaign. The power plant was ‘mysteriously’ stopped in October 
2014. He admitted that the villagers at Tigyit believed the power plant had been shut 
down and credited the PNO for solving the problem.
229 
However, little did the 
villagers know at the time of voting that another Chinese operator had signed an 
agreement with the government to run the factory for another 22 years, and the 
power plant restarted in April 2016.
230
 Interestingly, the MP claimed that even he had 
not known that the power plant had changed its operator and would be re-started. 
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However, he believed that he still would have won if the villagers had known this at 
that time. He explained that the Pa-O people would always vote for the PNO, but he 
admitted that he would have to change his campaign strategy if the Tigyit was still an 
issue at that time.
231
 However, the villagers did not think the same; they said in no 
uncertain terms that they would definitely not vote for the PNO had they known the 
power plant was going to be restarted.
232 
So, what really happened between October 
2014 and April 2016?  
 
Figure 18: Location map of the Tigyit coal mine and power plant (Source: (Pa-Oh Youth 
Organization & Kyoju Action Network, 2011)
233
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Table 11: Number of outpatients with pollution-related diseases at Pinlaung Hospital 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Outpatient 534 490 529 697 1406 
      
Disease:      
Acute Respiratory Infection 32 85 48 130 130 
Acute Gastro Enteritis 412 332 404 433 581 
Skin Infection 91 304 225 255 262 
Low Birth Weight 9 15 9 14 8 
  Source: Pinlaung Hospital 
7.2.2 The cover-up and the day of awakening 
If the power plant had stopped operations in October 2014, it should have been good 
news for the local people. However, from the interviews with local stakeholders, 
almost none of them knew the plant had stopped in late 2014. Indeed, a search in the 
electronic versions of the popular English news media, The Myanmar Times and The 
Irrawaddy Magazine, revealed a total absence of news between October 2014 and 
April 2016.
234
 Before reporting on 28 April 2016 that the Tigyit power plant was 
going to be restarted, the previous report by The Myanmar Times was on 15 July 
2013, urging the government to abandon the Tigyit coal mine and power plant.
235 
The report in 2013 is significant because it shows that the newspaper had been 
following the issue and would have reported on the stoppage if that had been the case. 
Indeed, a March 2016 report on the damaging effect of using dirty energy by Project 
Maje stated that the Tigyit power plant was still in operation.
236 
 
In order to determine the full scope of the lack of information about the project 
between October 2014 and April 2016, interviews were conducted with the relevant 
stakeholders between 30 July and 5 August 2017. The number of interviews were not 
pre-determined but were instead guided by the information obtained, and they only 
stopped when the context became saturated. The interviewees covered most 
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stakeholders, which included villagers from different villages near the power plant, 
the village headmen and village tract leaders, representatives of CSOs that were 
following the issue, local environmental activists, the religious leader in the Tigyit 
Monastery, and an MP of the Pinlaung Township. The objectives of the interview 
were to first find out when they began to know the power plant had stopped and 
where they got the information from. Second, questions were also asked about when 
they were told the power plant was going to be restarted, and if they knew that there 
was a change in the operator and were aware of the tender process and requirements 
for the new operator. Finally, the interview aimed to establish the role of the village 
tract leader in the distribution of news to the villagers. The responses from the 
interviewees are summarised in Table 12.  
Table 12: Timeline showing when the stakeholders found out about the stoppage and restart of the 




When stoppage was 
found out 



















Villagers 15 12 3     15 
Village 
Headmen  





2 1  1 1   1  
CSOs 2 2   1   1 
Activists 3   3   2 1 
Religious 
Leader 





1  1     
Total 27 17 10 5 2 20 
It became abundantly clear that none of the interviewees knew about the stoppage 
when it happened in October 2014. Of the 15 villagers interviewed, 10 said they had 
noticed that the factory had stopped emitting smoke, but they had not known the 
reason and they could not remember the exact time when they realised the factory 
was not operating, except that it was around 2015.
237 
Two villagers were told by 
friends, who worked in the factory around April 2015, that some machines in the 
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factory had broken down.
238 
The other three villagers did not know until rumours 
started to surface that the plant was going to restart in 2016.
239 
It also appeared that 
the village headmen were none the wiser. Like their respective villagers, they only 
found out at about the same time.
240 
The people who should have been more aware of 
the situation by virtue of their positions in the administration of the township also did 
not know until a late stage, or so they claimed. One of the VTLs claimed that he 
found out from other villagers in around mid-2015, and the other VTL claimed he 
was told nothing until the early part of 2016, when the news of the imminent restart 
was going to happen.
241
 It was also interesting to learn from the Pinlaung Township 
MP that he knew nothing about the stoppage until he took office in April 2016, but 
perhaps this can be explained from the fact that he had only been a farmer before and 
was not in a position to be informed until after being elected.
242 
However, three local 
activists on the Tigyit issue, two representing Taung Yoe villagers and one 
representing the Shan community in the Pa-O area, also denied any knowledge about 
the stoppage until early April 2016.
243 
Apart from the villagers and the headmen, the 
only other people who knew the plant was stopped in 2015 were two CSOs and the 
religious leader in the Tigyit Monastery, but again, they only knew because of some 
workers in the factory had told them.  
To be sure, at the time when the factory stopped operations in October 2014, there 
was no official announcement from the factory, PNO, nor from any official channel 
both from within the Pa-O SAZ and the Shan State government. There was no media 
coverage on what should have been a significant event in the township, if not 
nationwide. Local activists and CSOs, people who are supposed to be checking on 
every move of the factory, were not informed. Most important of all, the PYO, the 
group that published Poison Clouds in 2011 that had brought the Tigyit issue to the 
public, replied to an email enquiring about the status of the project, confirming that 
there was media silence between October 2014 and February 2016. They, too, 
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believed there had been a cover-up.
244 
All these factors indicate that there had been a 
deliberate effort to stop the news being leaked.  
Interestingly, a report in The Myanmar Times on 1 September 2015 revealed that all 
coal power projects were to be delayed until after the election. The report was not 
referring to Tigyit, but instead pointed at the eleven memorandums of understanding 
signed between the Ministry of Electric Power (MOEP) and various private 
companies since 2010.
245 
Importantly, the report quoted an unnamed MOEP official 
as saying ‘it seems that Union-level authorities would like to keep quiet about coal 
projects as the election is drawing near. So, the projects will be delayed until after the 
election’.246  
The news on changing operator and the plan to restart the factory was equally 
suppressed until April 2016. To many of the interviewees, 28 April 2016 was the day 
of awakening, as it was on this day that the news of a change in the operator of the 
factory was reported in The Myanmar Times.
247
 However, even the report was vague. 
It mentioned another Chinese company as the ‘winner’ of a ‘long-term operation’ on 
22 October 2015, but there was no mention of how the company was selected and 
what criteria were used.
248
 It was also revealed that there would be an upgrading of 
equipment, such as boilers and turbines, to ensure the power plant pollution emission 
would comply with the World Bank’s environmental standards. 
Suspending the project should have been good news to the local people, so why was 
there a blockade on the news until 2016? Interestingly though, the same report in The 
Myanmar Times also claimed that another Chinese company, Wuxi Huagaung 
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Electric Power Engineering (WHEPE), had been appointed, with a view to providing 
an upgrade of the Tigyit power plant. The report mentioned a tender process, but it 
was unclear about how the tender was operated. Who was invited to the tender? 
What were the terms and conditions? Was there any specific technology requirement? 
It was not until seven months later, in November 2016, that The Irrawaddy reported 
that WHEPE had been awarded a 22-year operating license for the Tigyit plant.
249 
There is very little public information on the new Chinese company, other than that it 
was started in 1992.
250 
Then, in October 2016, it was reported that the Tigyit power 
plant had resumed operations, although the Shan State government claimed it was 
only a test run to assess the effectiveness of the upgrade (see Figure 19 for the 
timeline of the Tigyit project).
251 
 
2001 – September Location selected by Vice-Senior General Maung Aye 
2002 – September Work began 
2005 – April Operations began 
2011 – November PYO published Poison Clouds 
2014 – October Operation stopped; no media coverage 
2015 – October WHEPE awarded a 22-year operating licence; no media coverage 
2015 – November General election 
2016 – April First media coverage on change in operator 
2016 – October  Operation recommenced; WHEPE claimed “test-run” 
   Figure 19: Timeline of the Tigyit power plant (Source: Myanmar Times, The Irrawaddy and 
various interviews) 
Apart from the media silence, several questions beg to be answered. First, why was 
production suddenly halted in late 2014 and without much publicity? The problems 
with the project had been widely publicised, especially after the PYO report in 2011, 
so why did it take so long for the government to take any action? Second, if the plant 
had been shut down for operational upgrade, how could production be resumed so 
quickly, i.e. in less than a few months after WHEPE being awarded the operation 
license? Finally, apart from the villagers, who got temporary relief from the daily 
pollution, who were the other beneficiaries in this short recess period? 
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According to a senior executive of the PYO, the temporary stoppage was purely a 
public gimmick ahead of the 2015 election. He explained that the PNO would have 
great difficulty in gathering support if Tigyit was still in production during the 
election period. He went on to explain that the PNO had claimed credit for stopping 
the project and had told the village tract leaders to stop the villagers from 
complaining and to believe in the PNO.
252
 
Putting aside the validity of the claim by the senior PYO operator, could there be any 
other explanation for the questions regarding the timing of the stoppage and why it 
could be restarted in such a short time but under a different operator? Importantly, 
who were the main beneficiaries? Former President Thein Sein had already been in 
office for over three years when the project was put on hold. If his action to suspend 
the equally controversial Myitsone Dam project is of any reference, he could have 
suspended the Tigyit project much earlier.
253 
The Myitsone Dam and Tigyit power 
plant shared many similarities in that both projects resulted in adverse environmental 
and social impacts, with ethnic minorities being the main victims of land loss and 
involuntary displacement. In terms of economic benefits, both projects offered very 
little return to the local area. Only 10% of the electricity generated from the 
Myitsone Dam was for domestic use, with the remaining 90% being destined for 
China. While both the coal and power production at Tigyit were for local use, the 
acid rain and contaminated water table were causing serious pollution to Inle Lake, 
an iconic tourist hotspot. Therefore, if the government was sensitive to large-scale 
environmental and social issues, it would only be reasonable to expect Thein Sein to 
take swift action on Tigyit similar to that of Myitsone and not to wait until late 2014.  
Moreover, if there was any genuine desire to contain the damage to the surrounding 
environment, one would expect the assessment process and the upgrade of 
machineries and methodologies to have taken a longer time. However, the original 
Chinese operator (CNHMC) was simply replaced by another (WHEPE), without any 
transparency or regulatory scrutiny. In fact, none of the English language media that 
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cited the resumption of production reported the change in operator until six months 
after the contract had been awarded to WHEPE. In fact, between October 2015 and 
April 2016, no English language media outlet had published anything relating to this 
significant changeover, which suggests that the regime deliberately kept a tight lid on 
the news. While direct evidence is still lacking to prove a cover-up, the absence of 
transparency and the media silence invite an inevitable connection to the general 
election held on 7 November 2015.  
Taking all this into account, the sudden suspension of operations and the secrecy in 
changing operators (resulting in the resumption of operations), all of which took 
place within a short timeframe of eighteen months and conveniently straddled the 
election period, indicate that the PNO was the ultimate beneficiary in this episode of 
events. Villagers and CSOs operating against the project were given the false hope 
that the operation would be suspended, at least until a solution could be found to 
solve the pollution problem. However, the truth is that production resumed once the 
election was over. Therefore, the suggestion by the senior PYO operator that the 
suspension was really a political gimmick is not without merit.  
7.2.3 The role of the village tract leader in the Tigyit coal mine and 
power plant projects 
The meeting with the Tigyit VTL was unscheduled because none of the interviewees 
in the area, including the religious leader, MP, village headmen, and representatives 
of CSOs, were able to (or they were reluctant to) make the introduction. However, 
informed by a village headman that the VTL owned a general store in the market and 
that he occasionally stationed in the office at the back, the team went to the store on a 
market day and found him there. He was at first surprised by the visit but eventually 
agreed to be interviewed. 
At the time of the meeting, the Tigyit VTL was sixty-six years old. He had been a 
member of the PNO since 1995 and had been the village tract leader for over fifteen 
years. In other words, he took over the position at around the time when the Tigyit 
coal mine and power plant were being launched. In such a position, he presided over 




blunt of villagers’ resistance. Despite this, he held the position uninterrupted for the 
entire period. Therefore, the part he played was of primary interest.  
To defuse the initial unease, a general question about his responsibility as a VTL was 
raised. He explained that his main responsibility was to attend meetings with the 
PNO and sometimes with state government officials, and to make announcements to 
the villagers when there were things to be disclosed. He went on to say that he was 
also responsible for building schools and roads.
254 
After sensing that the tension had 
subsided, the question of whether he had received any complaints from the villagers 
about the coal mine and power plant was raised. He explained that he was aware of 
some people being involved in the ‘movement’ (against the projects), but no one 
went to him to complain. He reiterated that his main responsibility was to get funds 
from the PNO in order to build schools and roads, thus implying that the Tigyit 
problems were none of his business. When pressed on the issue of land grabbing as a 
result of the coal mine and power plant, the expression on his face became uneasy. 
After a moment of thought, he said that he was willing to help the villagers, but he 




Since the VTL claimed that one of his main responsibilities was to make 
announcements to the villagers, he was therefore asked whether he knew about the 
plant stoppage, whether he was informed about the change in the operator and the 
imminent restart, and whether he made any announcement to the villagers. He 
explained that he had only found out about the plant stoppage from some villagers 
around the middle of 2015. He was adamant that he had not known about the power 
factory changing operator in October 2015, and he claimed that he had only known 
about the plant restarting in May or June 2017.  
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 The responsibility for building schools and roads ties in with interviews with other VTLs in other 
areas (see Chapter 6).  
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 The view of the VTL is consistent with that of the PNO. In an interview with the chairman of the 
political party, he explained that there was no record of land ownership at the village level, and 
therefore the claims by the villagers were groundless. Furthermore, he claimed that the lands taken by 




Prima facie, the VTL appears to have played no role in the Tigyit problem. However, 
the words of the Tigyit VTL cannot be taken at face value because parts of his 
narrative defied common sense and contradicted accounts from other highly 
respected people. On the issue of land grabbing, he could not be telling the truth in 
relation to not being sure if the villagers had really lost their land. Under his nose, at 
least two villages had been removed for the coal mine, and three villages near the 
power plant had land confiscated to make way for the factory. This was not 
unoccupied land, and villagers were forcefully displaced.  
Likewise, his claim about no one complaining to him about the projects was simply 
false. Three village headmen representing villagers who had lost their land to the 
projects said they had confronted the VTL but were told that they would be arrested 
if they continued complaining.
256 The village headmen’s account was more credible 
because, out of desperation, they turned to the METTA Development Foundation for 
help. METTA is an NGO formed in 1998 to assist communities in Myanmar to 
overcome the consequences of conflict through self-help initiatives.
257 
The training 
took place in Taunggyi and not Tigyit because they were ‘secretly’ attending 
capacity-building classes in relation to forming a farmer union organised by the 
METTA. The village headmen explained that they had attended the training sessions 
secretly because they were scared of being found out by the VTL and the PNO. The 
training was about their land rights and how to protect those rights. Why would the 
villagers take the risk of secretly joining a capacity-building programme organised 
by METTA if they could seek help from the VTL?  
The village headman of a village located right next to the power plant also tried to 
complain to the VTL, but he could not get anywhere near him because ‘there were 
soldiers’. The village headman explained that many people wanted to complain to the 
VTL, but he asked the PNA to turn those people away. He was clearly scared of the 
VTL. During the 2015 election, the PNO asked for a meeting with the villagers, and 
the VTL told him that every villager had to attend the meeting. When the Tigyit 
Monastery was being built, the PNO asked for volunteer workers, but the VTL told 
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the villagers that they had to volunteer. Towards the end of the interview, the 
headman revealed that he had once given an interview to the media on the power 
plant, and the VTL immediately called him that evening and told him not to talk to 
the media again or his village would not get funding for building its school and road. 
He ended the interview by saying that he did not want to talk too much because the 
village was applying for electricity supply.
258 
 
The supply of electricity also revealed an interesting power dimension. It is ironic 
that the power plant was right on the doorstep of the village, and yet the villagers still 
did not have electricity after over fifteen years of suffering. However, a director of 
WHEPE, the new operator of the power plant, revealed that the company had agreed 
to provide electricity to fourteen villages in the Tigyit village tract as part of the 
appeasement initiative. When asked about why this applied to fourteen and not all 
nineteen villages in the Tigyit village tract, the director said that the decision was 
taken after consultation with the VTL, who informed the company about which 
villages were most affected by the power plant.
259 
Therefore, the VTL knew about 
the plan to provide electricity to fourteen villages, but he chose not to disclose this 
information, presumably because he could then assert maximum leverage on the 
villagers, and, until the news was officially announced, the villagers would not know 
whether they were part of the lucky fourteen villages recommended by the VTL. 
However, the most important question is whether he really had not known that the 
contract for the factory operator had secretly been awarded to another Chinese 
company in October 2015? Whether he had known about the restart of the factory 
and its timing is of little consequence because, if the company signed a 22-year 
agreement with a new operator, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the 
factory was definitely going to be restarted. Keeping in mind that the current 
Pinlaung MP said that he had not had to face challenging questions on Tigyit during 
his election campaign, the award of the contract to the new Chinese operator took 
place in October, one month before the election. If the VTL had known about the 
situation but had not announced it to the people, then it can be argued that he played 
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an important role in helping the PNO MP get elected by suppressing vital 
information that should have been made public. 
Unfortunately, there is no direct evidence to prove that the VTL knowingly withheld 
information about the factory from the public, at least in this particular instance. 
However, while the bullet cannot be found, there was a smoking gun. The religious 
leader of the Tigyit Monastery said that while he had not known the factory was 
going to be restarted until 2017, he said that he had noticed a lot of Chinese people 
coming in 2015 to stay and look at the machines in the factory. They had also visited 
the monastery, and therefore he had good recollection of the incident.
260 
Had the 
VTL also known about the arrival of the Chinese visitors? If he had not known, then 
he would not have been doing his job. Under the Ward or Village Tract 
Administration Law introduced in 2012, Chapter VII, 13(p) stipulates that it is the 
duty of the VTL to inform the relevant parties ‘of the entering and leaving of 
foreigners’, and 13(h) further requires the VTL to report ‘if he finds a suspected 
stranger who does not live in the ward or village and report unusual processes at the 
same time’. In this sense, surely the arrival of the Chinese visitors should have 
triggered the attention of the VTL. If the village headmen had to go to Taunggyi to 
avoid being discovered attending capacity-training classes with METTA, and one 
headman immediately received a call from the VTL telling him not to speak to the 
media again, then it seems that the VTL had a good understanding about what was 
going on in his village tract. He may not have known the full details of the situation, 
but, in his position as VTL, he had a duty to know if there was something going on in 
the factory, in addition to investigating the Chinese visitors and reporting it 
accordingly.  
The incentive for not doing so is clear. It was election time, and the PNO was facing 
strong competition from the NLD and another Pa-O ethnic political party, the UPNO. 
The PNO could not afford to allow the Tigyit issue to affect its election campaign in 
Pinlaung. However, the coal mine and power plant were owned by state cronies, 
including Nay Win Tun, the main patron of the PNO. Therefore, while the signing of 
the new operation agreement in October 2015 may have been deemed inconvenient 
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for the election campaign, the negative impact could be postponed by a cover-up. 
The VTL, being a PNO appointment, would have no choice but to follow the party 
agenda and co-operate in the cover-up.  
7.3 Enforcing Social Control: Village Tract Leader as the 
Implementer  
The key finding of this chapter is confirming the role of the VTL in the PNO’s 
scheme of control in the Pa-O SAZ. From the ANOVA and post hoc tests in the first 
part of the chapter, to the qualitative narratives of the role of the VTL in the Tigyit 
disputes and the 2015 election, this finding supports the claim that the VTLs are the 
implementers through whom the PNO assisted the regime to maintain social control 
at the decentralised zone.  
How could the Tigyit VTL inflict so much fear, and thereby control, over the 
villagers? His ability to call upon the soldiers of the PNA to arrest and turn away 
protestors is one important asset. Moreover, he could determine whether a village 
could get schools, roads, or electricity, which is distributional power. Furthermore, 
the flexibility to withhold important information at will can also be seen as 
withholding power because, by withholding certain information, the VTL could 
apply more leverage on the villagers, as in the case of not announcing that the 
company had already agreed to provide electricity to fourteen villages so that the 
village headmen would not dare to give interviews. 
The remaining issue that needs to be addressed is how control at the village level fits 
into the whole picture of regime survival in the context of the decentralisation of 
authority in a frontier area. Recalling the argument that ceasefire capitalism fails to 
explain how a co-opted warlord could become a state builder, the identification of 
the role of the VTL provides the missing link for how authority is maintained and 
centralised. The illustration in Figure 20 provides the links that hold the state, the 
warlords in the frontier areas, and other state cronies together in an empire of 
exploitation, or what can be seen as the residue of ceasefire capitalism, and through 




Taking the case of Tigyit in Pinlaung Township to illustrate the point, the regime co-
opted ex-PNA General Nay Win Tun by providing generous economic concessions. 
Nay Win Tun, in turn, used his newly-gained financial power to fund the activities of 
the PNA and PNO, who became pro-regime.  
 
Figure 20: How power is manifested from macro to micro levels in Pinlaung Township\ 
This is where ceasefire capitalism ends and the finding of the role of the VTL fills 
the missing link. Authority in the Pa-O SAZ has been decentralised from the state 
and yet maintained because the PNA simply replaced the Tatmadaw in the SAZ, and 
the PNO served as the administrator to determine who should get what, when, and 
how. The country needs development, and development needs basic building blocks, 
such as electricity, cement, iron, and steel. Taking advantage of these opportunities, 
Nay Win Tun started Dragon Cement in Tigit, and another state crony, Aung Ko Win, 
founder of the Kanbawza group, invested in the Pinpet Iron and Steel plant in 
Hopong, both within the territories of the Pa-O SAZ. However, both the cement and 
iron and steel plants need electricity supply. Therefore, in 2002, the Tigyit coal mine 
became operational. Nay Win Tun was also a shareholder in the coal mine. The coal 




which, in turn, provided electricity to the Dragon Cement and Pinpet Iron and Steel 
factories. The coal mine and power plants caused land grabbing, human displacement, 
health issues, and severe environmental damage. Naturally, the locals resisted the 
projects, but their initial efforts were in vein due to a combination of threats from the 
PNA, whose main patron was Nay Win Tun, and the ‘ineffectiveness’ of the VTLs, 
given that they were appointed by the PNO.  
 
‘Ineffectiveness’ takes on two meanings, one of which is that the VTLs did not 
respond to the complaints from the villagers because they sided with the PNO. They 
handled the villagers by leveraging social infrastructure delivery. Villages that fell in 
line would be given preferential access to schools, health centres, and roads. If a 
VTL could not handle the villagers, he would be removed and replaced with 
someone who could do so. The other meaning of ‘ineffectiveness’ is that there was 
nothing the VTL could do, even if he was also a victim or sympathised with the 
villagers. He would simply be removed or faced a similar threat from the PNA. In 
either case, the result is the turnover of VTLs in Pinlaung being significantly higher 
than the other two townships, which reinforces the point that the PNO used the VTLs 
to control the villagers. 
However, the 2015 election was the acid test of whether the PNO was the right agent 
for the regime to control a frontier amid decentralisation. In a relatively free and fair 
election, which was closely monitored by international observers and with better 
voter education, the PNO was the only pro-regime ethnic political party that retained 
all its seats. In Pinlaung Township, the PNO candidate won 82% of the vote. While 
an improvement in the provision of social infrastructure could be one of the 
contributing factors leading to the Pinlaung victory, the cover-up of the Tigyit 
projects also helped to sway opinion in favour of the PNO. The Tigyit VTL, living in 
the eye of the storm, could not claim ignorance of the power plant being restarted 
because there were strangers staying in his village tract, when a secret agreement was 
concluded right before the election. The role of the VTL in the cover-up cannot be 
dismissed. After the election was over and the dust settled, the villagers woke up to 




power plant. In this sense, the temporary closure was only for the convenience of the 
election campaign. 
If there was any illusion that the 2015 election could be a political storm to remove 
injustice and reinstall faith in the political system, then, as far as the regime is 
concerned, it was a perfect storm because, after the storm, all the state cronies are 
still serving the ‘unity’ of the country while enriching themselves. In the Pa-O 
example, it has been demonstrated how state capacity and social control can be 
enhanced even though authority has been decentralised. The key to success is 
completing the triangle of accommodation and linking the state, warlord, and 
implementer in a self-serving political economy. 
This is the sad reality of a political structure under Murdoch’s school of critical 
political economy. Collusion between the political and business elites seek to stall 
any meaningful reform that would undermine their interests, and this political-







8   Chapter 8: 
 Conclusion 
 
The thesis began by examining the challenges faced by the Burmese military regime 
after it seized power in a ruthless suppression of the democracy movement in 1988. 
The country was left isolated by the West, and its financial woes deepened after 
decades of economic mismanagement. Amid the chaos, the regime quickly entered 
into ceasefire talks with various ethnic armed groups. In the process, special regions 
were demarcated and state control was decentralised. Interestingly, the ceasefire 
agreements allowed the ethnic armed groups to keep their weapons, which meant that 
conflict could easily flair up again. This led to the main research question: for a 
regime that lacked capacity and legitimacy to govern, how did it maintain control in 
these traditional conflict hotspots? The thesis looked into the political order in the 
Pa-O SAZ as a case study of the statecraft technique employed by the regime.  
Essentially, the research question ventured into the territories of state-frontier 
relations and warlord politics. However, treating the state as an analytical unit was 
clearly problematic for Myanmar because the regime lacked the capacity to penetrate 
society, regulate the population, extract the resources, and attribute the economic 
windfalls. Therefore, the research turned to Migdal’s state-in-society theoretical 
framework, which sees state-society relations through the lens of the interaction 
between various actors played out in an emerging political complex, or what Migdal 
calls the arena. Within the arena, the rules are fashioned through the mutual 
constitution of the actors involved.  
In explaining why so many developing countries remain weak, Migdal argues that 
such countries lack social control, which undermined state capacity. Social control 
can be observed from the ability to enforce compliance, mobilise participation, and 
provide the ruler with legitimation. In a conflict-laden society, the lack of social 
control inevitably hampers regime survival. To overcome this problem, Migdal 
suggests a three-way accommodation strategy, which he calls the triangle of 




accommodation of strongmen at the middle level, and accommodation of the 
implementer at the local level. The answer to the research question lay within the 
triangle of accommodation. However, the existing literature on Myanmar regime 
survival was missing the final piece of the jigsaw: the accommodation of the 
implementer. Moreover, the process on accommodating the top level of leadership 
and the middle level of strongmen also required clarification. Hence, the thesis 
proceeded to investigate the structure of accommodation at each level and to identify 
the implementer.  
Guided by the state-in-society framework, the thesis adopted the Murdoch school of 
critical political economy as the analytical tool to capture the dynamics of the 
interactions of the political actors in the arena. The difference between the theoretical 
framework and the analytical approach is that Migdal is on a higher level of 
theoretical abstraction, whereas the Murdoch school is more precise in defining the 
empirical tools for investigation. The accommodation strategy suggested by Migdal 
can take many forms, but the Murdoch school suggests zooming in on the political 
economy. In a nutshell, the Murdoch school believes that collusion between the 
political and business elites will resist genuine reform and hinder a country from 
development.  
In using the state-in-society framework, the thesis followed the suggestion of Migdal 
to start the investigation by looking at the environment of the conflict, which was 
outlined in regard to four dimensions in Chapter 2. The first dimension examined the 
basis of self-determination as the source of conflict. The second dimension focused 
on the conflict from the perspective of regime survival and explained how the top 
level of accommodation was achieved by, first, injecting state assets into two private 
companies owned by the military, with current and retired military officers as 
beneficiaries, and second, enacting the 2008 Constitution as added security to 
perpetuate military dominance. The third dimension examined the conflict from the 
perspective of the local strongmen by introducing the concept of a frontier (as against 
a border) and a warlord as a state-builder. This led to a discussion on warlord politics 
and the second level of accommodation of the warlords. The changing role of the 




expected behaviours. The final dimension examined the conflict from the perspective 
of the resistance. Since most Pa-O are farmers, the debate on moral economy and 
rational peasants between Scott and Popkin was revisited in order to inform the 
research about the source of resentment and resistance.  
Through examining the nature of the conflict under the four dimensions, the research 
question was further explained, which paved the way for the investigation of the 
regime survival strategy based on the accommodation of the warlord and the 
implementer, who remained to be identified. The process of investigation was like 
peeling an onion, in that it had to be taken off layer by layer before getting to the 
core, and for this investigation there were three layers. The first layer related to the 
system of administration, followed by a layer containing the players in the system, 
and then a final layer setting the rules of the game. These layers were revealed in 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 respectively. Once these layers had been revealed, the core was 
exposed, which contained information on how control was maintained in the Pa-O 
SAZ and who held the position as the implementer. This information was analysed in 
Chapter 6. 
The objective of providing a background to the transformation of the administration 
system in the country was to extract the components that could withstand change. 
Each society has its own unique ways of preserving values and traditions, which, in 
turn, can inform research on the core fabric that binds society together. Indeed, the 
examination of the system yielded important clues as to who the implementer could 
be. During the colonial period, the British divided the country into Burma Proper and 
the Frontier Areas. Interestingly, while the administrative system in Shan State was 
largely left intact, with the sawbwas remaining the local rulers, the British replaced 
the pu heins, the village tract leaders, with their chosen men. This strongly suggests 
that the British recognised the special position that these village leaders held in rural 
society. For the village tract leader to be the implementer, he would need to satisfy 
two requirements, as suggested by Migdal. First, he would need to be far from the 
sight of the regime; second, he would need to pose no threat to the regime. At this 
stage of the thesis, it could not be determined whether the VTLs fit such descriptions. 




from sight and posed no threat to the regime, which involved identifying the players 
in the Pa-O political system. 
Accordingly, the objective of Chapter 4 was to reveal the key political actors and 
how they interacted in the emerging political complex of the Pa-O SAZ. This 
informed the research on the political contours of the SAZ, particularly who was 
representing the interests of the state and who was on the opposing side of the state. 
The importance of this classification was that it was able to shed light into the 
operational rationale of the second level of accommodation, i.e. why the PNO was 
chosen ahead of other political actors. Constructing the political complex made up of 
political actors also served two important functions: it shielded the VTLs from the 
sight of the regime and created a buffer zone preventing the VTLs from threatening 
the power of the regime, both of which were required conditions for the VTLs being 
considered in the third level of accommodation. 
After explaining the structure of the political complex, Chapter 5 moved on to 
examine the rules of the game in the Pa-O SAZ. The rules of the game were 
conditioned by the political economy constructed by the regime under ceasefire 
capitalism, which is a form of capital production that facilitates state capacity in the 
process of extraction and attribution. While this form of capital production is allowed 
to roam free within the emerging political complex, the condition is that the activities 
must be within the orbit of the regime, or what Woods calls military-state 
centralisation.  
Consequently, in the resulting political economy, the military regime, Nay Win Tun 
(the local warlord who was an ex-PNA general), and the PNO formed a three-way 
patron-client relation to facilitate the extraction of resources and attribute the 
windfalls. Special economic concessions were granted to the companies controlled 
by Nay Win Tun. Part of the profits from these operations was used to finance the 
political activities of the PNO, which, in turn, supported the policies of the regime. 
This is the second level of accommodation in the triangle of accommodation, 




Additionally, the co-optation process pointed to a new divide-and-rule strategy. The 
ceasefire agreements also accommodated other local armed groups, but the economic 
incentives provided were very different from those granted to the PNA. Whereas the 
business concessions granted to Nay Win Tun provided recurrent income, other 
armed groups in the area, such as the PNLO, were only given one-off gains. The 
effect of this policy was that the PNA and the PNO were installed as the local 
hegemon in the Pa-O SAZ, but their power was constantly challenged by other 
groups, therefore indirectly further underpinning the patron-client relations between 
the PNO and the regime. 
Up to this point of the thesis, while the first two levels of accommodation on the 
leadership and warlords had been clarified, the last level of accommodation on the 
implementer remained unanswered. Although there were signs to suggest that the 
VTLs could play the role of implementer, how did they actually execute the 
implementation? Therefore, Chapter 6 scrutinised the social control mechanism at 
the village level. Instead of taking the direct approach by assuming the use of 
coercion, the Pa-O villagers were asked, by means of a questionnaire, what they 
wanted from their leaders. The questionnaire revealed that the villagers generally 
would like to have development in the form of social infrastructure, such as more 
schools, roads, and hospitals. The feedback from the questionnaire informed the 
research to focus the examination on the process of social infrastructure delivery at 
the village level.  
The chapter provided four important findings. First, in terms of satisfying the desire 
of the villagers on social infrastructure development, the PNO have built more 
schools and hospitals. This underpinned the argument by Olson that, as opposed to a 
roving bandit, a stationary bandit has the motivation to provide development. It also 
partially served to explain why Pa-O villagers voted for the PNO in the 2015 
election. Second, the desire for social infrastructure gave the VTL leverage on the 
villagers, i.e. a form of distributional power that delivered the compliance aspect of 
social control and ultimately brought legitimation through the election result. Third, 
the compliance came in the form of a trade-off. In the case of the villagers living next 




(compliance) because they wanted electricity at home (trade-off). This supported 
Popkin’s claim that the farmers are rational actors, while Scott’s proposition that the 
farmers also demanded subsistence ethics and justice could not be rejected. Finally, 
and importantly, the final piece of the jigsaw in the triangle of accommodation fell 
into place. The VTLs were the implementers in the scheme of social control. Since 
the VTLs were appointed by the PNO and, given that the PNO was closely tied with 
the military regime through ceasefire capitalism, the third level of accommodation 
was accomplished.  
The remaining issue was, besides deciphering the narratives of the villagers on the 
role of the VTLs that point to them being the implementers, can this interpretation be 
objectively proven? Therefore, Chapter 7 aimed to test the validity of the claim that 
the VTLs are the implementers. The hypothesis was built on the rationale that if a 
VTL was fulfilling his role in executing social control, and since there was no fixed 
term on his tenure, therefore, one would expect the VTL to be in office until he could 
no longer serve his purpose. There are three townships in the Pa-O SAZ, each with 
its groups of village tracts and VTLs. The Tigyit coalmine and power station owned 
by state cronies have been sources of local grievance. These projects, located in 
Pinlaung Township, were started in 2002, which is the timeline when local resistance 
began to emerge and the service of the VTLs (the implementers) was called into 
operation. By examining the average number of VTLs in a sample size of 50% of the 
total village tracts, it was established that Pinlaung Township experienced a more 
frequent change in VTLs in the period 2002–2015, which coincided with the 
development of the coalmine and power plant.  
However, the PNO won the seat in the Pinlaung Township despite local discontent. 
The villagers still voted for the PNO because the Tigyit power plant had 
conveniently been shut down before the election, giving the villagers the false hope 
that their nightmare had ended. However, it later transpired that there was a major 
cover-up in regard to the power plant stoppage, which began operations again in 
April 2016, barely five months after the election. The fingerprints of the VTLs were 




The Tigyit coalmine and power plant projects provided a vigorous test on the 
implementation of social control. The case illustrated how ceasefire capitalism 
created the political economy in the Pa-O SAZ, which facilitated the extraction and 
attribution of resources in favour of the regime and its cronies. More importantly, the 
case demonstrated how resistance could be managed through the VTLs, who were 
the implementers in the crucial last part of the triangle of accommodation. 
Consequently, even though authority had been decentralised, the regime managed to 
retain control in the Pa-O SAZ because state capacity had been enhanced through the 
proper exercise of social control at the village level. 
8.1 Summary of the Key Findings 
The research question set out to reconcile the claim by Castells that decentralisation 
of authority could undermine regime legitimacy when the locals become less 
dependent on the central government, with the statecraft technique of ceasefire 
capitalism in which a specifically constructed political economy could deliver state-
military centralisation despite decentralisation, as argued by Woods. In her study on 
the political contours after ceasefire initiatives, Callahan employs the concept of the 
emerging political complex to explain various ceasefire outcomes, which include 
total devolution and military occupation in some areas, and co-existence also being 
achieved in other areas. However, both Woods and Callahan do not specify how 
ceasefire capitalism and emerging political complexes actually function at the local 
level. 
Therefore, this research advances the ideas of Callahan and Woods by providing the 
operational mechanisms that link the implementation process from macro to micro 
levels. In doing so, this research engages with the theoretical concept of warlordism 
and provides Olson with fresh evidence that there is indeed a behavioural difference 
between a roving bandit and a stationary bandit, while the transition of the role may 
need external stimuli to kick-start it. Moreover, this research reopened the debate 
between Scott and Popkin on moral economy versus rational peasants and offered an 




8.1.1 The distributional power of the village tract leader 
The Pa-O SAZ lacks development, and therefore the majority of villagers saw 
development simply in terms of more roads, schools, and clinics. The villagers have 
no money to pay for these facilities, nor do they know how to apply for them, and 
therefore the village headman can only rely on the VTL to write a proposal to the 
PNO head office asking for funding. There is no transparency as to what the 
recommendation of the VTL is, what the criteria are, and, indeed, whether the 
proposal is submitted at all. Therefore, the VTL can determine which village can get 
what and when. The distributional power possessed by the VTLs is outside their 
statutory functions and duties as stipulated under Chapter VII of The Ward or Village 
Tract Administration Law 2012. In the past, the patron-client relation was formed 
between the villagers and the VTLs. However, after the PNO became the sole 
administrator of the region, they had it in their power to appoint the VTLs. Therefore, 
the VTLs no longer serve the villagers but are instead answerable to the PNO. 
Consequently, the PNO can make use of the distributional power of the VTL to 
manipulate the villagers in order to achieve social control. 
8.1.2 Village tract leader as the implementer  
Regime survival is a daunting task if there is a lack of state capacity and social 
control. Migdal uses this to explain why so many developing countries remain weak. 
For a strong state to return, the triangle of accommodation has to be in place. Sharing 
power with the elites in the leadership is the top level of accommodation, and co-
opting the strongmen is the second level. However, there is still a missing link in 
relation to finding an implementer to help the state enforce social control, which is 
the third level of accommodation. However, this implementer cannot be anyone. He 
has to be far from sight of the regime so as not to pose a threat to his leadership. In 
the case of the Myanmar military regime, the village tract leaders in the Pa-O SAZ 
were the implementers. They fulfilled the requirements and contributed towards 
enforcing local compliance and participation, and, by taking advantage of the rational 
calculations of the villagers, delivered legitimation to the regime. These are essential 
attributes of social control, which help to expand state capacity and overcome the 




8.1.3 The dynamics in the Pa-O SAZ political economy 
At the heart of Migdal’s state-in-society theoretical framework is the need to 
construct the state-society relations through the interactions of the various actors 
being played out in their specific arenas. Why does the state have to be broken down 
into different arenas, or, in other words, why do we have to unpack the state? The 
answer is that each arena has its own set of rules, and the boundaries of an arena are 
determined by where the local rules cease to apply. However, who determines the 
rules? In a frontier area, such rules are being carved out at the juncture where 
interests collide. Hence, one of the key findings of this research is in mapping the 
relationships of various actors under a political economy setting, thereby re-drawing 
the patron-clients relations with regard to respective interests.  
In the Pa-O SAZ, there were multiple dynamics at work. The co-optation of local 
warlords and binding them to a political economy under ceasefire capitalism is just 
one dimension. Continuous conflicts between the PNO and PNLO due to historical 
reasons and playing into the hands of the regime’s divide-and-rule strategy is another 
dimension. How local resistance was given a breath of fresh air with the help of 
CSOs sponsored by foreign donors represents yet another dimension. Moreover, how 
the PNO responded to the challenge by setting up their own NGO to compete for the 
moral high ground is another evolving dynamic. Although these dynamics are still 
evolving in the Pa-O emerging political complex, with old ones fading out and new 
ones entering the scene, the findings of this thesis provide a template on which to 
build for future studies.  
8.1.4 The learning curve of a stationary bandit 
To assume that all ethnic Pa-O were under pressure to vote for the PNO in the 2015 
election would be misleading. Indeed, the questionnaire indicated that the PNO 
enjoyed an overall 42% grass-root support, compared to just 35% for the NLD (see 
Table 5). The notion that they were ethnic Pa-O, and they would therefore only vote 
for the PNO against the NLD, is logically wrong because, unlike the 2010 election, 




themselves as anti-establishment on their election platform, i.e. as the alternative to 
the PNO. What does this tell us? 
The fact that the PNO received genuine support is because they had improved the 
social infrastructure at the village level, even though which village got what was still 
subjected to the distributional power of the VTLs. The total number of schools in the 
Pa-O SAZ increased by 22% during the period 1991–2015, which was much better 
than the 13% increase in other Pa-O areas and far superior to the Danu SAZ, which 
actually recorded a 6% decline (see Figure 13, Figure 14 and Figure 15). The number 
of station hospitals in the Pa-O SAZ increased from just one in 2001 to three by 2015. 
Likewise, the number of rural health centres and sub-rural health centres increased 
from 6 to 16 and 19 to 79 respectively for the same period (see Figure 16).  
When speaking with CSO representatives or other political parties, such as the 
UPNO, PNLO, and NLD, they were of the opinion that the PNO was as oppressive 
as the military regime, and the PNO/PNA were the main culprits of many social 
issues such as land grabbing and corruption. These types of narrative are expected 
because, after all, they were challenging the authority of the PNO. However, from 
the evidence, it can be argued that the PNO brought development and, to a certain 
extent, order back to the region. After the PNO had reached a ceasefire agreement 
with the SLORC in 1991 and Special Region 6 was demarcated under their sole 
administration, the PNO was effectively turned from a roving bandit into a stationary 
bandit. Therefore, the performance of the PNO provides strong evidence to support 
Olsen’s claim that a stationary bandit will at least care for the local development, as 
it needs to provide incentives for the locals to continue production that can be taxed. 
However, stationary bandits have to evolve with time, and their techniques for 
service delivery need to be able to withstand competition. As a case in point, the 
political climate in Myanmar turned more accommodating after U Thein Sein took 
office. Consequently, there has been a significant growth of NGOs and local CSOs 
taking active roles in promoting local development, building capacity, and providing 
support on social issues. These activities were directly undermining the authority of 




response, the PNO set up a registered NGO in 2011, the PDN, in order to co-ordinate 
international donors with local development. This is an ingenious regulatory 
arbitrage because, under the 2008 Constitution, the PNO, as a registered political 
party, is barred from receiving financial support from overseas donors. Consequently, 
local development initiatives could be wrested away from them by other NGOs and 
CSOs. In turn, this development would curtail the distributional power of the VTLs 
and eventually undermine the effectiveness of the PNO administration. Through the 
PDN, the PNO were able to attract the Nippon Foundation of Japan to build schools 
and repair monasteries, as well as private donors from Singapore to repair the Kakku 
Pagodas, which consisted of over 2,000 stupas.
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 In doing so, the PNO managed to 
resist the challenge from the collaborations between local CSOs and other foreign 
donors, who might have different agendas in mind.
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While it is still early for making any judgement on the success and effectiveness of 
the PDN as a soft power of the PNO, this nonetheless indicates that this stationary 
bandit is willing to learn, adapt, and adjust its strategy, which should be seen as a 
positive development. 
8.1.5 The rational Pa-O peasants 
All the villagers interviewed in this research indicated their desire to see 
development in their villages. Even though the PNO have been accused of working 
closely with the cronies of the state at the expense of the Pa-O, the villagers still 
overwhelmingly voted for them in the 2015 election. The Pa-O voters were not 
without choices; in this sense, they could have voted for the NLD if ethnicity had not 
been their main concern. Even if ethnicity had been a concern, they could still have 
voted for the UPNO, an ethnic Pa-O political party. To have voted for the PNO can 
only be seen as a trade-off in the hope that they would fulfil their part of the deal as a 
stationary bandit, which is to provide a suitable environment to encourage the 
production of capital. The villagers who wanted electricity for their homes, even 
though they were living right next to the power station, are another case in point. 
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They were too scared to talk to the media about the power plant in case of upsetting 
the VTL. This was clearly a trade-off, i.e. silence for electricity.  
Therefore, there is evidence to support Popkin’s argument that peasants are rational 
people. However, this does not imply that Scott’s claims regarding peasants 
demanding subsistence ethics and the maintenance of justice are necessarily invalid. 
Perhaps the Pa-O peasants did not revolt amid injustice and erosion of subsistence 
ethics because there was another channel to express their frustrations. Revolt is 
always the last resort. However, if the local CSOs and other political parties could 
help the villagers to address their concerns, like the PYO helping to make public the 
concerns on Tigyit and the NLD helping villagers to file claims with regard to land 
grabbing, then perhaps the villagers did not need to rely on the last resort. 
8.2 Reflections on the Theoretical Framework and the 
Analytical Tool  
The thesis treated the research question as a problem with frontier governance and 
warlord politics. This led to the state-in-society theoretical framework. However, 
could the research question be viewed differently, and would that lead to a different 
approach and conclusion? 
An alternative view would be to see the situation as a problem of uneven 
development. The divide-and-rule strategy during the colonial period left the Frontier 
Area isolated, and subsequent exploitation ensured the area remained undeveloped. 
Therefore, the re-integration project could be state-driven, and the unit of 
examination could remain at the state level. Under this perspective, the theoretical 
framework would be Marxism, or the neo-Marxist version of dependency.  
A Marxist framework would lead the research to investigating the process of 
exploitation by the owners of the factors of production, the bourgeoisie, on the 
people that provide the hard work, the proletariat. In the case of the Pa-O, the 
bourgeoisie would be the cronies of the state and the co-opted warlords, whereas the 




society to prepare the villagers in a class struggle against the business cronies, and to 
a certain extent may even expose the VTLs as the foremen of the workshop who kept 
the villagers at bay, it would be a theoretical overreach to use the framework to 
explain the PNO election victory in 2015; in this regard, the villagers would surely 
take their chance in a free election to overthrow the PNO, which sided with the 
bourgeoisie. 
Likewise, the dependency framework could illuminate the continuous 
underdevelopment in the Pa-O area, given that the extraction industry was only 
benefiting the cronies, thus leaving the villagers to suffer the consequences. It would 
also explain the collusion between the political and business elites in the exploitation 
of the lack of bargaining power of the ordinary Pa-O. However, going down the 
dependency route by focusing on the system of exchange may not lead to the 
revelation of the changing patron-client relations between the PNO, the VTLs, and 
the villagers. 
In truth, there is no single theoretical framework that can underpin the full dimension 
of the state-society relation in Myanmar. The state and society are evolving 
continuously and mutually constituting each other. A framework that is applicable 
for today may not be relevant in the future. Hence, this thesis is mindful that the 
state-in-society approach may also face criticism.  
Myanmar is a weak state with strong societies. ‘Societies’ is in plural here because 
the Myanmar society is fragmented, segregated by the divide-and-rule policy during 
the colonial period and further torn apart under the Burmanisation initiative put in 
place in the 1960s. Moreover, the conflict contour is not merely the dichotomy 
between the state and the ethnic minorities, or the central against the peripheral, but 
also among the ethnic armed groups themselves. The nationalist-communist divide 
has resulted in a rift between the PNO and PNLO, and conflicts over the control of 
natural resources, the drug business, and trade routes have fuelled internal rivalries. 
One of the reasons why the ceasefire agreements between the government and ethnic 
armed groups did not impose arms abandonment is precisely because the ethnic 




rival armed groups. Therefore, the state-in-society theoretical framework was used to 
capture the interactions of local political dynamics, but it is not without its 
limitations and shortfalls. 
First of all, the state-in-society approach directs the focus away from the state to the 
interactions of social forces. In this research, social forces have been interpreted 
through the cleavages of multiple interest groups colliding in an arena that is founded 
on a political economy platform. The state is therefore represented by different 
organisations and networks with conflicting economic and political interests. It is 
fine to unpack the state, but if it is being dismantled the way it is, how to stitch it 
back together and what would the state look like after being re-assembled? Crucially, 
the state-in-society framework makes no provision for how to re-integrate the state; it 
lacks a system perspective, such as the AGIL framework offered by Parsons (1956), 
for binding the state together.
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Moreover, another problem with the state-in-society framework is how to define the 
boundary of an arena? Is the boundary permeable? How does it interact with other 
arenas? To put this problem into context, the boundary of the Pa-O SAZ arena can be 
viewed from different perspectives, such as from its literal geographical boundaries 
as marked under Special Region 6 that later became the Pa-O SAZ, or it can be 
determined by the legal jurisdiction under the authority of the PNO. However, none 
of these are satisfactory because the Pa-O arena is clearly permeable. There are Pa-O 
villages outside the SAZ that are under different authorities, such as the PNLO or the 
SSA, and there are external forces that can penetrate into the SAZ, such as Chinese 
investments and international NGOs. These external forces also interact with the Pa-
O SAZ, giving it a multilateral dimension. To overcome these problems, the political 
economy that dictates the interactions of the political actors is used to capture the 
dynamics of the cleavages and provide the research with a focus. Without examining 
the interlocking economic interests between the regime, its cronies, and the co-opted 
ex-PNA General and his relationship with the PNO, which, in turn, hand-picked the 
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VTLs who could control resistance from villagers, the 2015 election result in 
Pinlaung Township would lack a meaningful explanation.  
Although using political economy as the analytical tool to examine the cleavages in 
the Pa-O arena overcomes the problem with defining the boundary, this method also 
has its shortcoming. A political economy approach assumes that the interactions are 
based on rational materialistic exchange. In his study of peasant behaviour, Popkin 
argues that peasants are rational people who make calculated decisions based on their 
own interests. It is not in the nature for peasants to rebel, and this decision must 
come from rational calculated considerations. There are always trade-offs between 
what there is to gain and what is to be given up (Popkin, 1979, p. 22). In a way, the 
Tigyit project in Pinlaung Township brought out this trade-off mentality in the 
villagers, given that they did not vote against the PNO because they were hoping to 
have roads and schools built in the village. In a village next to the power plant, the 
villagers did not dare speak to the media because they were hoping to have electricity 
supplied to the village. These are examples of rational trade-offs.  
However, the political economy approach underplays the moral dimension of a 
patron-client relationship, or what Scott (1976, pp. 32-33) terms the moral ethic of 
subsistence. The basic postulation here is that farmers should be entitled to the right 
to subsistence. Any political or business elites who ignore this basic right will suffer 
moral indignation that could fuel revolt. Many Pa-O villagers were living on a 
subsistence level, and they relied on the land to support their basic survival. 
Although they had to pay tax to the Shan sawbwas in the old days, the farmers 
enjoyed protection under well-established patron-client relations. The sawbwas were 
the patrons and the villagers were the clients. However, after the sawbwas 
surrendered their hereditary rights in 1957, and Ne Win’s military coup in 1962 set 
the country on the path to the Burmese Way to Socialism, the traditional patron-
client relation was destroyed. In its place came repeat ransacking by roving bandits, 
which included the Tatmadaw and various ethnic armed groups. Ironically, the 
villagers no longer had to pay tax to the PNO after they became the stationary bandit 




them. Therefore, how can an analysis that is based on rationality required under 
political economy capture the moral dimension of the struggle?  
The thesis is not insensitive to the existence of a moral claim on the right to 
subsistence. Indeed, cases of land grabbing, which equate to farmers losing their 
rights to subsistence, have been reported. However, when the patron-client relation is 
no longer in existence between the VTL and the villagers, then any hope of 
demanding that the ruling elites fulfil a moral obligation is futile. 
8.3 Implications of the Research 
Myanmar has strong societies, but does this necessarily make the state weak? In a 
comparative study of the development of Sierra Leone and Israel, Migdal (1988) 
argues that, within the background of decolonisation, a rapid incorporation of the 
peripheral into the core and the centralisation of resources are prerequisite conditions 
for a strong state to emerge. If these conditions do not exist, accommodation of elites 
becomes the only available survival strategy for the ruling regime.  
Warlord accommodation and elite co-optation are not new statecraft tools, but why 
did this work in the Pa-O SAZ and not in other parts of the country, leading to the 
drastically different outcomes observed by Callahan (2007) in that some areas faced 
total devolution, even military occupation, while others managed co-existence? In 
adapting the triangle of accommodation put forward by Migdal, this thesis argues 
that there is a missing link in ceasefire capitalism. For ceasefire capitalism to work, 
there needs to be an effective agent operating at the local level to ensure that the 
policy laid down at the macro level can be implemented at the micro level. This is 
the role of the implementer. For the regime and the PNO, the implementers have 
been the VTLs. Once the successful formula was found, by which this means the 
completion of the triangle of accommodation, it would be difficult for other parties to 
dislodge the PNO. The UPNO had the moral support of the deprived and 
marginalised Pa-O villagers, but the party was not on a level playing field because it 
did not have any financial support or an army to protect the villagers. More 




through the VTLs. Therefore, the dominance of the PNO in the Pa-O SAZ is 
expected to continue until the playing field is levelled out.  
Granted the immediate implication regarding the political contours for the whole 
country is limited because the PNO were the only pro-regime ethnic political party to 
retain all their seats in the 2015 election, which means that other co-opted political 
parties had failed (e.g. the SNDP). However, the Pa-O experience shows that it can 
be done if a suitable agent is found. Returning to what Migdal claims about the 
prerequisite conditions for a strong state to emerge, the military regime has already 
achieved one of these conditions – the centralisation of resources. In the early 1990s, 
the military government set up two companies, the UMEH and the MEC, to slice up 
the national resources in conjunction with other state cronies. The investments 
include ownerships in banking and finance, jade and precious stones mines, oil and 
gas exploration, tobacco, tourism, deep sea ports, and industrial parks. In other words, 
these two companies have interests in all the key sectors of the Myanmar economy. 
The shares of these two companies are owned by both retired and active generals, 
and therefore it is not a far fetch to suggest that the military and its cronies control 
the economy of the country. Once the military controls the essential resources, then it 
is just a matter of time to learn the trick of making this domination count, and the Pa-
O experiment provides the perfect template for how to translate economic power into 
political power. 
The political transition in Cambodia since the 1980s offers an interesting comparison. 
After the Vietnamese troops withdrew and the country was renamed the State of 
Cambodia, Prime Minister Hun Sen abandoned socialism in order to attract much 
needed foreign investment into the country. However, before the country was opened 
up, important state assets were transferred to companies controlled by the 
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), the only legal political party at that time under the 
leadership of Hun Sen (Hughes, 2003; The Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) of 
Singapore & The United Nations for Training and Research, 1995, p. 34). In the 
1993 election supervised by the United Nations Transitional Authority for Cambodia, 
a coalition government was formed between the UN supported party, the United 




(FUNCINPEC), and the CPP, with 45.5% and 38.2% of the vote respectively. 
However, due to the superior financial resources and control over the economy, the 
CPP overtook FUNCINPEC in the 1998 election, with 41.4% of the vote, and the 
latter dropped to 31.7%. In the 2008 election, the CPP became the strongest political 
party and won outright with 58.1% of the vote. Parallels can be drawn between the 
democratic transition in Cambodia and Myanmar. Although the NLD won a 
landslide victory in the 2015 election at the expense of the regime-backed USDP, 
whether they can introduce political and economic reforms to set the country on a 
firm path to democratic transition is questionable.  
Like the CPP, the military regime in Myanmar own important state assets through 
UMEH and MEC. Together with other cronies of the state, the collusion between the 
political and business elites will prevent any meaningful reforms in removing 
inequalities, providing even distribution of resources in the rural areas, and 
safeguarding minorities’ rights. Indeed, the cover-up on the Tigyit power plant 
during the 2015 election campaign underlines the scale of the collusion between 
politics and business. Despite the NLD winning the election, the interests of the 
existing beneficiaries will not be affected. Sadly, this is exactly what the Murdoch 
school of critical political economy would have foreseen from the outset; it is the 
curse of development that, even when the country is advancing, wealth will still be 
concentrated among the elites, while the deprived will continue to suffer exploitation 
and injustice. If the democratic transition in Cambodia is of any reference, then sadly 
Myanmar may face the same fate, as the military economic domination will favour 
the USDP in future elections. 
To break the development curse and address injustice, the role of civil society needs 
to be further enhanced. This requires the continuous support of foreign donors 
because all local CSOs were funded by Western countries; for example, KRSAN and 
DEMO were funded by the NED, and the PYO was funded by George Soros’s Open 
Society. Among the benefits, such as building capacity, broadening the concept of 
democracy, and consolidating the community, investment into CSOs result in two 
direct positive effects and an additional side effect. First, CSOs help to galvanise 




The publication of the “Poison Clouds” report on the pollution caused by the Tigyit 
projects by the PYO is a case in point. Second, CSOs can invite foreign donors to 
build schools and roads, thereby weakening the distributional power of the PNO. The 
response to the potential diminishing power has triggered the PNO to set up the PDN 
in order to bring in foreign donors to build schools and repair pagodas so as to 
maintain their influence on the locals. This can be seen as healthy competition 
between the PNO and the CSOs because, ultimately, it is the villagers that benefit 
from the additional social infrastructure provision.  
Moreover, there is an added benefit to the increase in CSO activities at the grassroots 
level. In Pa-O villages, where there is lack of opportunities for teenagers, education 
is their only hope of escaping a life as farmers, the same as their parents. However, 
due to language problems, the majority of the Pa-O youth cannot get into good 
universities because they do not score well in entrance examinations, which are in 
Burmese. Some young people go to Chiang Mai, where there is a large Burmese 
population, looking for jobs. There, they encounter the American Consulate, where 
English classes are offered. They learn English and begin to receive knowledge about 
Western values based on human rights and democracy. They take capacity building 
classes, and they learn how to organise events, how to build teamwork, and how to 
promote their ideas. The youth leaders of KRSAN, DEMO, and PYO all went 
through such training. Indeed, the PYO set up its first base in Chiang Mai, and only 
when the political climate became more liberal did they set up offices in Taunggyi. 
KRSAN, DEMO, and PYO all receive funding from American sources. These youth 
leaders are frequently invited to attend overseas training programmes; for example, 
the youth leader of DEMO was invited to New York in October 2014 for three weeks 
to attend capacity-training classes, and the youth leader of KRSAN received a 
scholarship to study in New Zealand for four months in 2015. These youth leaders 
become role models for other Pa-O youths. Thus, organising civil society and 




8.4 Scope for Further Research 
This thesis has identified the VTL as the crucial link in the control process between 
warlord accommodation at the macro level and manipulation of villagers at the micro 
level. However, since the research was only conducted in the Pa-O SAZ, the 
conclusion will inevitably invite criticism in relation to its idiosyncratic implication. 
Therefore, it needs to be broadened, through the use of comparative study, to other 
regions in the country. Since the organisation of Pa-O villages is similar to their 
immediate neighbours, the villages in Shan State, a comparative study can therefore 
be performed between the PNO and their counterpart, the SNDP, who is considered a 
pro-regime political party. In the 2015 election, they lost all their three seats in the 
House of Nationalities and eighteen seats in the House of Representatives. They only 
managed to hold on to one seat in the State and Regional Hluttaws, where they 
previously had 31 seats. Their seats were mainly taken over by the SNLD and NLD, 
which are anti-establishment parties. If the hypothesis is valid that electoral success 
depends on the ability to control the VTL, then the SNDP defeat should be able to be 
explained by their inability to control the VTLs. 
Another issue that is worth further examination is the question of whether the 
hegemonic position of the PNO is beyond challenge. The state-in-society approach 
enables the research to focus on the process of power construction at the local level. 
It leads the research to identify the VTLs as the implementers, through whom the 
PNO controls the villagers. However, can this process be altered by changing power 
dynamics in the future? Given that the PNO is the sole administrator of the Pa-O 
SAZ by right after the 2015 election, and considering that they can exercise a 
considerable amount of distributional power on social infrastructure delivery, which, 
in turn, can reinforce support based on a well-entrenched political economy, what 
can be done to enforce checks and balances and bring justice to the SAZ? Even 
though the domination of the PNO appears to be solid, there are ripples in the 
political contours brought about by the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) 
signed in October 2015. As a parting legacy, former President Thein Sein was 
instrumental in renewing the ceasefire commitment of eight ethnic armed groups, of 




two-fold. First, in contrast with the previous agreements, which were not signed and 
lacked transparency, this one was written in black and white with witnesses and amid 
international attention. Second, after signing the NCA, the PNLO have become a 
legal entity. As such, the PNLO can conduct normal business, same as the PNO. 
More importantly, they can start taking foreign donations to bring much needed 
development to the villages outside of the PNO jurisdiction. Effectively, the PNLO 
could potentially challenge the authority of the PNO. At the time of writing, the 
PNLO have not set up a political wing, so they remain an armed group. However, 
there have been suggestions that they could either form a political party or work 
closely with the UPNO, which lost the election to the PNO in 2015.
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Together with 
the rapid development in civil education through CSOs, a combined effort by the 
UPNO and the PNLO could potentially pose a serious challenge to the PNO. 
Furthermore, the significance of the state-in-society approach is that it lays out the 
process through which state and society engage with one another and how control 
and resistance are being played out, which result in the current political situation. 
The approach is not to be used as a prediction of political outcomes; instead, it serves 
to highlight the different pathways of political transformation, thereby providing 
policy implications that shape socio-economic dynamics. Importantly, within the Pa-
O emerging political complex, where different political actors are vying for influence 
and control, the dominance of the PNO in the Pa-O SAZ is far from a foregone 
conclusion. Rather, as suggested in the findings, reducing the reliance on the PNO 
for social infrastructure delivery by courting CSOs and overseas donors could 
mitigate PNO dominance in a positive way. 
On a theoretical level, a question has to be asked in relation to whether the concept of 
moral economy can co-exist with warlord accommodation under ceasefire capitalism. 
This is to revisit the Scott-Popkin debate, but with revised concepts on subsistence, 
justice, reciprocity, and community resistance based on 21
st
 century settings. 
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8.5 Is a Stationary Bandit Capable of Instilling a Moral 
Economy? 
In this research, I have been privileged to be able to talk to a unique community of 
Pa-O people from different walks of life; some were leaders of political parties, some 
were still taking active roles in ethnic armed groups, while others were political 
activists, businessmen, religious leaders, civil society activists, village tract leaders, 
village headmen, and ordinary villagers. Whatever was dividing them, there was a 
consensus among them that the area needs development. At the same time, they also 
recognised that development could not take hold if there was no peace. Therefore, 
the ordinary Pa-O were hoping that peace and stability would return when the PNO 
became a stationary bandit after reaching a ceasefire agreement with the regime in 
1991. However, the resulting political economy that emerged from the collusion 
between the regime and warlords-turned-businessmen has merely continued 
previously exploitative practices. Crucially, the political economy has destroyed the 
traditional patron-client relations between the villagers and those in possession of 
power, i.e. the PNO and their agents at the village tract level, the VTLs. When the 
ethics of the moral economy was broken, resistance inevitably surfaced.  
From a state-building perspective, one way of incorporating a frontier area into the 
core is through development.
 
However, development has its price in the shape of 
inequality, injustice, and exploitation. The problem is intrinsic and systemic, and any 
promise that everyone will eventually benefit is just a fallacy. Therefore, the question 
is not how to solve the problem of development, but how to minimise the negative 
fallout.  
In a political economy that is constructed through collusion between the political and 
business elites, the chance of getting justice and equality may seem remote. Despite 
this, there is a glimpse of hope that the arrival of CSOs, which create competition for 
the PNO with regard to social infrastructure delivery, may just accelerate the learning 
curve of the stationary bandit, which may include re-establishing a new patron-client 
relation based not just on providing the bare ethics of subsistence, but by offering 




Appendix 1: Interview Introduction Brief 
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed by me today.  
My name is Ricky Yue. I am a PhD student at the University of Bath in England. I 
am working on my PhD thesis, which studies the politics in Myanmar. For this 
research, I need to interview political party leaders, political activists, local 
community leaders, government and non-government organisation representatives, 
civil society organisation representatives, and ordinary citizens, hence the interview 
today. My translator is a student at my previous university in Hong Kong. 
The objective of the research is to study the state-society relations in Myanmar, and 
in particular how state authority can be manifested at the local level where the 
resistance took place. The interview will be divided into two parts. The first part asks 
for your background, which includes your ethnicity, religious beliefs, and 
occupation. For this part of the interview, the information provided will be written 
down on a piece of paper, which is separated from the second part of the interview. 
The purpose of writing down the information on a separate file is to reduce the risk 
of exposing your identity, which is kept confidential at all times. The second part of 
the interview covers your understanding and experience of the state-society relations. 
With your permission, in addition to taking notes, this part of the interview will be 
audio-recorded to allow me to listen to it again afterwards in order to ensure that I 
have not misunderstood or omitted any points you have raised. After the research is 
finished, all records will be permanently destroyed.  
At any stage of the interview, you may ask me questions if you do not understand. 
You do not need to answer any question that you do not feel comfortable with, and 
you may stop the interview at any time.  




Appendix 2: Semi-Structured Interview Question List  
This is the second part of the interview, and I shall turn on the audio recording. There 
are six main areas that I want your views on: 
- Who are the major political actors in the Pa-O SAZ? 
What power do they have? 
Where does their power come from? 
What are their relationships? 
How influential are these political actors? Can you give me examples? 
 
- How is law and order being maintained in the SAZ? 
Are there police? 
Are the Tatmadaw involved? 
Are the PNA involved? 
Are there any traditions that people need to follow? 
 
- Do you think there is justice in the current political arrangement? 
How are disputes settled? 
Who has the final say? 
Are there any traditions that you need to observe? 
 
- What is your view on self-determination? 
Do you think self-determination has been achieved after forming the SAZ? 
What has improved? 
What has got worse? 
 
- How do you see development in the SAZ? 
What do you expect from development? 
Who is responsible for development? 
What benefits has development brought to the community? 





- What do you think of the 2010 and 2015 elections? 
Do you think the election in 2015 was fair? 





Appendix 3: The Three Waves of Ceasefire Agreements 
from 1989 to 1995 
 
Period Name of armed group Date Demarcated Area 
First 
Wave 
Myanmar National Democracy 
Alliance Army (Kokang) (MNDAA) 
21-Mar-89 Special Region 1, 
Northern Shan State 
United Wa State Army (UWSA) 9-May-89 Special Region 2, 
Shan State 
National Democratic Alliance Army 
(Shan/Akha) (NDAA) 
30-Jun-89 Special Region 4, 
Eastern Shan State 
Shan State Army (SSA) 2-Sep-89 Special Region 3, 
Shan State 
New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-
K) 
15-Dec-89 Special Region 5, 
Northern Shan State 
Second 
Wave 
Kachin Defence Army (KDA) 13-Jan-91 Special Region 5, 
Northern Shan State 
Pa-O National Organisation (PNO) 11-Apr-91 Special Region 6, 
Southern Shan State 
Palaung State Liberation Army (PSLA) 21-Apr-91 Special Region 7, 
Northern Shan State 
Kayan National Guard (KNG) 27-Feb-92 Special Region 1, 
Kayah State 
Kachin Independence Organisation 
(KIO) 




Karenni State Nationalities Peoples' 
Liberation Front (KNPLF) 
9-May-94 
Special Region 2, 
Kayah State 
Kayan New Land Party (KNLP) 26-Jul-94 
Special Region 3, 
Kayah State 
Shan State Nationalities Peoples' 
Liberation Organisation (SSNPLO) 
9-Oct-94 N/A 
Shan State National Army (SSNA) End of 1995 N/A 
New Mon State Party (NMSP) 29-Jun-95 N/A 






Appendix 4: Questionnaire 
 
Questionnaire 
(All personal information will be kept confidential) 
 
Date:    ________________________  Time:  ___________________ 
 
Male/Female (delete one)     Age:  _______ 
 
Ethnicity:  Pa-O / Shan / Bamar / Wa / Chinese / Other (please specify)  
___________________  
 




_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
_ _ _ _ _ _  
 
 
1) Are you a member of any political party?       Yes / No  
(if Yes, ________________) 
 
2) Did you vote in the 2010 election?    Yes / No 
 
3) Which political party did you vote for?    
 
USDP    
     NLD    
     PNO    
     PNLO    
     UPNO      
     SNLD      
     SNDP    
     Other (please specify) ____________________ 
 
4) Which political party will you vote for in 2015?  
 
USDP   
     NLD   
     PNO   
     PNLO   
     UPNO   
     SNLD   
     SNDP   





5) Which political party do you not trust? (you can tick more than 1 box) Why? 
USDP    _______________________________________ 
NLD    _______________________________________ 
PNO    _______________________________________ 
PNLO    _______________________________________ 
UPNO    _______________________________________ 
SNDP    _______________________________________ 
SNLD    _______________________________________ 
Other (please specify)    _______________________________________ 
 
6) What do you expect from the political party? (you can tick more than 1 box)  
a) Build more schools       
b) Build more hospitals         
c) Build more roads       
d) Provide more job opportunities     
e) Improve living standards      
f) Maintain peace       
g) Protect ethnic rights       
h) Promote equality       
i) Protect the environment      
j) Push for democracy       
k) Push for development       
l) Push for change in the Constitution     
m) Other (please specify) 
 _______________________________________________________ 
  ______________________________________________  
7) How to you rate the importance of the following objectives? (1 to 5; 5 = most 
important) 
a) Build more schools      1  2  3  4  5  
b) Build more hospitals      1  2  3  4  5  
c) Build more roads      1  2  3  4  5 
d) Provide more job opportunities    1  2  3  4  5 
e) Improve living standards     1  2  3  4  5 
f) Maintain peace      1  2  3  4  5 
g) Protect ethnic rights      1  2  3  4  5 
h) Promote equality      1  2  3  4  5 
i) Protect the environment     1  2  3  4  5 
j) Push for democracy      1  2  3  4  5 
k) Push for development      1  2  3  4  5 






8) Do you trust the following political parties? 
USDP   Yes / No 
   NLD   Yes / No 
   PNO   Yes / No 
   PNLO   Yes / No 
   UPNO   Yes / No 
 SNDP   Yes / No 
 SNLD   Yes / No 
 
9) Do you trust the current government in terms of: 
a) Maintaining peace in the region?  Yes / No 
b) Protecting ethnic rights?   Yes / No 
c) Providing development?   Yes / No 
d) Ensuring equality?    Yes / No 
e) Promoting democracy?   Yes / No 
 
10) Do you trust USDP in terms of: 
a) Promoting peace in the region?  Yes / No 
b) Protecting ethnic rights?   Yes / No 
c) Providing development?   Yes / No 
d) Ensuring equality?    Yes / No 
e) Promoting democracy?   Yes / No 
 
11) Do you trust NLD in terms of: 
a) Promoting peace in the region?  Yes / No 
b) Protecting ethnic rights?   Yes / No 
c) Providing development?   Yes / No 
d) Ensuring equality?    Yes / No 
e) Promoting democracy?   Yes / No 
 
12) Do you trust Aung San Suu Kyi in terms of: 
a) Promoting peace in the region?  Yes / No 
b) Protecting ethnic rights?   Yes / No 
c) Providing development?   Yes / No 
d) Ensuring equality?    Yes / No 
e) Promoting democracy?   Yes / No 
 
13) Do you trust PNO in terms of: 
a) Promoting peace in the region?  Yes / No 
b) Protecting ethnic rights?   Yes / No 
c) Providing development?   Yes / No 
d) Ensuring equality?    Yes / No 








14) Do you trust PNLO in terms of: 
a) Promoting peace in the region?  Yes / No 
b) Protecting ethnic rights?   Yes / No 
c) Providing development?   Yes / No 
d) Ensuring equality?    Yes / No 
e) Promoting democracy?   Yes / No 
 
15) Do you trust UPNO in terms of: 
a) Promoting peace in the region?  Yes / No 
b) Protecting ethnic rights?   Yes / No 
c) Providing development?   Yes / No 
d) Ensuring equality?    Yes / No 
e) Promoting democracy ?   Yes / No 
 
16) Do you trust SNDP in terms of: 
a) Promoting peace in the region?  Yes / No 
b) Protecting ethnic rights?   Yes / No 
c) Providing development?   Yes / No 
d) Ensuring equality?    Yes / No 
e) Promoting democracy ?   Yes / No 
 
17) Do you trust SNLD in terms of: 
a) Promoting peace in the region?  Yes / No 
b) Protecting ethnic rights?   Yes / No 
c) Providing development?   Yes / No 
d) Ensuring equality?    Yes / No 
e) Promoting democracy ?   Yes / No 
 
18) Do you think corruption is getting better now than: 
a)  Before 2012?    Yes / No / Same 
b)  Before 2010?    Yes / No / Same 
c)  Before 2008?    Yes / No / Same 
d)  Before 1988?    Yes / No / Same 
 
19) Do you think the rule of law is better now than: 
a)  Before 2012?    Yes / No / Same 
b)  Before 2010?    Yes / No / Same 
c)  Before 2008?    Yes / No / Same 
d)  Before 1988?    Yes / No / Same 
 
20) Do you think the area is more stable now than: 
a)  Before 2012?     Yes / No / Same 
b)  Before 2010?     Yes / No / Same 
c)  Before 2008?     Yes / No / Same 





21) Do you think the country is more stable now than: 
a)   Before 2012?     Yes / No / Same 
b)  Before 2010?     Yes / No / Same 
c)  Before 2008?     Yes / No / Same 
d)  Before 1988?     Yes / No / Same 
 
22) Are you happier now than: 
a)  Before 2012?    Yes / No / Same 
b)  Before 2010?    Yes / No / Same 
c)  Before 2008?    Yes / No / Same 
d)  Before 1988?    Yes / No / Same 
 
23) What do you think of Chinese investment in the area? 
a)  It is good for the area’s development Yes / No / No comment 
b)  It creates job opportunities   Yes / No / No comment 
c)  It is welcomed    Yes / No / No comment 
d)  It causes pollution    Yes / No / No comment 
e)  It causes land grabbing   Yes / No / No comment 
f)  It causes corruption    Yes / No / No comment 
g)  It causes social problems   Yes / No / No comment 
 
24) Do you think other countries’ investment is better than Chinese investment? 
Yes / No / No comment 
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